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

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Juan Goytisolo

Death of the Leader

November 25, 1975

There are certain events that are awaited for such a long time that when they finally occur they seem unreal. For years and years, since the time I was first a university student, I have waited, like millions of my compatriots, for this day, the day *par excellence* that would divide—a little like the birth of Jesus in the egocentric perspective of Christianity—my life, our life, into two eras: Before and After; Limbo and Heaven; Fall From Grace and Redemption.

I'm not a man particularly given to bitter grudges. I honestly believe that hatred does not figure in the list of my faults and character defects. I have, throughout my life, tried to prevent the moral or ideological conflicts inherent in my participation in Spanish cultural affairs from degenerating into personal battles. When the opposite has occurred, in the rare cases of enmity I can remember, my ability to forget has always been stronger than my anger.

How then can I explain the tenacity of my hatred concerning *him*? All through the long, unrealistic agony of these past weeks—while he was being cruelly tortured by a sort of compensatory medical justice for the historic and moral injustice that allowed him to die of old age in bed—this emotion never left me: I felt no touch of pity in reading the medical bulletins, objectively monstrous, of the latest horrible afflictions that, day after day, were officially revealed by his group of physicians that seemed to grow in direct proportion to his number of ailments.

I won't trace now the bloody history of his rise to power, nor the repressive methods that helped him hold onto it during the span of 39 years: the well-known 1 million dead in the Civil War; the hundreds of thousands of prisoners and victims of executions during the postwar era; the exile of another million Spaniards, among them the most distinguished personalities of the Spanish cultural world, from Picasso to Casals, from Amèrico Castro to Jorge Guillén, from Buñuel to Luis Cernuda. Nor will I refer to the somewhat paradoxical yet predictable causes of the economic changes that took place under his rule and at a severe price.

The rigid military suppression of the working class and the incredible oppression of the peasantry resulted in a process that transformed the country into a modern industrial society during the decade of the '60s. This reality, which ironically was feared and fought against by his own claque, given their preference for a traditional and static Spain, forced those who had not died to witness the apotheosis of values, which neither the Protestant Reformation nor the Age of Enlightenment nor the Industrial Revolution had managed to impose on our land. The chain of transformations included: the annual peaceful invasion of 30 million tourists; the mass migration of labor to Europe's Common Market countries; the rise of foreign investments, mainly North American; the accelerated industrialization of the country; the end of an old-fashioned agrarian economy.

There was a growing imbalance between this modern dynamic society and an archaic political superstructure. The former was quietly undermining the latter by its very obvious and ostentatious success. He was the executioner—and at the same time the involuntary creator—of modern Spain. But it is up to the historians, not to me, to determine his true role during the last 40 years—preferably, without indulging in either the lies of official hagiography nor in the distortions of the alternative black legend.

At the hour of his death, I would rather dwell on what his existence has meant to those of us who were children during the Civil War—today men and women—condemned to the bizarre situation of growing old without ever having known, because of him, either youth or responsibility.

The distinctive characteristic of the time in which we grew up was perhaps this: the impossibility of

(continued on page 210)

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

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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

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

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Michael Harrington

How to Reshape America's Economy

The following summary of socialist ideas for reshaping the American economy is taken from testimony that Michael Harrington, chairman of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, gave before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress last November. Harrington began with a discussion of the Hawkins-Humphrey bill (the Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Act of 1975):

The basic presuppositions of the bill before us assert a fundamental—to my mind, erroneous—Keynesian principle: that the private corporate infrastructure of the American economy is sound, so that the role of government is to supplement and facilitate its decisions with regard to what investments should be made, what kinds of jobs should be created, and how the benefits of this process are to be distributed.

My rejection of this thesis is not the unique consequence of a socialist analysis, though it is shaped by such an analysis. In a just published book, *The New American Ideology*, Professor George C. Lodge of the Harvard Business School asserts similar criticisms of the Lockean assumptions about the American political economy, including our faith in a benign providence that somehow is thought to have created an economic universe in which private greeds interact to achieve a public good.

This faith is not merely a matter of conservative orthodoxy. In May 1967, for instance, Gardner Ackley, a leading spokesperson of the liberal point of view, said:

> If one were to examine all of the thousands of decisions made daily by the managers of the modern corporations, I think he would be struck by the relatively small number in which significant questions of conflict between public and private interest arise. In the vast majority of these decisions, businessmen need not explicitly consider the "public interest"; nor does government have reason for concern. What sources of material are cheapest, what product sells best, which production method is most efficient—these are questions to which answers that maximize private profit in most cases also maximize public welfare.

A similar, if unformulated, view underlies the Hawkins-Humphrey bill. Before turning to its specifics, some basic criticisms of this proposition are in order.

It is simply not true, certainly in terms of our recent experience, that answers that maximize private profit in most cases also maximize public welfare. Two related, and quite momentous, cases in point, the oil and auto industries, provide persuasive evidence on this count.

For more than a generation, the United States government has assumed that the welfare of the giant oil companies promotes the nation's interest. This was the rationale behind the special tax treatment devised for these companies in 1950—which was really a secret, undemocratic foreign aid program for reactionary Arab oil potentates, in which Washington had American corporations effectively operate as the tax collectors for foreign powers. (Senator Church's hearings on the multinationals documented this point brilliantly.) It was the theory behind the oil import quota system that kept Arab oil out of the United States when it was

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cheap and without political strings. It motivated percent depletion and the expensing of intangible costs; it was a subsidiary reason for the commitment of more than $70 billion for interstate highways dedicated to the glory of the private car and the destruction of mass transit. It was the explicit argument for effectively absolving the oil companies from the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws when the Department of Justice openly abandoned their enforcement in 1953–54. I could go on citing more examples, but the basic point now is plain: America paid tens of billions in direct and indirect public expenditures in order to support the private purposes of oil companies on the assumption that those purposes would benefit the public interest.

They did the opposite. These multinational corporations were given governmental incentives, not to develop our coal reserves, not to invest in new energy technologies, not to develop refinery capacity within the United States, and so on. After more than 40 years of federal support, the oil companies succeeded in creating a wasteful, environmentally destructive energy economy that is needlessly vulnerable to the OPEC cartel.

Similarly the automobile. Back in 1949, the United Auto Workers' union asked the car manufacturers to build a small, efficient vehicle, Detroit refused to do so for about a quarter of a century. It took advantage of the enormous, publicly financed infrastructure created for the care and feeding of the private car to build bigger and bigger, less and less efficient, more and more polluting automobiles. It imposed upon the American people the tremendous social costs of a corporate technology that maximized antipublic values. A few years back, the Ford Foundation reported one of the incredible ironies in all of this. Poor people, it found, got more mileage to the gallon than members of other social classes, and this was the only area in which the poor had any advantage—and this because they drove older, and therefore somewhat more efficient, cars!

TO GENERALIZE, it is an ideological, unscientific proposition to assert that the investment decisions of the private sector, even the ones made on a much more sophisticated profit calculus than those of the robber barons, promote the common good. The technology of the giant corporations has more "externalities" than "internalities"—i.e., its social cost regularly and massively exceeds its private costs and benefits.

This, in turn, means that government must have a much more systematic and conscious method for determining its priorities—democratically, on the basis of maximizing social values—and of effecting them in the economy. Earlier this year, the U.S. Railway Association told us that federal subsidies to transportation, from the early 19th century on to the present, totaled $450 billion, most of that money being spent during the last 50 years. Yet there was no plan for allocating these subsidies.

The result was that tens of billions were assigned to private corporations on the basis of an intra-industry competition held in the corridors of power. So the victory of truckers and private cars over the railroads was accomplished at the public expense and at an enormous dollar cost. It has, among other things, also helped to isolate the central city along with the poor and the minorities who live there, threatened the environment, promoted suburban sprawl, and so on. Indeed, to speak of the New York City crisis for a moment, a good deal of our problem derives from the fact that Washington spent so much money on cheap housing and publicly subsidized roads to help the middle class flee the City.

So private corporate priorities cannot empirically be assumed to be social in character, and government subsidy programs cannot go on in their present chaotic way, financing revolutions in the American way of life without any democratic discussion. And a similar point applies to present government full-employment policy.

The recession that began in 1969 was initiated by the White House. This is not a Watergate secret that had to be extracted from the President; it is a fact he himself confirmed at the time. We are going to strive for price stability by "cooling off" the economy, Mr. Nixon said. One of the reasons impelling him to act in this fashion was that sustained full employment is a threat to private corporations. For when there is full employment, the labor market tightens up, unions become more combative, and wages tend to rise at the expense of profits. When the commanding heights of the economy are occupied by corporations that can administer prices, as is the case in America today, the result is inflation. So there was a corporate demand in 1969 to restore profitability and price stability by means of the classic remedies: deflation, or, to put it less technically, through the suffering of working people and the poor. This policy was too politically dangerous, as the 1970 elections demonstrated, and it was followed by a preelection heating of the economy in 1971–72, and a postelection slamming-on of the brakes in early 1973, a catastrophic decision from which the nation still suffers.

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There are many instructive aspects to this history but only one of them is germane to the particular theme of this analysis: that corporations feel uncomfortable with full employment. If I can go back to, and contradict, Mr. Ackley's optimistic assumptions—in this rather basic case, what maximizes public welfare, i.e., full employment, does not maximize private profit. If the priorities of the latter prevail, as they have under the Nixon and Ford administrations, the former is impossible to achieve. We have a basic, structural conflict, not a providential harmony.

So on three counts—the antisocial tendencies of the corporate development of technology; the chaotic, antipublic character of a public subsidy system subordinated to corporate priorities; the contradiction between corporate profits and full employment—the Keynesian assumptions have been subverted. My policy conclusion is that government cannot relegate itself to an ancillary role, that it must intervene actively with regard to basic investment priorities, and to the best use of our human resources. This cannot be accomplished by "indicative" planning that leaves the fundamental corporate determinants in charge of the direction of the economy. It does not require totalitarian compulsion, which is economically inefficient as well as abhorrent on many other grounds. It demands a degree of democratic planning and socialization of the investment process, which means some structural changes in the American economy.

LET ME NOW APPLY these general remarks to an analysis of a few important aspects of the Hawkins-Humphrey bill.

In Section 3 of the bill, the president is cast in a passive role. His analysis of the economy is assumed to accept private investment plans as a given and to tailor federal policy to that reality. I believe that we should provide for a much greater role for the public sector, as a source of jobs and as a means of planning production for social use (the specifics of how this might be done will be outlined in a moment).

A related point: Section 4 of the bill emphasizes local planning councils as the prime instrumentality for identifying needs that can be met in the course of providing useful employment to people. There are two limitations to this notion. First, the macroeconomic planning of basic priorities in the economy is once more slighted—or rather left to the corporations. Second, experience with the planning councils under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 does not suggest that they have been as efficient or democratic as they should be. Let me stress one aspect of this last point. I think there should be as much local involvement, decision-making, and administration as is possible. We have overwhelming evidence with regard to the political and economic costs of a totally centralized economy. But the instruments of that local participation must be much more effective than CETA councils have been; and the possibility of serious local participation is conditioned by the success of federal efforts to get some kind of democratic control of the society's basic investment decisions.

Another and very important related point: Section 4 of the Act refers to the CETA councils creating "reservoirs" of useful, potential jobs. And Section 6 calls for the creation of a "standby" Job Corps. The unstated assumption of both of these proposals is that the private employment of labor is the most efficient and socially desirable, and that federally financed work is a matter of last resort, to be found in "reservoirs" on "standby." I disagree. I do not think that the best use of human talent in this society is inevitably to be found in the private profit-maximizing occupations. Do we want workers to build Nevada casinos or another generation of Florida condominiums in preference to applying their energies to erecting housing for working people and the poor?

I think there are occasions when government should be an employer of *first* resort. In specifying some job-generating activities that I think should be undertaken here and now, these criticisms can be seen in more explicit, counterposed detail.

I believe that the Congress should consider a number of projects, valuable and urgent in themselves, which could provide work for the unemployed and a means whereby society could assert a democratic social control over at least some of the investment decisions in the economy. While I see these things within the framework of my own democratic socialist analysis, all of them have been proposed by non- and even by antisocialists. I would be less than candid if I did not say that I hope that these ideas will become the first step toward a basic democratization of corporate power in America and the world. But liberals and reformers who disagree with my vision can share my immediate agenda.

• First, we should nationalize the railroads in the United States. Current legislative proposals do involve nationalization, but only of the losses and

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decrepit property of a system that the government and greedy managements did so much to destroy. We should not have the public pay for the private cannibalization of the rail system. We should establish a national transportation plan that would determine, on the basis of social needs, how subsidies are allocated to the private sector and that would have a public sector of sufficient weight to influence the entire industry. The public railroad corporations should be designed according to the plan devised by the rail unions right after World War I: with a board of directors composed one-third of workers' representatives, one-third of public representatives, and one-third of representatives of the operating managers.

The nationalization and refurbishment of the American rail system would save energy, protect the environment and, as the UAW pointed out in its energy proposals, create an enormous number of socially useful jobs.

• Second, we should nationalize one existing major oil company and provide it with privileged access to the development of energy resources on public property. In this regard, the proposals of President Ford and Senator Jackson, for socializing the developmental costs of new energy technologies while turning the benefits over to private corporations, should be rejected. It was Adam Smith who argued, rightly in this case, that risk-takers should be decision-makers and profit-takers. If the people take the risks in this area—and they are so large that the private sector refuses to take them—the people should make the decisions and reap the benefits. This is why the expansion of the public energy sector is so crucial.

• Third, we should explore Congressman Reuss's proposals for the creation of a mechanism of national credit allocation. Along similar lines, we should consider the creation of a national bank—but not one that would simply get the risky leavings from the private banks.

• Fourth, we should look toward the federal chartering of all major corporations, as Ralph Nader, George C. Lodge, and others have suggested. Those charters should require public and employee representation on the board of directors as a condition for doing business in interstate commerce.

• Fifth, we should learn from the enormously effective experience of the Rural Electrification law. Washington provided subsidized credit to electrification co-ops and thus helped to facilitate one of the most important gains farm people have made in recent decades. That principle can and should be applied to consumer cooperatives, housing cooperatives, community development corporations, and the like. It is a perfect example of how the socialization of investment decisions need not be centralized in Washington.

• Finally, an obvious question arises: How does one finance these things without incurring a ruinous inflation? There are a number of ways in which this can be done, two of them particularly relevant to my analysis.

It is, of course, necessary to resist increases in the Pentagon budget and to look for possible reductions in it. Any cutbacks requiring the closing of defense installations and the loss of jobs must, of course, be accompanied by an explicit plan for redeploying the people involved in work at least as remunerative as what is being abolished. But beyond that point, I think the time has come to consider a suggestion made sometime ago by John Kenneth Galbraith: we should nationalize all those major defense contractors whose prime, or only, client is the government. In those cases the private risk is a fiction and the private gain at the public expense a reality. This is one source of funds, along with other cuts in Pentagon waste.

The Treasury this year published a list of "tax expenditures" in the federal budget. They total around $94 billion, and we know from an analysis prepared for Senator Mondale that they discriminatorily reward the rich: e.g., the privileged character of capital-gains income, or the multibillion-dollar subsidy to the housing of the wealthy and the upper middle class contained in the perverse priorities of the deduction of interest on the mortgage. There are enormous savings to be made in these areas simply by following in fact the principle we now honor in the breech: that those best able to pay should bear their share of the tax burden.

CLEARLY, my proposals for government action are far from exhaustive. They are, rather, illustrative of an analysis and of a trend of possible action. We cannot assume, as the Hawkins-Humphrey bill does, that full employment can, or should, be achieved by making the government the subordinate of the private corporate economy. To achieve socially useful full employment, we must be prepared to take steps to democratically plan and control some of the major investment decisions in this country. In the particular cases in which I have urged action, I think the pragmatic liberal can agree with me in seeing its necessity. I therefore do not make these proposals in terms of some distant utopia: they are necessary to the creation of full

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employment in this decade and in the rest of this century.

Let me stress my conviction that we are at one of those moments in American history when structural change is on the agenda. In the 1890s this country, and European capitalism, responded to the two-decade-long crisis of the laissez-faire economy by the creation of the modern corporation, the trusts, and the oligopolies. The problems of competition were ameliorated; the problems of monopoly were created. In the 1930s the United States, the last industrial democracy to build a welfare state, backed into a system of Keynesian planning. It assumed that all the government had to do was to establish a proper economic climate for the private economy by stimulating, or restraining, aggregate demand and investment. We demonstrated—by means of the war economy of 1940–45, and later by the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts of the '60s—that we know how to put unused capacity back to work in this manner. But now we face the problems inherent in our old solutions: inflationary pressures; the manipulation of the business cycle for political purposes, as under President Nixon; the threat to private profit in a full-employment economy; and so on.

We surely are going to get structural change; the questions is what kind. The corporate rear guard fulminates about "socialism" while the corporate avant-garde proposes new RFCs to socialize investment for private purposes. Under such conditions, I believe that full-employment policy is a focal point, and we must demand that it be implemented by a socialization of more and more investment on behalf of the people. We have been funding "socialism" for the rich, leaving free enterprise to the small shopkeepers, the workers, and the poor. We now must see to it that we do not continue that outrageous trend, buying full employment by further increasing the maldistribution of wealth and the corporate misuse of resources. We should, rather, achieve full employment by democratically investing in our social needs. □

It'll Take More Than That to Make Jerry Ford Seem Funny

Robert Orben, a former script writer for Red Skelton and Jack Paar, the comedians, has been put in charge of speech-writing operations at the White House

New York Times, January 22, 1976 □

John Kenneth Galbraith

The Conservative Majority Myth

My thought in this article is to identify and comment in a scientific way on one of the notable political phenomena of our time. That is, the powerful and wonderfully persistent devices by which recurrently we are persuaded that conservatism is the wave of the future. These instruments of persuasion are brought to bear at all times and with much success on the Congress. And once every four years, at about this time in relation to the election, they are directed at the Democratic party and the nation at large.

The purpose is always the same. It is to persuade all susceptible citizens, but Democrats, their legislators, and the candidates in particular, that the country has, at long last, moved sharply to the right. Specifically, it seeks to persuade them that, politically speaking, there are no poor, no aged, no sick, no black, no minorities, no people seriously squeezed by inflation, not many for whom unemployment is a major issue, no one whatever whose health, education, food, shelter, protection from economic abuse or exploitation or even survival itself depends on the services of government. Instead there are in this Republic only indignant taxpayers deeply angry about the willful idleness of the unemployed. The only sophisticated policy is their appeasement. The prime enemy of the people is the state, save only as it involves itself in the exigent needs of national defense and bankrupt corporations. The ultimate tendency (and hope) of our politics is toward two equally conservative parties competing for the great conservative majority.

We should have a name for this phenomenon; I propose that it be called "The Conservative Majority Syndrome." In an earlier time it would have been called "The Dayton Housewife Discovery"; that was its last manifestation. That excellent woman, you will recall, was also unblack, unpoor, definitely uninterested in anything as unrefined as women's rights and, you can be sure, deeply concerned about taxes. I have always thought that both she and Dayton were greatly libeled.

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THE SUCCESS of the conservative syndrome depends on four motivating factors, all powerful in our time. The first is the susceptibility of much of our political comment and many of our political commentators and sages to the rediscovery of the wheel. Its special manifestation is the recurrent discovery, offered each time as a breath-taking revelation of only slightly less than scriptural impact, that people of means would rather not pay taxes. This is not combined, unfortunately, with the companion revelation that people of means are infinitely more articulate than anyone else, their spokesmen and intellectual sycophants alone excluded. So it is not noticed that, by its sheer volume, the voice of the relatively affluenced in our land gets mistaken for the voice of the masses. If you are in doubt on this point, recall how many welfare recipients you have heard on the question of the profligacy of New York City. Compare this with the volume of expression emanating from Chase Manhattan, Lazard Frères, and Secretary of the Treasury William Simon. The Westchester County budget, it was announced in mid-November, will rise by 22 percent in 1976. That, in those mostly pleasant precincts, was the result of changing population structure, inflation, and recession. In New York it would be caused by the idle and the unions. And, of course, by John Lindsay and Abe Beame.

The second support to the conservative syndrome is related: it resides in the deep desire of politicians, Democrats in particular, for respectability. All seek to inspire confidence, convey an aspect of sound judgment. And what is the test of sound, confidence-inspiring judgment? It is, broadly, whether speech and action are consistent with the comfort and well-being of the affluent, including, needless to say, the people who lead the great financial institutions, man the large corporations. A radical is anyone who causes discomfort, or otherwise offends such interests. Thus, in our politics, we test even liberals by their conservatism. Alfred Marshall, the great founder of neoclassical (and now conservative) economics, once said that there is nothing an economist should so fear as applause. Certainly nothing should be so damaging to a Democrat as an approving editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* or the most primitive nod from Evans and Novak.

The self-reinforcing character of our conservatism works with particular force in Washington. There some public official to whom Andrew Mellon would seem advanced identifies an action as likely to cause pain to the privileged. He forthrightly communicates his alarm to Messrs. Evans and Novak. These scholars tell of the intended action, note that it is a potential cause for popular indignation, maybe even mass anguish. The original progenitor reads their story and is affirmed in his fears. So are others. It is, I believe, the only successful closed-circuit system for recycling garbage that has yet been devised.

The third strength of the conservative syndrome lies in the superb tactical position of the Republicans when they are in power—as now. For they can attack government for indifference, callousness, or incompetence and then justify the attack by making it so. This is the history of the last seven years. When Republicans attack government, let us be sure as many as possible know that the government of Richard Nixon or that of Gerald Ford or—let me be nonpartisan—that of George Wallace in Alabama is not our model. Government was not thought callous or indifferent or even incompetent in the days of Roosevelt or, for that matter, Lyndon Johnson.

Let us not, above all, allow anyone to believe that we take the economic management of William Simon and Alan Greenspan—men, as I've often said, who see progress as escape to the 18th century—as our model of what intelligent macroeconomic management can accomplish.

I must add a special word here. Even those, and I am one, who are celebrated for our patience, our kindly tolerance of human frailty, must be discouraged at the reception that the prophets of the respectable view accord the Simon-Greenspan achievement. These statesmen have, we know, only one remedy for inflation. That is unemployment and recession. Having achieved a recession, they are then allowed to attribute the recession to natural cyclical causes, and they are further forgiven for its not preventing the inflation. Had men of similar competence been in charge of the space program, we would now be digging the boys out of the Grand Canyon. And had the same standards of judgment been brought to bear, the failure would be accepted as a natural manifestation of the law of gravity.

We must never minimize the importance of good public management and administration. This is a dull but important business, one that must always be part of our claim to govern. It has not had the attention from Democrats that it deserves. But let us not join in the currently fashionable tendency to defame either government or those who work for government. The civil service of the United States is as honest, effective, and perhaps even as innova-

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tive as that of any other country. It was stubbornly honest people in the Department of Justice, the FBI, the IRS, and elsewhere who frustrated the tax evasion, obstruction of justice, subornation of perjury, and constitutional subversion of Richard Nixon and the less imaginative felonies of Spiro Agnew. Had our public servants not been honest, our case would have been hopeless.

THE FINAL BUTTRESS to the conservative syndrome is those whom we may perhaps call the liberal-establishment economists. Here I must proceed tactfully; I am speaking of the work of conscientious and intelligent men, excellent citizens, good friends. But, alas, time, in its ineluctable march, has made them also pillars of the conservative edifice. This is because some inevitably yearn for the establishment applause, test their performance by its volume. Alfred Marshall's warning has been forgotten even here. Some inevitably are confined by the institutions they serve. This is a subtle but powerful influence in our time. Most economists serve within an institutional framework; some additionally are sustained visibly and directly by the banks and corporations they assist or advise. Out of this comes a largely innocent and natural desire to avoid embarrassing one's colleagues and institutions by urging policies that are at odds with the respectable view. And out of the service to corporations comes the rather less innocent desire to protect one's income. Much of what was once called liberal economics has become very conservative in our time.

The conservatism of contemporary economics manifests itself in two major matters, both vital for the Democratic position.

The established economics can, in principle, treat unemployment. It cannot in its accepted form deal with such part of the inflation problem as is caused by the wage/price spiral in the industrial sector of the economy. No one, or not many, doubt the importance of this spiral. Not having a cure for inflation, the accepted economics minimizes it as a problem, asserts that at any given time the real economic need is for more growth, more jobs. The result, so far as this guidance is accepted, is to divide our political life between conservatives who prefer unemployment over inflation but do not say so and liberals who prefer inflation to unemployment but do not say so.

There is no political future for Democrats in such a debate. Unemployment hurts a smaller number of people a lot; inflation hurts a larger number of people a little. We cannot defend either. It is not possible to persuade people—as some economists would—that inflation is an overrated evil. For the person wondering how to stretch limited income or savings over urgent needs, who is in anguish that on the next trip to the supermarket there will not be enough in their pockets, inflation is not an overrated evil. In any case, we must take people's dislikes as they are. We know they dislike inflation.

Most of you will be aware of the conclusion to which this leads me—there must be direct intervention on incomes and prices in the organized sector of the economy. Next time it must be done seriously; it cannot be again, as it was in 1971, for the purpose of getting a Republican president past an election. And you will notice that I use the word incomes. We have a labor movement in the United States that, on this issue, is quite possibly more reasonable, modern, and nontheological than any other in the world. It will, as George Meany has reiterated, accept such a policy as long as it is fair and general—as long as it applies equitably to all incomes. It must also keep living costs effectively stable or otherwise protect real wages. Any trade union leader is right to insist on these conditions. The problem for Democrats is not whether to have such controls; this the circumstance of economic power in the economy has already decided for us. The question is how to meet the required conditions of their equitable application and effective administration. For so long as the established economics ignores the problem of controls, and its counsel is followed, Democrats are left with no viable alternative to conservative mismanagement of the economy.

The second support to conservatism from the established economics, a very urgent matter, lies in its formula for expanding the economy, for curing unemployment. In recent years its remedy has become the reduction of federal taxes. It is offered all but automatically whenever the economy is operating at less than full capacity, which of late has been all the time. This remedy—I speak very deliberately—is a liberal and Democratic disaster. Nothing in recent times has so played into the hands of conservatives.

There was always the danger that tax reduction would be seized upon by conservatives as the excuse for limiting public expenditures—always excluding defense and those in which business has a prime interest. That danger Gerald Ford has now made explicit. He has made acceptance of tax reduction conditional on expenditure reduction, promised the requisite vetoes if the spending reduction is not made good. Those of us who had feared this result must be grateful to him for clarifying a diffi-

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cult point. We should also be thankful to my friend Professor Milton Friedman, a man of great if inconvenient honesty, who also made the conservative position wonderfully clear. In a *Newsweek* column on October 27, he could not have been more forthright: "I am in favor of a federal tax cut at all times—as the only way to exert effective pressure on Congress to keep down federal spending." The reduction in spending inevitably affects the services and support of the poor, for defense and business needs are always exempt. And if it succeeds, it also means—much more than incidentally—that there is no expansive effect at all from the tax reduction. There would be contractive effect, in fact, for the tax savings are not as reliably spent as the proceeds of the outlays so curtailed.

It is federal taxes that are reduced. These in substantial though not exclusive part are levied on middle- and upper-income brackets of the personal income tax and on corporations. This reduction comes at a time when states and cities, in consequence of the recession the tax reduction is to cure, are being forced to raise their taxes, and these invariably are taxes on the poor. While the House Ways and Means Committee was discussing the extension of the cut in income taxes last autumn—now I agree inevitable—Secretary Simon, in one of his typically compassionate moods, was urging New York City to raise its sales tax to 10 percent. Highly regressive taxes were raised. And the services of a city already deep in public squalor have been ruthlessly curtailed. In the same week that the Committee reported out the tax-cut bill, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts agreed on a tax increase of $364 million, all of it in relatively regressive taxes for no others were available. ($218 million would be from taxes on sales and on meals.) The *Boston Globe*, noting the juxtaposition of these events, said they made no sense. How right. And again there is no economic stimulation in a shift from progressive federal to regressive state and local taxes. If anything, the reverse. There is only joy for the affluent.

We are learning, finally, that federal tax reduction, taken by itself, is an inefficient form of stimulation. In last year's second quarter there was a big bulge in private savings. Its source was the tax reduction and refunds. People who didn't need the money were not using it. This would not have been the case if the money had gone instead to employ people on useful work, maintain or improve public services, provide help to the large cities, prevent lay-offs, ease the burden of state and local welfare costs. That money would have been spent. In buying tax reduction as the magic of the establishment economists, Democrats have bought a slightly modified version of the Hoover trickle-down doctrine. And the trickle is as unreliable a recovery instrument now as it was then. As I've said, last year's tax policy is over the dam. Thereafter let us spend instead for needed services as a substitute for regressive taxes.

Thus the lesson: Liberals can become conservatives, Democrats can become Republicans, we *can* have not one conservative party but two. We have only to test our policies by the affluent applause, seek respectability before all else, assume that government must be as bad as under Nixon and Ford, and be guided on controls and taxation by the established economics. We are, I venture, well on the way. The only problem is that if Democrats continue on course they will have deserted their natural constituency. We won't be worth electing. Nor will we be elected. For, as Harry Truman once observed, given the choice between two conservative parties, people will always choose the one that is honestly and deliberately so. □

Well! At Last — Something We Agree On!

We have even had our political labels changed for us. When we began, almost all the editors and contributors would have described themselves as "liberals." (One of the editors would have described himself as a socialist, although not all his colleagues would have done so.) But before long we began to find ourselves depicted as "conservatives." In time, a new term—"neoconservative"—was invented for us (more specifically, for myself, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Bell) by the socialist writer Michael Harrington. Later, his essay and others were collected in a volume, *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left*, edited by Lewis Coser and Irving Howe. This had something of a New York "fraction" fight about it, as many of these writers were friends, and almost all were honorable men. Although the label was given us by the "left," it seems to have been welcomed by liberals and conservatives alike, the former evidently relieved to be rid of us, the latter glad for infrequent recruits. We remain cheerful about all this for one simple reason—the guiding principle which illuminates the essays in this volume. It is...that liberty was the first principle of this Republic, that it is the animating principle of the Constitution no less than of the Declaration, that it is this which makes us what we are, be we conservative or liberal or, for that matter, socialist—socialists, that is, of the synod with which we commerce.

—DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN in "The American Experiment," Introduction to the Tenth Anniversary Issue of the *Public Interest*, Fall 1975 □

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William Spinrad

The Continuing Democratic Majority

In trying to think about the 1976 election, let's start with one proposition, even though it is discounted by some political analysts: the majority of voters still maintains a national allegiance to the Democratic party that goes back to the 1930s, most noticeable in the vote for congressmen. While such continuing party loyalty would be clear in a parliamentary system, it is obscured by the complications of American politics. Furthermore, if we exclude the South (its special situation must be excluded from most of what follows), the same population groups provide the Democratic margin, augmented by new pro-Democratic types.

The current American political scene, of course, is not a replica of the 1930s or even of a decade ago. New issues and constituencies have emerged. The Republicans won two consecutive presidential victories, the second decisively. Yet the implications for long-term voting trends seem slight. Every presidential election is special (which is why it is fool-hardy, at this stage, to predict the outcome for 1976). Although the voters' motivations were varied and complex, both national elections reflected popular discontent over an agonizing war and domestic turmoil. Economic anxieties, which usually help Democratic candidates, gained votes for Nixon in 1972, out of fear over McGovern's proposed defense cuts and resentment against the presumed favored treatment of the underclass. And antics of McGovern and his supporters further antagonized those who were upset by the strains of the late 1960s.

These and other elections seemed to indicate that the particular annoyances of the period, sometimes summed up as "social issues," had become all-important. The accompanying frustrations, further intensified by Watergate, suggested a disenchantment with all official political entities, including parties, and a sizable vote for candidates appealing to a vague need for some kind of protest. The result could thus be either a realignment of the parties or some new party offering little more than the expression of such protest, similar to the Poujadists in France in the 1950s or the Progress party in a recent Danish election whose central plank was the elimination of the income tax. Nevertheless, a meaningful American third "party" is easily ruled out at this time. It is difficult to get voters to support new parties in a country with two major parties; the U.S. has its own legal, organizational, and financial obstacles. (Few 1968 Wallace supporters also voted for congressional candidates on his ticket.) Attempts to sketch out new alignments between the Republicans and Democrats, which usually add up to quaint regional line-ups or a fanciful picture of a contest between "producers" and those who live off "ideas," look quite hollow by now.

Nothing that has happened in American society implies any such dramatic changes and, except for special and temporary protest choices, most Americans will vote under the major party labels, and the Democratic label is generally more attractive to the majority. The best index is the vote for the House of Representatives. Specific candidates are frequently unimportant, local and parochial issues usually irrelevant. The Republicans did improve their position in the early 1950s, when the House was about evenly divided, but since 1958, the Democratic majority has been amazingly constant, about 54 percent to 56 percent, with the exception of the increased strength following the 1964 and 1974 elections. The only significant Republican gains have been in the South. Even Nixon's 1972 landslide had little effect on Congress.

HOW DOES ALL THIS FIT in with the evidence of increased ticket-splitting? Presidential voting acutely reflects immediate events and the "images" of the candidates. State and local choices are based on a variety of reasons, frequently unrelated and sometimes opposed to the motivations for national party loyalty. As Samuel Lubell has disclosed in 20 years of election studies, many voters have been hedging their bets by choosing candidates of different labels for different offices.

The continued Democratic congressional margin illustrates a relative "comfort" with party symbols; the other tendencies, specific occasional "discomforts." Such continuity rests, to a considerable extent, on traditional class politics, particularly those of the working class. Workers, throughout the developed world, have a typical political orientation, described, in a recent British study, as "*instrumental collectivism*," a realization that they cannot solve their economic problems individually and that some government action is necessary. Working people are generally pragmatic in their politics, seeking the tangible and visible payoff.

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Romantic political messages, appealing to pie-in-the-sky dreams or nostalgic yearnings, rarely find much of a working-class audience. Responding to specific frustrations, many workers may sometimes vote for candidates with this kind of appeal, such as Wallace; yet these are aberrations. A significant number may vote for a Ronald Reagan as a form of protest, but, soon realizing that his politics are about the same as those of Goldwater, few would support any continuing movements using him as a spokesman.

Working-class politics in this country has, therefore, meant allegiance to the Democrats. Has this allegiance declined? Some analysts concentrate on temporary shifts, as in 1972. Others emphasize the decrease in the gap between the blue-collar and white-collar Democratic vote, probably explainable by the increasing Democratic vote among the latter. In any case, even in 1972, about 60 percent of nonsouthern blue-collar workers voted for a Democratic congressional candidate compared to a little less than half of white-collar workers.

The strong Democratic hold on the "out-ethnics"—blacks, Jews, Catholics, immigrants and their descendants—has been the other accepted dominant pattern for some time, but many have insisted that Democratic voting has significantly declined among the Catholic nationality groups. Because ethnic voting is a result of a variety of motivations, data supporting this view is available for local elections but a few statistics make it at least questionable as a national trend. Excepting 1960 (the first Catholic elected president) and 1972, the difference between the Protestant and Catholic vote for Democratic presidential candidates has been fairly constant since 1948. Among those both working-class and Catholic, 60 percent voted for Humphrey in 1968. Andrew Greeley's examination of the two major Catholic nationality groups revealed that 73 percent of the Irish and 62 percent of the Italians voted for Democratic congressional candidates in 1970, the last year of available relevant figures.

Except for the South, the New Deal voting coalition is still the central national tendency despite several deviations in different times and places—something clearly recognized by the Ripon Society, the sophisticated Republican brain trust. (Party *identification*, frequently used by pollsters, is a very complicated matter and is probably, by now, a poor indicator of either voting or political inclinations.) The most significant changes are those that should enhance Democratic support—an increase in the population base for Democratic voting and the return to major significance of those concerns that most favor the Democrats.

White-collar workers, the fastest growing occupational group, have become more Democratic in their voting. Although in most elections less white-collar workers tend to vote Democratic than blue-collar workers, the trend is marked and corresponds to white-collar trends in political attitudes—on welfare state issues, civil rights, etc. This Democratic trend is most evident among younger voters. In 1972, about 60 percent of the nonsouthern white-collar workers between 18 and 29 voted for Democratic congressional candidates. Within the white-collar category it is the New Class, the professional and technical workers in service and "knowledge" organizations, that is both dominantly Democratic and a significant force in the Party, especially among New Politics adherents.

The Democratic vote has also steadily increased in rural and small-town America, former Republican bulwarks, indicated by the continuing election of liberal Democrats in such states as South Dakota and Iowa. Nor is the former belief in an overwhelmingly Republican suburban population still feasible. In one small-scale example from my own area of suburban Long Island, four out of six congressmen elected in 1974 were Democrats; no Democatic candidate had a chance there 25 years ago.

BUT HOW ABOUT the supposed evidence of growing "conservatism"? Calling oneself a conservative in recent times has been little more than a way of separating oneself from the archetypical "liberal" portrayed in the media. At most, findings about public opinion on civil rights, civil liberties, race relations, help to the underclass, etc.—the presumed bases for conservative tendencies—are very mixed and arguable. But there is little support for Goldwaterite economics, no matter who presents it. In other words, there is almost a national consensus for the idea of a welfare state and government intervention in the economy. Cutting government expenditures is always an appealing idea (it even provided the core of Franklin Roosevelt's campaign rhetoric in 1932), but this does not prevent decisive majority support for such proposed measures as national health insurance and federal aid to mass transportation. During the 1972 campaign, Lubell noted that those who objected to government help to the underclass usually added a strident demand that more be given to people like themselves. Some New Politics people have expressed skepticism

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about a welfare state philosophy and questioned "too much reliance on big government." Yet, most of what they advocate requires a greater government role and more government money.

The possible Democratic losses, as in the last two presidential elections, are among those upset by the "social" issues. Their resentments supply a sizable audience for the political spokesmen dubbed "conservatives." The direct primary furnishes an easy protest mechanism for their feelings without affecting lasting political inclinations. That is the explanation for the strong Wallace showing in the 1964 primaries (against Lyndon Johnson), in the 1972 primaries, and probably again in 1976. For similar reasons, Reagan can do fairly well in Republican primaries.

But the general election is another story. In 1964, the Wallace primary vote, outside the South, scarcely helped Goldwater. In 1968, he did get a sizable protest vote from Democratic voters, who nevertheless showed their continuing Democratic allegiance in congressional voting. In 1972, many of these voters reluctantly chose Nixon. In 1976, whatever happens in the primaries, the earlier resentments may still be strong enough for them to support Wallace as a third-party nominee, or choose Ford (who, I assume, will get the nomination), or even Reagan. However, in the current political atmosphere, the older concerns appear dominant again, whether among the working class, or among yesterday's New Leftists who now yearn for the careers they formerly disdained. The annoyances and arguments of the 1960s are no longer so important.

While the Watergate revelations undoubtedly account for the 1974 Democratic sweep, their impact was so extensive because people were also angry about the state of the economy. The same villains were, according to the polls, seen as the people most dangerous to the nation. Yesterday's targets—activists, protesters, hippies, even ordinary criminals and welfare chiselers—were much lower on the list of undesirables, which indicates a decline of the "social" issues. Efforts of Republican spokesmen to advertise their party as the tribune of "middle America" against "elite establishments" fizzled. Instead, a majority of Americans again saw the GOP as primarily the agent of the powerful and privileged.

Working class and New Class may not always agree with each other on whom they like, but they now do have a clear agreement on whom they don't like. The evidence available implies an intensification of that image. The most relevant vote in 1975 was in the New Hampshire senatorial race, where the Democratic candidate was very successful with a class-line appeal.

Any precise predictions about the 1976 election is silly at this time. Too many things can happen, particularly as they could affect the vote for the presidency. Nevertheless, the Democrats start with both the long-range historical trends and the immediate situation clearly on their side. (Recent polls, which set up hypothetical races between specific Democratic and Republican candidates, suggest a close presidential race; but historical experience indicates that such early "evidence" is usually meaningless.) Yet, whatever the other side does, the Democrats can throw the game away. What some see as great achievements—the party and election reforms and the use of direct primaries for the presidential nomination—can disrupt the necessary cohesion and antagonize voters. The plethora of candidates, the innumerable campaigns, the mountain of rhetoric, the vast expenditure of money add up to inanity and confusion, however noble the motivations of participants. Perhaps there is no better way in the American system, but the result could well be a series of exhausting internal conflicts.

The large number of New Class amateur politicians, whose emergence on the political scene is generally welcome, could exacerbate the situation. Many of them are prisoners of their own rhetoric, concentrating on pet issues and favorite people. Some will never forget the disputes of the late '60s; others are bent on ego trips. Ironically, Democratic "reformers," many of whom started out with the objective of developing a more responsible and disciplined party structure, may help create chaos.

From a "left" perspective, one can hardly chastise anyone for avoiding blind loyalty to a party that is not really "ours." But this is not what the internal struggles will emphasize, except, of course, for the Wallace forces and their opponents. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the differences among most serious candidates, announced or not, are minor and will have to be overdramatized to create a distinctive image. If I may be permitted what seems a wildly heretical assertion, the important considerations are: who is more likely to win, and who will have the most effective relations with a Democratic Congress? Those administrations that achieved new policy thrusts—in the early years of Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Johnson—were headed by executives who, by judicious use of the political system, got Congress to do something, a

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task that could become easier in the future because Congress has begun to do much on its own. National programs in American emanate less from the philosophy of a candidate than out of some combination of existent conditions and ideas for meeting them, frequently pushed by pressure groups (within and outside the parties). The successful candidate's task is to get them adopted.

The proper orientation for socialists in the early stages of the campaign is to play it cool about candidates, to come forth with and proselytize *policies*. Individuals may find it profitable to participate in the campaigns of prospective nominees, for this means contact with political activists and possible influence on the direction of a successful candidate. But there are other missions we are better equipped to perform.

The Democrats are likely to win. If they don't, it won't be because of anything we failed to do, but may be a result of what some in the Democratic fold actually do. Let's not get too involved in their bickerings and mistakes. □

Joseph Clark

Portugal — Between Hammer and Anvil?

Perhaps the saddest aspect of socialist history has been the frequent evocation of a right-wing reaction through extremism on the left. No fiercer battles were fought in pre-Hitler Germany than those between Communist Red Front fighters and brown-shirted Nazis. But an unholy "dialectic" found Red Front feeding brown shirts. In the Prussian plebiscite, Communists and fascists voted together. Communist theories of "social fascism," which designated social democracy as the greatest menace, facilitated Hitler's rise to power.

Will the same sorry symbiosis of left-wing and right-wing extremism shatter the hope of a democratic socialist evolution in Portugal? There are good grounds for optimism and hope. Both those on the far right and far left view parliamentary democracy as a form of "cretinism." Thus, an American Communist party leader (in a party distinguished by its subservience to the Soviets) headed one of many "tourist" delegations who had been swarming over Portugal to see a real revolution in action. A fellow-traveling tourist asked, timidly of course, why the Communists had received only 12.5 percent of the vote in the April 25 elections in 1975, held on the first anniversary of the revolution that overthrew the half-century-old dictatorship. "Because the workers were not ready for elections," the Communist leader explained.

That same leader had previously written a book extolling the Castro dictatorship, which had the good sense to eschew elections after the overthrow of Batista. Even after those revolutionists who had fought with Castro against Batista but who believed in Castro's prerevolutionary promise of democracy and in early democratic elections were thrown into jails and concentration camps—even then Castro did not trust his people in an election. They do hold regular "elections" in the Soviet Union, because there the workers are "ready" for elections—they had better be because the Gulag Archipelago beckons those who are not ready.

The Communists' determination to destroy the democratic process was made amply clear in Portugal when they collaborated with the Maoist, Trotskyist, and Castroite left in an attempted putsch last November. To everyone's surprise, the government under Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, prevailed on the military Council of the Revolution to move with dispatch against the putschists and to remove the far leftist head of security, General Carvalho.

Since then it seems to be the turn of the extremists on the right. That the menace from starboard is real enough was described in considerable detail by Robert Moss, the foreign editor of the London *Economist*, whose sympathies are with the right and who wrote an amazingly frank article in the December 1975 issue of *Harper's*. Contemptuous of the socialists and liberals in Portugal, Moss sees a need for deploying military strength to stop the Communists. Where can you find that? "The answer may be," Moss writes, "the paramilitary Right." That he knows whereof he speaks is clear from the personal contacts and hours of interviews he had in Portugal and Spain, "with the leaders of the underground that has been preparing for an eventual civil war in Portugal."

The two extreme right-wing groups preparing for this violent overthrow of the Portuguese government are the Portuguese Liberation Army (ELP) and the

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Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal (MDLP). Moss describes the former as politically aligned with the Salazarist right; its operational leader is believed to be Barbieri Cardoso, former deputy chief of the Caetano secret police. The latter Moss describes as professing democracy, but its directorate is largely composed of close supporters of General Antonio de Spinola, who organized a remarkably inept putsch in March 1975.

The greatest reason for hope that Portugal will achieve a durable democratic society—which Socialist party leader Mario Soares defined as government of the people, by the people, and for the people—is the pact that has been signed by Portugal's military leaders and the five major political parties to end rule by the military and proceed to democratic elections of a representative legislature and of a president. It seems that those favoring such an outcome for the Portuguese revolution among the military Council of the Revolution have prevailed over those who had previously asserted and exercised the dominance of the military over the civilian and popular forces. This development is undoubtedly a tribute to the resilience of the Socialist party, its firmness in opposing totalitarianism of both right and left, as well as its ability to find a common basis for action with Portugal's other democratic parties. The Socialists also demonstrated a shrewd tactical skill in firm opposition to the concept of military supremacy while cooperating with, and seeking to win over, those among the military who were ready to let democracy take over.

Impatient revolutionaries whose dreams usually end up in totalitarian nightmares are always contemptuous of parliamentary elections. The amazing thing about events in Portugal is the extent to which democratic elections have nevertheless played a decisive part in the course of the revolution. Last year's April elections were a defeat for both the extremists of the left and of the right and revealed that the well-heeled Communists indeed were only a small minority in Portugal. Now new elections are scheduled to establish a more permanent basis for democratic government; the prospects are that the extremes will again be routed.

The Socialists headed by Soares clearly see the dangers from both ends of the political spectrum. Equally important, however, is that the Socialists and the Popular Democrats, who came in second in the April 1975 elections, are addressing themselves to the urgent, immediate need of rebuilding Portugal's shattered economy. Rather than outlining a visionary utopia, they seem to be anxious for transition programs that will succeed in averting economic bankruptcy. To help save both the economy and democracy will require aid from the European Common Market and from the United States. While our country's treasury is opened up to dictatorships and oligarchies the world over, it would be far more useful for America's political (and economic) health to devote the relatively small amount that the Portuguese government is seeking in aid—some $200 million over the next 18 months.

We do have traditions of socialist and labor internationalism in this country and these might well be directed toward supporting the democratic socialists and their allies in Portugal and toward opposing the totalitarians whose enfilading fire comes from both right and left. □

Henry Judd

India — Decline into Police State

At a recent gathering of the Congress party of India held in Chandigarh, Mrs. Gandhi presided over the meeting from a high platform, looking down upon her courtiers. The image evoked was that of Catherine the Great, haughty and contemptuous. Directly behind her was a huge portrait of herself; on one side, a portrait of her father, Nehru; on the other side, one of Mahatma Gandhi. The Congress party, with two-thirds of the lower house, had made a number of decisions that were then ratified by the subservient Parliament: to postpone elections scheduled this year to the following year (this can be repeated again in 1977); to prolong the life of the present Parliament for another year; to prepare a fundamental revision of the Constitution so as to institutionalize the current "emergency" that, in turn, was indefinitely extended. In the January session of the *Lok Sabha* (lower house), attended on occasion by opposition spokesmen and

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MPs not yet jailed, one witnessed the spectacle of the Prime Minister orchestrating, by waves of her hand, glances over her shoulder, and nods of her head, the chorus of derision to which the dissenters were subjected. When one considers the respect with which Nehru as prime minister treated Parliament and particularly the opposition in his day, one becomes aware of the degradation of Indian democracy under the rule of Madame Gandhi.

An Indian citizen, no matter who, can now vanish in the dark of night, without a word or accusation, without being allowed recourse to his lawyer or the courts—and for an indefinite period of time. Amending the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) under which persons can be imprisoned for up to a year without bail, without trial, and without formal charges, the Indian parliament gave the government power to detain political prisoners without having to disclose reasons to anyone, including the judiciary and, also, to permit the rearrest of persons whose detention orders have expired or been revoked. India's Attorney General Niren De argued recently before the Supreme Court that in matters of internal security the courts must accept the principle that the state knows best. The interest of the state was the prime consideration during "emergencies," he said, and this was not the time to go into details of legality.

As for the Indian press, after passing through a confused transition in which large blank spaces often spoke out eloquently against the censorship, it is now reorganized, restructured, tamed. The freedom of the press laid down by Gandhi has been destroyed:

> Liberty of speech means that it is unassailed, even when the speech hurts. Liberty of the press can be said to be truly respected when the press can comment in the severest term upon, and even misrepresent, matters. — MAHATMA GANDHI

The Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Ordinance of 1975 bans the publication of matter that will "excite disaffection toward the state or central government, and prohibits the publication of any words, signs, or any visual representation which are defamatory of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister or any other member of the Council of Ministers of India." An additional ordinance withdraws immunity hitherto enjoyed by the press. The Constitution states that "no member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said by him in Parliament or any committee thereof...." This immunity no longer exists. And the definition of "objectionable matter" is all-encompassing.

This ordinance also empowers the government to specifically prohibit newspapers from publishing "any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects," for specified periods up to a maximum of two months. A bill introduced into Parliament, and sure of passage, merges India's four news agencies into one whose goal is to "project a correct image of India at home and abroad." The present agencies, says this bill, project India as a "backward country of endemic food shortages, economic crises, strikes, disease, and religious bigotry." According to its terms, the President will nominate the agency's chairman and 15-member governing council. Opposition spokesman Erasmo de Sequeria has summed up the situation: "Step by step the structures and the organs of our free society are being first muzzled and then destroyed." The free press of India is dead.

If the overall strategy is to proceed step-by-step and restructure the Indian government,. basic changes in the Constitution will come at a later stage. It is not as though, for example, there will

Bad News from India

We have received the following communication from Janata, *the newspaper of the Socialist party of India:*

Dear Subscriber,

The Government of Maharashtra has banned the *Janata* issues of October 12, 19 and 26, 1975. It has also served an order on the Editor, the Printer, and Publisher, prohibiting them from using the Mouj Printing Bureau, the press, for the making or publishing any document coming from us.

We are challenging the Order in the Bombay High Court and also seeking a stay order. Till the ban is lifted there will be no Janata. Our Managing Editor Dr. G. G. Parikh was arrested on October 23, 1975.

Yours sincerely,

N. G. Goray, *Editor*

Bombay, November 15, 1975

Dr. G. G. Parikh is one of the most admirable human beings in the socialist movement today. Apart from his editorial work and political activity, he has, for many years, conducted a clinic in Bombay where he has treated poor people without charge. If the word "socialist" still retains a moral value, it is because of people like Dr. Parikh. □

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never again be general elections in India. Such elections will take place; perhaps two or three years hence, when the leadership is convinced there can be only one outcome—an overwhelming victory for the Congress party. Although only less than one year has gone by, India has already gone a long ways down the slope of authoritarianism. When the Constitution is changed (by revision or complete scrapping), it will be only after "the people at large have been consulted"!

Still, this has not prevented a flood of rumors, informal proposals etc. concerning constitutional changes; the drift is apparent. Parliament is untidy and often ineffective; let it meet less frequently, let further restrictions on the reporting of its proceedings be enacted; let all or the greater part of legislative work be transferred to parliamentary committees. Since all through the years of independence, since 1947, except for a few months after a 1969 split in the Congress party, this party had an overwhelming majority in parliament, it is impossible to believe or even argue that parliament has at any time actually obstructed implementation of any of the government's measures.

Those who call for "drastic changes in the Constitution to fulfill the people's aspirations" have more in mind than the hope of curbing Parliament. They would favor a presidential system of government, drawing upon the American and French models, with the executive power clearly in the saddle. The judiciary, as an independent branch of government, would be the principal target of such a change, just as it has been the target of the emergency ordinances. No authoritarian system can afford a "government of law." But first the proper "climate" must be created for such fundamental measures; that, at least in part, is the purpose of the continuing emergency. When an independent judi-

From the Indian Underground

The following is taken from a document issued by an underground group in India, which reached us a few weeks ago. —Eds.

What is our goal? We are dedicated to the cause of the millions of semi-fed and semi-clothed souls whom Mahatma Gandhi, father of the Indian nation, called the dumb millions. To begin with, curbs would be imposed on luxury production and consumption. A ceiling on personal expenditure would also be imposed. Either employment or unemployment relief would be provided. (Some people say that such drastic measures cannot be afforded in a poor country like India, but that luxury production and consumption can be afforded!) Our aim is to establish a Gandhian system, based on equality, austerity, and justice.

A labor-abundant and capital-scarce country like India has only poverty to distribute. Luxuries at the expense of basic necessities for the weaker sections of the population are criminal. Gandhi was realistic enough to see the impracticality of the Western approach to the Indian situation. Thus, poverty based upon self-sacrifice becomes the Gandhian ideal.

Gandhian economic philosophy...aimed at reviving the villages. He clearly envisaged the cost of industrialization based on labor-saving techniques of production. His approach has not only been negated but practically ridiculed by his "followers" in the government.

Gandhism is based upon equality. Under Indian conditions he found the answer in production by the masses, as against mass production in urban-based modern factories. He considered the latter approach iniquitous. In a labor-abundant economy such as India, labor-saving technology would render millions of laborers unemployed.

Capital-intensive and labor-intensive technologies are divergent. Technological progress in capital-rich nations has resulted in the accumulation of technical know-how along capital-intensive lines. On the other hand, the possibilities of labor-based technical change have hardly been explored. Once we create the necessary conditions for the emergence of labor-based technology, we can very well expect the development of the required type of technology. Only by adopting labor-intensive techniques can we expect to improve them. That is why Gandhi favored labor-intensive techniques, regardless of their current economic productivity. He was not against science and technology....He was against its indiscriminate use....

As we in India have found out today, the end of this modernization approach is not different from what Gandhi feared. This painful experience has revalidated Gandhism. However, the adoption of the Gandhian approach imposes certain sacrifices on the affluent elite for which they are least prepared. Realizing that the Gandhian wave cannot be prevented under a democracy, they have tried to suppress it by bringing democracy itself to an end. But we shall overcome.... □

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ciary comes to an end, indeed, when the state becomes the administrator of "justice," then freedom is on its deathbed.

One hears, of course, the argument that the emergency has brought discipline, order, work, an end to strikes, stabilization of prices, a slowing down of inflation and other economic blessings. There are always some people ready to believe that economic progress and democratic liberties are incompatible—who does not recall how Mussolini's trains ran on time? But there are two kinds of discipline. A "discipline" based on fear and intimidation lasts only as long as external repression. This is the kind of "discipline" brought about by Mrs. Gandhi's police measures. It is not a discipline that comes from within, the strength of a nation united in its goals, based on a people's voluntary association in a common effort.

THE ECONOMIC MEASURES that have been taken are both superficial and unrelated to the fundamental problems of the country: poverty and gross inequity. As India's population is about to reach 600 million, some 40 percent of the population, according to official government statistics, stands below the poverty level! The great mass of small farmers, agricultural laborers, and unemployed continues to live as before. The increase in grain production (estimated at about 115 million tons this year) is admittedly the result of the first favorable monsoon in five years, which, welcome though it is, lays stress on the fact that Indian agriculture, far from having attained an autonomy based on irrigation, the building of dams and canals, etc., is still at the mercy of nature. The projected agricultural gain under the fifth Five Year Plan had been 125 million tons, a mark nowhere near attainment. India's agricultural production simply is not keeping up with population increase—the true criterion of success or failure.

As for other aspects of the economy, the *Economic Times of India* (January 13, 1976) reports: "Production in as many as 50 industries in the first eight months of the current financial year lagged behind last year's, according to the latest available data." The stagnation of industrial development continues; the shift toward greater export trade, which has had some considerable success, not only increases the country's dependence on the world market, always a danger, but underscores the fact that the internal, domestic market is not developing properly. The multinational corporations, more interested in Indian investment than in previous years, may well prove more of a disadvantage than a blessing if the internal economy is too weak to stand up to their demands.

It has been suggested that enforced sterilization is the only way to halt India's still explosive birth rate (14 million additional people each year). Such a measure would fit into the repressive atmosphere of the nation, even if it is of doubtful morality and practicality. Most demographers insist it simply won't work. It ignores the real problem of the peasant masses who want children and consider them an economic asset, but would cooperate and forgo extra children voluntarily if their general standard of living were on the rise. Food, work, education, health care, recreation— these are the real answers to the runaway population increase. Mrs. Gandhi's 20-point economic program does not touch upon the basic inequities from which the country suffers. Her program operates entirely within the framework of existing relations, reinforcing the gulf between rich and poor. A detailed account in the *Economic and Political Weekly* (December 20, 1975), based on reports of the Reserve Bank of India bulletins, indicates that the "(private) corporate sector never had it so good." Gross and net profits have increased substantially over the year. Meanwhile, the government's basic approach remains what it has been over the past 28 years of independence, or, in the words of the resolution adopted at the latest Congress party conference:

> We continue our emphasis on basic sectors such as iron and steel, coal, power, cement, and machinery. The sustained increases in production levels in these industries are essential to strengthen our economic base, to build up our defense potential, and to ensure self-reliance.

This dogma has operated over many years and helped bring the nation to its present condition. The opposition, proposing a great national debate over priorities in the economy, has challenged this conventional doctrine of development. The opposition's proposals for change have been fundamental—proposals along Gandhian lines, such as less emphasis on heavy industry and a shift to village and agricultural development.

But Mrs. Gandhi has shown no inclination to participate in such a discussion. Here is a government that consists of a gigantic bureaucracy, operating a party and governmental machine of corruption and bribery that sucks graft out of the peasant poor while dispensing patronage and contracts to its supporters. Its principal backers are part of India's business community (the private corporate sector, particularly those branches tending to hold

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monopolies in textiles, chemicals, etc.; the Indian landlord class of large commercial farmers in wheat, rice, grain; and a section of professionals who depend on the government for career advancement—in sum, what is usually thought of as the ruling class of the country). The orientation of Mrs. Gandhi's government is so clear that even her most voluble supporter, the official Indian Communist party, has recently protested the banning of strikes, the ending of workers' annual bonuses and cost-of-living raises, and the freezing of the wage structure of civil-service employees.

IS INDIA, then, a police state? If the answer were to depend on what we know about the treatment of tens of thousands of political prisoners in Indian jails, it would be an unqualified *yes*. It is impossible to ascertain the precise number of people being held—estimates range from 40-45,000 to more than 100,000. Unlike under the British during the days of empire, there is no specific category of political prisoners; hoarders, black marketeers, common criminals are lumped together with political activists and party leaders.

The treatment of prisoners varies considerably. Top political leaders (men like Moraji Desai, former Deputy Prime Minister under Nehru, a leading figure in the old Congress movement; Ashoka Mehta, a founder of the Socialist party, Deputy Planning Minister under Nehru, Minister of Planning under Mrs. Gandhi, president of the opposition Congress movement; Jayaprakash Narayan (J.P.), symbolic leader of the unified opposition; Chandrasekhar, leader of the "Young Turks" opposition within Mrs. Gandhi's own party, and a member of its top Working Committee until his recent expulsion)—men such as these are bundled in and out of jail according to the personal instructions of Mrs. Gandhi. Desai and Chandrasekhar are kept in solitary confinement, without access to newspapers or visitors. The middle category of local and regional political activists in jail, who number in the thousands, are reported to be receiving acceptable treatment. But the large group of young people, militant youth accused of painting slogans on the walls or distributing leaflets denouncing the emergency, are harshly treated—poor food, crowded cells, lack of medical care, beatings, and there have even been instances of torture with burning candles.

There is need for an international committee to investigate these conditions. Amnesty International has proposed such a committee several times, only to be harshly rejected by Mrs. Gandhi. And, if the U.N. could send a committee to investigate jail conditions in Chile, why not propose one for India?

All this may not make India a full-blown police state, but certainly we have here a forerunner of such a regime. Already there now exist two kinds of police—one to protect the citizen and another (Central Reserve Police, directly under Mrs. Gandhi's control) to protect the state, a classic political police. Richard Pipes, in his excellent account of the Czarist police state, *Russia under the Old Regime*, writes:

> Since 1845...it has been a crime in Russia not only to seek changes in the existing system of government or administration, but even to raise questions about such issues. Politics has been declared by law a monopoly of those in power; the patrimonial spirit...has here at long last been given flesh in neatly composed chapters, articles and paragraphs. Particularly innovative in these provisions is the failure to distinguish deed from intent— a blurring of guilt characteristic of modern police states...."

With some differences in detail, such a police state system has now been imposed on India. Of course, it has yet to be polished and refined, and the tradition of democratic liberties still evokes the spirit of resistance. The "even more sinister realm of totalitarianism" does not yet exist.

> Under a police regime [as Pipes explains the difference], political activity is outlawed and security organs are given practically unlimited powers to make sure the proscription is observed. The system is essentially defensive; it is created to beat back challenges. Totalitarianism is characterized by a more positive approach: while it includes also all the elements of police statehood, it goes beyond them, trying to reorganize society in such a manner that all public institutions and expressions of social life, even those with no political connotation, fall under the management of the bureaucracy, or, more specifically, its security apparatus. Everything is politicized and everything directed.

If India is not fully totalitarian, certainly the hopes of those who believed that economic development and a lessening of gross inequities could take place within a democratic framework have been dashed. The opposition—active and stronger than it is given credit for in the American press—is alive and functioning both above-ground and underground. Clearly on the defensive, it has a long struggle ahead as it works out its message to the Indian people—that the existence of a developing economy moving in the direction of greater equality for the people can be achieved, indeed, can only be achieved, with a revival of democratic rights and institutions. □

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Peter Reddaway

Dissent in the Soviet Union

Under Stalin, Soviet society was effectively atomized by the application over two decades of mass terror. In an important if paradoxical sense, it was depoliticized.[2] Since his death in 1953 a process of incipient repoliticization has begun, affecting both the *apparat* that rules the country and many groups outside it. The process was encouraged in various deliberate and nondeliberate ways by Khrushchev, but has developed much faster under his successors. This has been partly in reaction to their tendency to try to *discourage* it and, in important respects, to reverse it. One could also perhaps say that in the absence of a return to mass terror such a process has been inevitable. In any case, most of the groups outside the *apparat* have developed increasingly dissenting features, a trend that seems sure to continue.

Today the leadership of the *apparat* possesses enormous power, but probably decreasing authority (at any rate at home). A similar situation existed, we might note in passing, in the last decades of the Czarist period. Today's leadership cannot, however, try to increase its authority by adopting a new ideology or seriously atoning for the past, as such a course appears to it much more risky—cf. Khrushchev's partial attempts—than "clinging on."

Why is this so? First, perhaps because the post-Khrushchev leadership has systematically suppressed the issue of the mass crimes of Stalin, which involved, among other things, the death of some 20 million Soviet citizens through shooting, concentration camps, deportations, and artificial famine in the period 1930–53. The leadership is therefore widely, if often subconsciously, linked with those crimes and with all the personal, social, and economic suffering that accompanied them, some of which persists to this day. A second reason is that Soviet Marxism-Leninism has become ossified, ritualized, and almost universally—except within the party apparatus, where it is the obligatory language—discredited or ignored. In this way an ideological vacuum has been created in society and even, potentially, within the *apparat*. It is this vacuum that the dissenting forces show some signs of beginning to fill, much to the alarm of the *apparat*.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Soviet leaders continue firmly to reject the idea of "ideological coexistence" (as opposed to "peaceful coexistence"), as such coexistence would tend to facilitate and, even worse, legitimize the growth of domestic dissent and opposition. When dissent nonetheless appears they often label it subversion, as will be seen below.

Definitions of Dissent and Opposition

THIS BRINGS US to the problem of defining dissent and opposition. In any autocracy where such activities are illegitimate, or only semi-legitimate, and where the true aims of the dissenters and oppositionists are often therefore disguised, this problem is difficult. Under an autocracy with totalitarian goals, like that of the CPSU,[3] it is especially difficult. Broadly,

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though, opposition implies an aspiration to rule in place of the existing rulers, whereas dissent implies no such aspiration, just an objection to certain of the rulers' actions or policies and a determination to "articulate demands" not only through approved, but also through non-approved channels. Thus Trotsky and his followers openly called themselves an opposition, even when exiled abroad. But the 2,000-odd documents and books of *samizdat* that have reached the West in the last decade from extra-systemic sources contain very few references to any "opposition" in the U.S.S.R. today. Their authors use most frequently about themselves and their colleagues the word dissenters [*inakomyslyashchie*]. And such people are usually regarded as expressing dissent [*inakomyslie*], either in their writings or by their "actions in defense of human (or national) rights."

Nonetheless, Soviet dissent should still be viewed as a seedbed for opposition, and some of the dissenters as proto-oppositionists. For although most dissenters do not form conspiratorial groups or draft political programs, and thereby at least imply a desire to change the system and play a leading part in a new one, there are some who do,[4] and the borderline between the two categories is often blurred. Also, there is the ambiguous phenomenon of those writings—like some of Sakharov's and Roy Medvedev's—which virtually amount to oppositional programs, but whose authors show little or no inclination to court arrest by participating in oppositional (rather than dissenting) activity. This phenomenon could, perhaps, be called intellectual opposition.[5]

Opposition within the Regime

ALTHOUGH THE REGIME'S greatest weakness is its own inflexibility and the inflexibility of its *apparat* (terror no longer being available to cut through the various powerful vested interests), opposition can and does, as Conquest and others have shown,[6] exist at the higher levels. It is different in character from extra-systemic opposition, being, despite the party's ban on factionalism, less illegitimate and also more shifting and fluid. It occurs on particular issues and groups of issues, but, as with the "anti-Party group" in the mid-1950s, it can quickly develop and embrace broad trends of policy. It is especially likely to appear when a power struggle is producing instability in the leadership.

Opposition within the *apparat* is, of course, when it occurs, the only significant and fully political opposition that can exist in the contemporary Soviet Union. But it constitutes a big and largely separate subject, and therefore falls outside the bounds of this essay. We might only note here that in a system as inflexible as the Soviet one, and in a world where change occurs with increasing rapidity, either opposition factions or established leaders could well in future feel compelled to look outside the Establishment for new ideas. Thus they could easily make contact with the dissenters in a way that most of the latter would welcome. Already one can infer that certain sorts of unorthodox ideas attract at any rate small sections of the *apparat*. Roy Medvedev, although a rather isolated figure among the active dissenters, has evidently enjoyed enough protection from *apparatchiki* sympathetic to his brand of "socialism with a human face" to enable him to continue writing and publishing abroad. And, probably of greater significance, the Russian nationalist dissenters outside the *apparat* clearly enjoy high-level protection, as they have been virtually immune from arrest.

Soviet Law and KGB Practice in the Area of Dissent

THE TRADITIONAL Soviet tendency has been to see, or pretend to see, actual or potential opposition in almost all forms of persistent dissent. Yet it should be stressed at this point that the Criminal Code, in defining different types of political offense, does make a distinction between dissent and opposition, even though not in those terms. Opposition is punishable under, notably, articles 70 and 72, which concern "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "anti-Soviet organization,"

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both conducted with the aim of weakening or overthrowing the Soviet system as a whole. The penalties are correspondingly severe. Article 190/1, by contrast, in practice concerns dissent. It penalizes the possession or propagation (in written or oral form) of "deliberate fabrications which discredit the Soviet political and social system." It is not concerned with agitation against the system as a whole, and so the penalties are relatively light (up to three years' imprisonment or five years' exile).

The fact that "deliberate fabrications," rather than "views objectionable to the state," are specified in article 190/1 can presumably be explained by an official desire not to contradict too blatantly the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience. Yet, partly because of the dissenters' efforts, this fact has a definitely inhibiting effect on the KGB in some cases. In others, however, the well-documented pleas of defendants that they have propagated no fabrications, let alone deliberate ones, are simply ignored by the courts (acting on party or police instructions), which sentence them regardless. The dissenters' only satisfaction then is that they have clearly revealed the kangaroo nature of the proceedings.

Similarly, the KGB has to consider carefully, in some cases, whether it has enough evidence to prosecute under, say, article 70 or whether it must content itself with article 190/1. The strength or weakness of their inhibitions in any particular case depends on many factors: are they operating in Moscow (under the eyes of activists and foreigners), or in the provinces (where arbitrariness knows fewer restraints)? Is the defendant skillful in his own defense and would he be able effectively to expose evidence they might fabricate? Has he managed to outmaneuver them and secure the services of one of the few lawyers who will vigorously defend him? And what are the operational guidelines of the moment from their political masters?

The KGB is, then, subject to certain political and legal restraints in its handling of dissent. More than this, ever since the arrest of Beria, the reduction of his empire, and this empire's subordination to close party control, the regime has taken pains to bureaucratize the KGB and thus to ensure that it can never again be used to destroy the party leadership as it did in the 1930s. The regime has achieved this partly through introducing (in the 1950s) laws to limit the KGB's powers, and partly through appointing men from the party apparatus to head the organization, to follow Politbureau guidelines, and to prevent the reemergence of any tendencies to autonomy.

The dissenters too impose restraints. As discussed above, they try to take full advantage of the more liberal laws. They also, with equal skill, use the weapon of publicity through *samizdat*, foreign news media, and Western radio stations broadcasting to the U.S.S.R. In this way they increase the political cost of planned KGB repressions and sometimes mitigate or even prevent them.[7]

Mainstream Dissent Outside the *Apparat*

MANIFESTATIONS OF "mainstream" dissent first appeared in the mid-1950s.[8] But a genuine human rights movement, in which different groups consciously cooperated with each other, began to emerge only in 1965-67. The main catalyst was the Ukrainian and Moscow arrests of 1965. These alarmed the more critical minds among the professional classes, which had become accustomed since 1953 to a significant degree of security and stability in their lives, to an at least embryonic rule of law. These minds had also been pondering for some years the phenomenon of Stalinism and drawing the lesson that unless one resists tyranny firmly from the start, the tyrant will soon eliminate the chance of any resistance at all. They therefore felt that the 1965 arrests, coming as they did at the same time as the tightening of the censorship and the banning of public discussion of Stalinism, might well signal a regeneration of Stalinism and that they must resist at once before it was too late.

This attitude of "Never again!"—stimulated by further political arrests in 1967 and the trial of the young intellectuals Galanskov and Ginzburg—brought the human rights movement to maturity in 1968.[9] In this year

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the *Chronicle of Current Events* began to appear, every two months, and to act as a forum and "information center" for all the main groups.[10]

The most important prerequisite for this achievement by the dissenters—and also for all others—was the breaking of a series of social and political taboos, which were several decades old, and the creation of a certain atmosphere among a small section of the intelligentsia in various large cities. In this atmosphere people dared to think and act independently of the authorities, to create formal and semiformal associations, to intercede for persecuted individuals and groups, to send information and texts of intercessions to the editors of the *Chronicle* in Moscow, to give similar material to foreign journalists, tourists, and diplomats, to listen systematically to foreign radio stations and then circulate the information obtained, to turn *samizdat* into a large-scale cottage industry, to stage demonstrations, to propose to the authorities carefully drafted proposals for law reform,[11] and so on. In this atmosphere the *Chronicle* could appear and, with luck, survive.

What were its editorial principles? It avoided value judgments, it reported factually and objectively on events connected with human or national rights, and it summarized new works circulating in *samizdat*. Its liberal political position was implied by the article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (no. 19), which it carried regularly on its masthead: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Its economic position was not stated, but its overall attitudes showed clearly enough in the atmosphere of enthusiasm (then mourning) for the "Czechoslovak Spring" that some of its pages reflected.

The *Chronicle's* editors were, and still are, anonymous, as are the news items and articles, but not usually the documents that it carries. But much is now known of its methods of compilation. Its editors have changed and rotated quite often, and very few people have known for sure who they were at any particular moment. Material for inclusion has been passed to these few people along chains that have developed on the basis of personal friendship and trust. The method of distribution has been the standard one for *samizdat*: typescripts passed from hand to hand, constantly being retyped in ten copies on onionskin paper.

Throughout its first two or three years the *Chronicle* steadily expanded its geographical coverage and its size. By 1971 it had published material from most of the major population centers of the European and Central Asian parts of the Soviet Union, and from a few labor camps and cities in Siberia. The most prominent cities over the years have been Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov, Vilna, Kaunas, Riga, Tallin, Gorky, Novosibirsk, and Tashkent.

The *Chronicle's* subject matter, apart from the *samizdat* summaries, can be categorized as information on: the judicial or extrajudicial persecution of individuals for expression of their views; the severe conditions in the labor camps and mental hospitals used to imprison dissenters;[12] the persecution of minority nationalities and religious believers; the activities of the censorship,[13] and a few other oppressive institutions; and reactions to the dissenters' situation in the outside world. Underlying all the *Chronicle's* reporting has been an insistent concern for legality, for the observation of Soviet laws (in their more liberal interpretation), and for the subtle education of its readers in how to use their legal rights to promote the democratization of society. Other notable features have been the *Chronicle's* size and also the accuracy, concreteness, and detailed nature of its information: an average issue is 10-15,000 words long; the first 32 issues contain nearly 4,000 different names (about half belonging to dissenters and a third to officials and their collaborators); it has made no reporting errors of substance; and it has corrected most of its minor errors in subsequent issues. In the underground conditions of its compilation and editing, clearly unusual care has been needed to attain this level of accuracy.

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The "mainstream" dissent movement, as opposed to the related but largely separate national and religious movements, has so far been supported at various times by only some 2,000 people whose names we know.[14] But it has a considerably larger number of sympathizers, who read *samizdat* publications, help it in various ways, but prefer not to put their names to documents or protests. Socially, the movement is overwhelmingly middle-class. Among its informal leaders are a high percentage of people from research institutes, including a disproportionately high number of mathematicians and physicists. Other leaders and supporters are engineers, teachers, lawyers, writers, artists, journalists, and students, with a very small number of workers and military men.

The movement has only been organized in the loosest sense, through personal contacts and a feeling of common purpose in difficult and often dangerous circumstances. That it would lose much of this unity if the regime were one day to liberalize and to ease the pressures on it is certain. The moral concerns that hold it together are a common humanitarianism, a common insistence on legality, and a common moral opposition to the oppressive methods of the regime. Hence it views itself not as a political but a human rights movement, a movement that asserts the worth of the individual *vis-à-vis* the omnipotence and frequent brutality of the state.

This said, we may now look more closely at the main political, ideological, and philosophical tendencies within it.

Neo-Leninists and Neo-Marxists

A SMALL and apparently declining sector consider (or considered) themselves neo-Leninists or neo-Marxists.[15] Some of these have formed groups with names like "True Communists," which the KGB has usually broken up without much difficulty.[16] People such as the late writer Alexei Kosterin and ex-Major General Pyotr Grigorenko have tried to promote a return to Leninist ideals within the party, but have found little response and been expelled. Kosterin died in 1968, and Grigorenko was imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital.[17] The historian Roy Medvedev has pursued a similar line in a very different and less idealistic style, but also with little apparent success.[18] The absorbing *Political Diary*,[19] produced in his circles, shows in some detail how the *apparat* reacted over the years 1964-70 to this political trend and how it moved against it with increased decisiveness after seeing what a similar (if much stronger) trend could produce in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nonetheless, Medvedev has so far been allowed to keep the small flame of liberal Communism alight in the U.S.S.R., perhaps because elements in the *apparat* believe that the regime might one day need to turn in that direction.

Liberals and Humanitarians

THE SECOND TREND in the mainstream, and much the most important, can be described as liberal and humanitarian. Many people in it might call themselves apolitical supporters of ordinary human decency. Their more politically minded friends would probably not reject the Western labels liberal, liberal socialist, or, in the case of the Orthodox layman Anatoly Levitin, Christian socialist. This is the trend that has produced the *Chronicle of Current Events* and includes such people as Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Bogoraz, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, Victor Nekrasov, and Andrei Sakharov.[20]

Sakharov, one of the more politically minded adherents of the trend, regards himself as having moved since the mid-1960s from neo-Marxism to liberal socialism to liberalism. But since 1970 he has been typical of the trend in his tactics and his values. Skillfully using his semiprotected position as a famous scientist, he has sought more than anyone else to legitimize in practice the constitutional right to communicate truthful information at home and abroad. Such communication has now been performed so often with impunity by Sakharov, and by others operating to some extent under his wing, that it has become increasingly difficult for the KGB to prosecute producers of

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the *Chronicle*, which regularly does exactly the same thing. Naturally, though, the KGB's guidelines could be changed in future, to obviate this dilemma.

The humanitarian trend believes in the liberal principle of helping any individuals or groups persecuted for their beliefs. Thus it maintains links with a wide variety of national, religious, and cultural groups, studies their problems, transmits their petitions, journals, and appeals abroad, gives these documents to foreign visitors and journalists, and publishes them in full or in summary in the *Chronicle*. It also runs an unofficial "Red Cross" system of welfare and support for political prisoners and their families. Money and clothing are collected from well-off sympathizers and distributed to those in need. Money also comes from Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, who have set up funds abroad out of income from their publications and from literary and humanitarian prizes. In addition to much *ad hoc* activity, regular meetings are held in Moscow flats, where relatives of political prisoners congregate, often from distant corners of the country, to exchange information and experiences, obtain legal advice, and, as their family incomes have often become nil, communicate their material needs.

Liberal Russian Nationalists

THE THIRD and last broad trend can be labeled liberal Russian nationalist. The label distinguishes it from more chauvinistic varieties, which will be discussed later in a broader review of recent forms of dissenting Russian nationalism. This trend is not particularly strong or influential, but the presence in it of one man, Solzhenitsyn, however uncomfortably he fits, suggests that it may become stronger. Solzhenitsyn belongs in part, in fact, in the previous category, to which many of his friends also belong, as humanitarianism and human rights (especially opposition to censorship) figure strongly among his preoccupations, alongside his predominant concern for the moral regeneration of the Russian nation and the rebirth of Russian culture.[21] But his "Open Letter to the Soviet Leaders," published in 1974, clarifies matters and puts him indisputably among the liberal nationalists.

Vladimir Osipov, for three years the chief editor of the *samizdat* journal, *Veche*, calls himself a "liberal patriot." He has friends among the liberals, but strongly supports Solzhenitsyn's political position, and has consistently propagated in *Veche* the virtues of the 19th-century Slavophiles, whom Solzhenitsyn also admires. In early 1974 Osipov was ousted from the *Veche* editorship by less liberal elements, but soon founded a new journal of his own, *Zemlya*, only to be arrested in November of that year. It remains to be seen how strong support for his position will be in the future, and also whether the KGB will ultimately regard the liberal or the right-wing nationalists as more dangerous. The question of why it regarded Solzhenitsyn as more dangerous than any other dissenter, and therefore deported him abroad by force, is much clearer. His *Gulag Archipelago*, in particular, undermines the regime in passionate language at what, as noted earlier, are probably two of its most vulnerable points; its past record of mass crimes and now widely discredited ideology.

Mainstream Dissenters and the West

THE VALUES of the dominant trend in the mainstream dissent movement are, broadly speaking, similar to Western democratic ideals. The dissenters have therefore, with one or two exceptions, expected that the Western democracies will support them, and have sent a continuous stream of appeals to them to do so. Much less has been done from the West than the dissenters have hoped, but more than nothing. Most important have probably been, first, the contribution of Western radio stations (especially Radio Liberty, which devotes up to a quarter of its broadcast time to transmitting *samizdat* texts) and, second, the determination of some governments and newspapers to try to defend the limited rights of Western journalists in the U.S.S.R. However, détente has worried some dissenters, notably Sakharov,[22] because, while they support it fully in principle, they

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fear that the regime will succeed in conducting it on its own selfish terms and in exploiting what they see as Western opportunism and naïveté. In this way, they fear, the West may be lulled into a false and dangerous sense of security, and the regime may be able both to postpone reform (especially economic) at home and to suppress more easily the growth of democratic trends.

To some extent their fears may, so far, have proved justified. Governments which have spoken out about the South African, Brazilian, Greek, Spanish, Chilean, and other authoritarian regimes have preferred not to criticize publicly (or even, apparently, privately) the U.S.S.R.'s suppression of human rights and its treatment of political prisoners in forced labor camps and mental hospitals. In particular, the silence of the Nixon-Kissinger administration on these issues probably enabled the KGB to be considerably more repressive than the Politbureau would otherwise have permitted.

The one occasion on which a few governments spoke up was in the autumn of 1973, when a virulent campaign against Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov was launched in the Soviet media. This episode did, however, see a certain breakthrough in nongovernmental, liberal opinion in the West, and this opinion, by its interventions, succeeded in acting as an at least temporary brake on KGB repression. An important lead was given by a statement of America's National Academy of Sciences in defense of Sakharov, and much liberal opinion—in the press and in organizations like the International PEN Club, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Amnesty International, and so on—followed suit. Thus, we might note, the situation of the late Czarist period may have been recreated. At that time equivalent opinion was strongly critical of the autocracy, while Western governments generally held their fire, not apparently realizing sufficiently that the noble causes of constitutional government and international stability would not be served if the autocracy reformed itself too little and too late.

Impact of Mainstream Dissent on the Regime

THE DISSENTERS have not claimed that they constitute a powerful pressure group, nor that they make a continuous impact on the regime's policies. Yet we have seen the danger that the regime ascribes to Solzhenitsyn's writings, and the Politbureau must often have taken the dissenters into account when deciding, for example, how much to rehabilitate Stalin, how far it could afford to tighten political control, whether to make the censorship more severe (which would divert still more works into *samizdat*), whether to continue its internment of dissenters in mental hospitals (a convenient device internally, but politically embarrassing abroad), whether to ease its emigration policy, and so on.

Above all, perhaps, the mainstream dissenters have had an impact on the regime in two indirect but powerful ways. First, their writings and their example have probably had a considerable effect in persuading Western opinion of the continuingly authoritarian nature of the Soviet system. In a period when, in reaction to the prolonged tensions of the Cold War, some Western opinion has felt inclined to take Soviet assurances and intentions at face value, this role could not have been filled as effectively by anyone else. Second, the dissenters have, by breaking out of "the inertia of fear," provided a powerful example to other oppressed groups in Soviet society of how to act. Their books and protests, and the *Chronicle*, have been systematically sent abroad and then broadcast back to the U.S.S.R. and listened to by millions of people. Some of the latter have belonged to groups that, as we shall see below, have gradually found the means and the resolution to imitate the dissenters' methods and take advantage of their services.

Mainstream Dissent and Its Prospects

BUT HOWEVER MUCH impact the dissenters have or have not made, in late 1971 it became too much for the regime to continue tolerating them at the then existing level. A high-level

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decision was taken to suppress the *Chronicle* and other major *samizdat* activities at all costs. A contributory factor in the decision, many dissenters believe, was an assurance allegedly given by the Nixon administration, as it laid the groundwork for détente, that it would not make a public issue, or even protest, about the Soviet suppression of dissent. There is no proof that such an assurance was given, but, as mentioned above, no protests were in fact made.

In any case, in January 1972, as preparations were being made for Nixon's first visit to Moscow as president, the KGB struck at the *Chronicle* and its Ukrainian equivalent, the *Ukrainian Herald*. In the course of the year several hundred apartment searches and interrogations were conducted in the case against the *Chronicle*, in a variety of cities, and a dozen or so arrests were made. The breakthrough came late in the year, when two well-known Moscow dissenters, Pyotr Yakir and Victor Krasin, began to collaborate with the investigators after several months in prison. With a mass of detailed information from these men the KGB eventually succeeded in silencing the *Chronicle*, driving some of their associates into emigration under threat of long-term imprisonment, jailing others, and intimidating yet others. Much of the intricate network of *Chronicle* correspondents and distributors was uncovered, and 1973 was a year of reduced and less coordinated activity. Indeed, the movement *as such* sank to a low ebb, as the *Chronicle* had, in effect, been its principal collective expression. Nonetheless, many networks continued to function, funneling information and documents to the outside world in as large quantities as before, partly perhaps in response to the founding of a "substitute" publication, *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, in New York.[23]

In September 1973 the KGB launched its media campaign against the two most formidable dissenting figures, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, presumably planning to arrest or deport them and thus bring dissent under better control. At this moment, however, when, ironically, mainstream dissent was in considerable confusion, Western opinion at last spoke up. As a result, over the next few months the KGB presumably received new guidelines from the Politbureau, the remaining dissenters took courage, a new coordinated network gradually took shape, and in May 1974 the *Chronicle* reemerged with four large issues to fill in most of the backlog since its suppression.

To sum up, by the end of 1974 at least half the leaders of the "first generation" of mainstream dissent had been more or less neutralized through imprisonment, emigration, exhaustion, intimidation, or death. But a second generation had begun to appear, and it seemed to be heartened by the increased vigor and cooperation of a wide range of dissenting groups outside the mainstream. If, though, as may be surmised, the humanitarian mainstream is too Western-oriented, too apolitical, and too rational ever to develop widespread support in the U.S.S.R., then, if the politicization of society should gather speed, more politically minded dissenters may divert an increasing amount of their energies elsewhere. But it seems likely that the services of a basically humanitarian movement will be needed for a long time to come, and the moral strength of the present movement will probably prove to be more than the KGB can break.

Dissent Among the National Minorities

IT IS QUESTIONABLE whether the KGB has become more concerned over the last decade about mainstream dissent or nationalities' dissent. For the latter might eventually, as Amalrik has predicted, lead to the fragmentation of Russia's border lands, as happened in 1917-21.

The evidence suggests that significant and growing currents of opinion in a number of the Union republics feel that their nations did not achieve after 1917 (or 1944) the liberation from Russification and Russian imperialism the Bolsheviks appeared to promise them and now justified by their growing national consciousness (similar to that of many other peoples in the world's disintegrating empires).

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Such currents of opinion have been strongest in those republics and areas that the U.S.S.R. annexed during the Second World War: here the brutality of the annexations ensured that there were fewer illusions about Soviet intentions.

National dissent in the republics has opposed, mainly, two separate but interconnected policies: first, the camouflaged but persistent policy of Russification, which manifests itself in the promotion of things Russian and in discrimination against minority languages, traditions, literatures, cultures, and religions, and also in the officially sponsored settlement of Russians (or other Slavs) in minority areas. And second, this dissent has opposed the policy in practice—despite the façade of a federal structure that enshrines the sovereignty of the national republics—of dictating all important political and economic policies from Moscow. The national dissenters have based their protests and demands on the law and the constitution. And thus, not surprisingly, they have had much in common, and important contacts, with the mainstream dissenters. They have also found sympathy on occasion from the local party leaders, whose loyalty to the center—particularly over economic exploitation by Moscow—has apparently sometimes become weaker than their loyalty to their nation. If this last phenomenon should become more common in the future, involving, as it does, a major potential vulnerability of the Soviet system, then it could probably be said that the nationalities problem would definitely become the regime's first preoccupation in the area of dissent.

The Ukraine

UKRAINIAN DISSENT has a long and complex history but stems, in its contemporary form, mainly from Khrushchev's policy of increased Russification, introduced at the end of the 1950s. This stimulated dissent in literary and other circles, but, although several groups were arrested each year and their members sentenced, in a few cases to death, little suppression of socially more established dissenters occurred until 1965. Then, concurrently with the arrests of Sinyavsky and Daniel in Moscow, 20 Ukrainian intellectuals were also arrested and sentenced to up to six years each. Their cases were documented in *The Chornovil Papers* (New York, 1968), the compilation of a young Lvov journalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil.[24] In his long introduction, written in early 1966, Chornovil skillfully deployed the juridical approach developed in subsequent years by the mainstream dissenters. With the latter the Ukrainian dissenters maintained close ties from the start, and as a result their problems have been well covered in the *Chronicle*.

For his book Chornovil served 18 months in a labor camp, but with this and one other exception there were no arrests of well-known people in the Ukraine from 1966 until December 1971. This was the period when First Party Secretary Petro Shelest tried to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The other exception was the historian Valentyn Moroz, who served four years in 1965-69, and who in 1970 was resentenced to 14 years of prison and exile for his writings. These powerfully written essays are concerned with human and national individuality and especially with the rebuilding of Ukrainian nationhood.[25]

But, as noted above, the KGB's major move came in January 1972. At this point, with Shelest's political position slipping fast and Shcherbytsky replacing him in May, the KGB arrested at least 50 dissenters and had them sentenced to an average of nearly ten years of prison and exile each. In this way the *Ukrainian Herald*, which had published six large issues in *samizdat* over two years, was soon suppressed, and with it, for a period, articulate national dissent. In 1974, however (following the Moscow *Chronicle*), it re-emerged.[26] Nonetheless, Ukrainian dissent sustained in 1972 the heaviest single KGB assault since 1953 of any dissenting group, and so it remains to be seen how quickly it will recover. When it does so, it will probably be the stronger for its roll call of new martyrs and will have more chance of extending its roots from the intelligentsia down into the working

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class, which may, especially in the West Ukraine, prove to be more fertile soil than can at present be demonstrated from documents.

Lithuania

FOR WHATEVER the potential strength of Ukrainian dissent, it has at no stage (since the 1940s) been a mass movement. The only republic whose national movement has achieved this status so far is Lithuania. Here the interlocked national and Catholic traditions, reminiscent of Poland, and the relatively small number of non-Lithuanians in the population of 3 million have facilitated the growth of a movement that the KGB seems powerless to stop. The movement began in the late 1960s among groups of Catholic priests, who protested against the restrictions on the printing of Bibles and religious literature, on the admission of students to seminaries, and on the freedom of action of the hierarchy. In 1971 the arrest of two priests stimulated the unrest, and although they received only one-year sentences,[27] in early 1972 the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* began to appear in *samizdat* and 17,000 signatures were collected on an appeal to Dr. Waldheim to intervene and bring religious persecution to an end. In May 1972 riots broke out in Kaunas, Lithuania's second city, after a student had burned himself to death in protest against the persecution of religion and national traditions.[28]

Since then the situation has remained tense, with the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church* appearing regularly, and with occasional arrests and trials. By late 1974, 11 large issues of the *Chronicle* had come out, edited in a more militant style than most other *samizdat* journals and calling repeatedly for support from the Vatican and from Christians abroad.[29] The most determined KGB drive against it was launched in November 1973 with a large wave of searches and interrogations, and some arrests, in various cities and villages. To date, though, evidently in deference to the mass nature of the dissent, the authorities have refrained from imposing sentences longer than six years at political trials.

Armenia, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and Moldavia

IN ARMENIA, Latvia, and Estonia national movements clearly exist but are much weaker than those in Lithuania and the Ukraine. Their exact strength is still difficult to gauge, as too few documents are yet available. Those at hand suggest that the Lithuanian example may have started to infect Latvia and Estonia, where small dissenting groups have been arrested, but if so the results are unlikely to be as dramatic as in Lithuania. These two republics are not united around a single national religion, and they have a higher proportion of Russian settlers.

In Armenia national and religious traditions are intertwined, as in Lithuania, but memories of the Turkish massacres appear to have acted as a brake on the growth of the national movement. The latter seems to have developed at the end of the 1960s. Major arrests and trials of dissenters occurred in 1968-70,[30] and 1973–74.

In Georgia documentary *samizdat* evidence of national dissent began to appear only in 1973.[31] One catalyst appears to have been the removal in 1972 of First Party Secretary Mzhavanadze and the drive of his successor, Shevardnadze, against corruption. Another catalyst was a revolt by laymen and priests against profound corruption in the hierarchy of the Georgian Orthodox Church. But although the Armenian example might prove infectious, the contribution of the church revolt to the national stirrings is likely to be limited, as the Church is in general much weaker in Georgia than in Armenia, let alone than in Lithuania or in the Western Ukraine.

In Moldavia national stirrings favor, as might be expected, the return of the republic to the Rumanian motherland, which, with its militant nationalism, has not refrained from hinting that it would favor the same thing.

Belorussia and, even more, Azerbaijan, it should be noted, show little signs even of stirrings. The Central Asian republics are a more complex phenomenon, but it must suffice to

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say here that they have not yet produced any *samizdat* documents except those by the exiled minorities to be discussed below. Anti-Russian nationalism and pan-Islamicism clearly exist, but they have not yet progressed, apparently, beyond moods and attitudes and what dissenting scholars can convey between the lines of their writings.

The Dissent of National Minorities without Their Own Republics

ATTENTION will now be turned to a different source of national dissent, those peoples who wish, in large numbers, to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. or to return from their places of internal exile to their homelands inside the U.S.S.R.

The Jews

THE BEST KNOWN of these peoples are the Jews, whose national movement has received wide publicity since 1969-70. The movement's development is of special interest and importance, as the Jews are not tucked away in some corner of the Soviet Union like all the peoples described above except the Ukrainians. They are, on the contrary, scattered in many parts of the country, especially in its large cities, where some of them occupy important positions in the economy, the arts, higher education, research, and the professions.

In the late 1960s the still extant traces of the Russian Zionism of 40 years earlier received a boost from, first, the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War, and second, the emerging human rights movement, in which many Jews were participating. The result, especially as the KGB pressed down increasingly on the human rights movement, was the rapid development of a movement to emigrate to Israel. The movement spread quickly from Kiev, Moscow, and the Baltic to Georgia, Leningrad, Kharkov, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and Central Asia. Imitating the methods of the mainstream dissenters, it produced a *samizdat* journal, *Exodus*, adopted the juridical approach in appeals to the authorities, staged demonstrations and sit-ins, and passed its news and other materials to foreign journalists and tourists. They also pioneered a new method, soon imitated by the dissenters, of communicating regularly with the West by international telephone, dictating whole documents on to tape recorders in London, Paris, New York, and San Francisco.[32]

At first the authorities resisted. But in 1970, as the Jewish lobby in the West began to operate, and as the thwarted would-be emigrants resorted to increasingly militant methods, including the planned hijack of a plane, the KGB had little choice but to yield. The other options were presumably unacceptable. To put thousands of Jews in camps was impossible for reasons of foreign policy, and was anyway no longer, for a fully bureaucratized KGB, an easy task. But to tolerate the *status quo*, in which the Jews were with virtual impunity providing an example of militancy to many other oppressed groups in various cities, and in which publicity was building up abroad, was also impossible.

So the gates were unlocked and by 1974 the 100,000th Jew had pushed through them. A radical change in emigration policy had been forced on the regime, a change which the Jackson Amendment had capitalized on, but in no way initiated, and which may prove to be little affected by the Soviet renunciation in January 1975 of the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement of 1972. The major limiting factor in future, as regards the volume of Jewish emigration, may prove to be the capacity of Israel and the West to absorb it. At the same time the regime can be expected to detain various Jewish scientists and other economically valuable people for considerable periods before letting them go. Meanwhile, some of them will probably continue to give support of various kinds to the mainstream dissenters, especially in Moscow.

The Soviet Germans

THE SOVIET GERMANS, at present almost 2 million in number, were deported by Stalin after the Nazi invasion of 1941 and simultaneously lost their Autonomous Republic on the

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Volga. In 1955 the punitive exile regime imposed on them was lifted, but not until 1964 were they legally exculpated of their alleged crime of having helped the Nazi invaders *en masse*. These easings of their position were closely connected with the evolution of Soviet-West German relations. But their long campaign for permission to return to their homeland and to have their Autonomous Republic restored had still, in 1974, been unsuccessful. Indeed, from the early 1970s a growing number of them decided that the struggle was hopeless and that in any case the Jewish movement had been setting a very persuasive example.

Thus a German emigration movement emerged, using the same militant tactics as the Jews. In 1974 close links were established with the mainstream dissenters, demonstrations were staged in Moscow and Tallin, and a *samizdat* journal, *Re Patria*, began to appear.[33]

Again, militancy, helped by the conjuncture of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, appears to have paid off. In the years 1971-74 some 13,000 Germans reached West Germany, and the rate rose steadily to some 4,000 per year by 1973. Few Germans appear to have gone to East Germany. As with the Jews, though, Soviet policy has been two-pronged: some 40 Zionist Jews were, in late 1974, in labor camps, along with about 25 activists of the German movement. Although the Soviet Germans are about a million less numerous than the Jews, their movement seems likely to become a strong one and to figure increasingly prominently in negotiations between the Soviet and West German governments.

The Meskhetians

THE MESKHETIANS are a small Turkic people, of probably less than 200,000, from the south Georgian border with Turkey. In November 1944 they were deported by Stalin to Central Asia, evidently to clear possible opposition from the path of a planned Soviet advance into Turkey. No charges were preferred against them, and in the mid-1950s the punitive regime imposed on those who survived the deportation was lifted. At once they began a campaign to be allowed to return home, organizing "congresses of the people" at which, in the mid-1960s, 6,000 delegates elected campaign committees. They also sent emissaries to Moscow to lobby both officials and, to greater effect, the circles which produced the *Chronicle*.[34]

In 1974, however, success on the key issue had still eluded them, even though from 1970 on they had begun demanding that if the authorities would not let them return home they should allow them to emigrate to their brothers and fellow Muslims in Turkey. So far the Turkish government has shown no public readiness to accept them, and apparently none of them have received exit permits. As the regime apparently forbids their return home for strategic reasons, the problem they pose will presumably fester until such time as emigration is allowed.

The Crimean Tatars

THE RECENT HISTORY of the Crimean Tatars has certain similarities to that of the Meskhetians. Their deportation in 1944 was, however, punishment for their alleged wholesale collaboration with the Germans, and not until 1967 did they win the removal of this charge from the record. Earlier, nearly half of them had died as a result of the deportation to Central Asia and elsewhere, and the survivors had undergone a punitive exile regime until 1956. From that point on a powerful and democratically organized campaign to return home was launched, with similar features to that of the Meskhetians. The Moscow dissenters, led by Kosterin and Grigorenko, took up the Tatars' cause with vigor, but to no avail. Between 1956 and 1974 over 200 members of their movement were imprisoned, and thousands who returned to the Crimea without permission were expelled.[35]

Presumably, again, strategic reasons inhibit the regime from allowing them to return home. And presumably the problems of this notably

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united people of nearly 500,000 will continue to generate dissent until the authorities relent. If they continue not to relent, the Tatars, too, may be driven to demand emigration to Turkey, their traditional haven for over two centuries when times have been bad in Russia. But the mere demand, as noted about the Meskhetians, may not change anything.

Nor have the numerous Crimean Tatar appeals to the U.N. and other bodies abroad helped them much as yet. World opinion has been indifferent to their situation, as to the Meskhetians', in contrast to its response to the Jews.

Russian Nationalist Dissent

RUSSIAN nationalist dissent of the variety less liberal than Solzhenitsyn's or Osipov's is an important, but still little studied sector in the spectrum of dissent. To put it in perspective, a brief review of the full range of semilegitimate and extrasystem Russian nationalism since the early 1960s may be useful. Its emergence at that time was probably provoked in part by Khrushchev's orthodox Marxist-Leninist position on the nationalities and religious questions as embodied, for example, in the new party program of 1961. This position tended to injure those Russian as well as Ukrainian (and other) national feelings that had been developing during the gradual de-atomization of society in the 1950s. Hence the emergence in 1964 of both the officially approved "Motherland" [*Rodina*] clubs and the liberal nationalist underground group of Leningrad Social-Christians,[36] and in 1965 of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments. The blossoming of this society, whose membership reached 3 million in a year and 7 million by 1972, suggested that the new party leadership hoped to gain popular support by making concessions to national feelings. Further evidence of benevolent tolerance, or even support, in high places were the thinly disguised neo-Slavophile writings that appeared in a leading Komsomol organ, *Molodaya gvardiya*, in 1967-70, discreetly propagating disapproval of industrialism and proletarian internationalism, and approval of various traditions and qualities associated with the Orthodox Church and the Russian nation.

But official tolerance declined in 1970. In November *Molodaya gvardiya's* chief editor, Anatoly Nikonov, was dismissed and replaced by a Central Committee *apparatchik*, and a few months later one of his neo-Slavophile contributors, Yury D. Ivanov, was sacked from his post at Moscow University. The main response to this came within two months of Nikonov's removal, when Osipov and others founded the *samizdat* journal *Veche* for Russian patriots loyal but not subservient to the regime. Almost at once, from the summer of 1971 on, the KGB reacted by threatening Osipov with arrest and harassing him and his wife.[37] But soon the 1972 campaign against the *Chronicle* and the *Ukrainian Herald* took precedence, and only in 1973 did the KGB go beyond harassment of *Veche*. This was when it sponsored efforts to "co-opt" the journal to a position more acceptable to the regime, in which *Veche* would disown Orthodoxy and anti-industrialism in favor of neopaganism, virulent anti-Semitism, and recognition of the party as the preserver of national unity and stability against the many threats of disintegration that faced the country.[38] When this attempt foundered on the Orthodoxy, which apparently united the producers of *Veche*, the KGB opened a criminal investigation against *Veche* and its numerous supporters. In this way the KGB forced Osipov at last, in March 1974, to close it down after nine book-length issues. Soon, though, a different *Veche* faction, accused by Osipov and his supporters of unsavory collaboration with the authorities, revived it. The new group put out a tenth issue, denounced Osipov for alleged personal misdemeanors, and, while showing some signs of a shift "to the right," asserted its intention to continue the established line. But in July this group, too, closed *Veche* down under pressure of the KGB's investigation. When Osipov, who described himself in 1974 as "a liberal patriot," then started *Zemlya* (*The Earth*), his arrest, as noted above, swiftly followed.[39]

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All this suggests that in late 1974 the regime was trying, by neutralizing the most independent figures, to bring the dissenting Russian nationalists as closely into line as possible, but, by largely avoiding arrests, to keep their alienation to a minimum. However, as a number of *Veche* collaborators, including several of the Leningrad Social-Christians, had remained unbroken by their camp-terms, and as one of these, Leonid Borodin, started another new publication, *Moscow Almanac* [*Moskovskiy sbornik*] in September 1974, it seemed doubtful whether the KGB would achieve any easy *Gleichschaltung*. At the same time the patrons of the *Molodaya gvardiya* line of 1967-70, whoever they may have been, had clearly retained some power since 1970. The first detailed, high-level rebuttal of this line had reportedly been barred by them from publication for nearly a year, prior to its appearance in late 1972,[40] and shortly thereafter its author, A. Yakovlev, acting head of the Propaganda department of the Central Committee, was removed from his post and "exiled" to Canada as ambassador. The notably defensive tone of his article made this development less surprising than it would otherwise have been.

Veche was concerned primarily with: the thought of Slavophiles, nationalists, and neo-Slavophiles; the Orthodox Church and religious thought; Alexander Solzhenitsyn; problems of ecology and the preservation of old Russian architecture; literary and musical themes; and the collapse of moral standards, genuine culture, and self-respect in the Russian nation. Broadly speaking, *Veche* may be said to have represented all the main Christian tendencies—liberal, centrist, and rightist—within dissenting Russian nationalism, with its editorial position more on the liberal side. The word "liberal" implies, in this context, not a commitment to classical political liberalism and a multiparty system, but rather a desire for a liberalized, benevolently authoritarian regime incorporating the best traditions of the Russian nation, and also a liberal attitude on issues such as political censorship, anti-Semitism, the right of minority republics to secession, and the permissibility of publicly criticizing the Orthodox Patriarch and the hierarchy. In these terms, Solzhenitsyn and Osipov are liberal nationalists and can be distinguished from centrist and right-wing tendencies. This said, though, it is worth noting the view (however debatable) of A. M. Ivanov, writing under his pen-name "A. Skuratov" in *Veche* no. 10 that *Veche's* supporters completely share the basic position of Solzhenitsyn as expressed in his "Open Letter to the Soviet Leaders."

In any case, the right-wing fascistic tendency is relatively weakly expressed in *Veche*. This tendency is more often atheistic or pagan, it glorifies strong leaders like Stalin and even (for his Jewish policy) Hitler, and it has a world view permeated by belief in a world Jewish conspiracy as set forth in *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. By late 1974 only a few documents of this tendency were as yet available, although some had, in disguised form, achieved official publication.[41] It was still impossible to gauge the strength of the support in regime circles for either this tendency or the *Veche* tendencies. Even more unclear was how much this support was based on any belief in the ideas themselves, and how much on the view that they might prove a useful instrument in intraparty struggles, in the way that anti-Semitism was used in the Polish leadership struggles of the late 1960s.

Religious Dissent

RELIGIOUS DISSENT has a somewhat marginal political element to it, as most religious dissenters—of whom there are many varieties—simply want greater freedom for religion and are not concerned much about politics (except where religion is intertwined with it, as in Lithuania, the western Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and, incipiently, Russia itself). But their persecution naturally tends to alienate them from the regime. Also, their causes have often been taken up by mainstream dissenters, and some of the latter belong to a church or faith and act as link men. However, as these questions are discussed in another chapter they will not be developed here.

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Working-Class Dissent

IT IS CLEAR that discontent is quite widespread among workers and peasants, but except for frequent "go-slows" and rather rare strikes, and the mass participation in certain national and religious dissent movements, it is not yet organized. It may well become more so in the future, and focus on wages and conditions—a development that would please the mainstream dissenters. In time it may indeed grow and link up in certain ways with the mainstream. The regime clearly fears this, partly because a link-up of that sort was a critical factor in the growth of opposition in the period 1900-17, and so it has tried hard over the last decade to raise steadily the real incomes of the working class. It must also fear the latter as a potentially destructive force in the long tradition of elemental Russian revolt "from below." However, the evidence easily available on the whole subject is as yet of low quality, and so only very tentative speculations can be advanced.[42]

The Pattern of the Decade

LET US NOW PULL the different threads of the discussion together and see what pattern emerges from the decade since Khrushchev's fall. For nearly a year after October 1964 no clear line on dissent was visible. The trend appeared, in fact, to be somewhat liberal, as certain authors and editors took advantage of the general uncertainty to get "liberal" writings into print, and as young, mostly bohemian writers and artists in Moscow became more active. In late August 1965, however, the arrests began in the Ukraine, and two weeks later extended to Sinyavsky and Daniel in Moscow: this was a clear signal to the "creative intelligentsia" as a whole. The latter, however, reacted by developing over the next two years the new techniques of collecting signatures on mass appeals and gaining publicity for them through *samizdat* and the foreign news media. To combat *samizdat* and unauthorized demonstrations, articles 190/1 and 190/3 were added to the Criminal Code in 1966, along with new laws to suppress religious dissent. 1967, it is true, saw the concession of legal exculpation (for their alleged wartime crimes) granted to the Crimean Tartars, who had recently begun sending regular delegations to Moscow and also establishing links there with dissenting intellectuals. But 1967–68 also saw, in response to the Galanskov-Ginzburg case, an acceleration of *podpisantstvo* [the signing of collective protests] and the natural extension of this into the human rights movement and the production of the *Chronicle*.

In spring 1968 the KGB moved against this trend rather cautiously, limiting itself largely to expelling key figures from the party and getting others dismissed from their jobs. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 changed the situation, especially when the Red Square demonstrators had been arrested four days later and sentenced. Political arrests now became a regular occurrence. The KGB had presumably received—from a Politbureau shocked by how rapidly liberalism had burgeoned in Czechoslovakia—new guidelines aimed at preventing the growth of the human rights movement and cutting its links with the Crimean Tartars. In 1969 the KGB set up a new chief directorate to coordinate and direct all activities dealing with the types of dissent discussed in this chapter. As there are in fact only two other chief directorates, this move reflected clearly the KGB's growing concern. By the end of 1969, with people like General Grigorenko and Anatoly Marchenko, a good proportion of the Initiative Group of the Defense of Human Rights, ten Crimean Tartar leaders, and a dozen Armenian nationalists all either arrested or sentenced; with Solzhenitsyn expelled from the Writers' Union; with Shelest having reached a viable *modus vivendi* with the Ukrainian dissenters; and with Western opinion passive—the situation had apparently been brought more or less under control.

Now it was important to weed out heterodoxy in the "thick journals." First came *Novy mir* under Tvardovsky and his revisionist lieutenants, a journal with which the dissenters had many links. In February 1970, after a six-month rearguard action, it succumbed to a

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forcible takeover by literary officials and hacks.[43] Then later in the year, as noted above, a similar takeover brought the excessively nationalist *Molodaya gvardiya* into line.[44]

But 1970 also witnessed the rapid aggravation of a new problem, the Jewish emigration movement. This force was powerful enough that it had to be met by concessions as well as repression. By mid-1971 the guidelines were established: jail those Jews who form underground groups or plan hijacks, but create a safety valve by allowing emigration on a significant (and, we should note, unprecedented) scale.

In 1971 the groundwork was laid for the policy of détente with the U.S.A., and plans made for President Nixon to visit Moscow the next year. It was now important, therefore, to impress on the Western-oriented dissenters from the start that détente would mean a tightening, not a loosening of political controls. So the *Chronicle*, which had obstinately survived the KGB's salami tactics for nearly four years, became from January 1972 on the object of an intensive investigation, to which, by the end of the year, it had succumbed. The simultaneous assault on the Ukrainian dissenters probably resulted from a KGB assessment that Shelest's *modus vivendi* with them had, in view of the vigorous development of the *Ukrainian Herald* over the last two years, broken down in a way that was too dangerous to tolerate any longer.

The drive against the *Chronicle's* creators continued in 1973, but, with the *Chronicle* silent, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn virtually replaced it by their increasingly frequent public statements and interviews. Hence the decision in August to settle accounts with Sakharov, and then, when he was immediately and aggressively defended by Solzhenitsyn, with him too. However, by late October the unprecedented foreign campaign in their defense had forced the KGB on to the retreat. It was only the publication in Paris of *The Gulag Archipelago* two months later—the timing being partly fortuitous—that caused a new press campaign against its author to flare up. This led to his deportation in February 1974 and the persecution of some of his friends, especially in Leningrad.[45]

Meanwhile, the pressure on Sakharov and the *Chronicle* circles had eased somewhat, and the KGB had turned some of its attention to the organizing of sudden waves of searches, interrogations and arrests in Lithuania (November 19-21, 1973) and also in Armenia (November 19). The sequels to these operations continued in 1974, those in Lithuania showing no signs of ending, and a new, if much smaller operation was also launched in Georgia.[46] Other drives, as noted earlier, were aimed at the Russian nationalists and the Germans.

Conclusion

DISSENT IN ITS MANY different forms is, we may conclude, deeper rooted in the U.S.S.R. than most Westerners realize and carries a much stronger emotional charge to it than the majority of Western dissent. This is especially true of minority nationalism, which has continued to advance in many parts of the world for over a century, but has received repeated setbacks in Russia and the U.S.S.R. Thus, in a political system as potentially brittle as the Soviet one, where the ideological vacuum in public life seems likely to produce increasing tensions, the regime could easily in the future mishandle dissenting groups and provoke sudden crises. At present these groups have reached a stage at which they represent dissent rather than political opposition. But the process of the pluralization and repoliticization of society is likely to continue, and possibly accelerate, whatever the KGB does, just as the authority of the Communist party is likely to decline.

In 1965 no organized dissent existed on any significant scale, except among the Crimean Tartars, Meskhetians, Germans, and Baptists. But even in these cases it was (apart from a few successful Baptist efforts) completely unpublicized. Nine years later the situation is radically different. The *de facto* freedom of expression of a steadily increasing number of groups has increased from virtually nil to a

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very significant level. The media involved—*samizdat* and foreign publications and radio stations—have been either semilegitimate or illegitimate: the regime has not, even occasionally, allowed access to its own media. But it has also not been willing, or able, to practice oppression severe enough to curtail the newly won freedom.

The exact degree of oppression of any particular group or individual has depended on many factors, including: the amount of support it (or he) has in the U.S.S.R. and, often more important, abroad; the relevance of its (or his) foreign support to the Soviet economy; the importance of it (or him) to the economy; and how vigorously it (or he) is likely to practice self-defense. These considerations have, taken together, meant that Solzhenitsyn can be dealt with least cost by deportation, as adverse foreign literary opinion does not affect the economy; whereas similar treatment of Sakharov might seriously affect Soviet-American scientific and even trade agreements and must therefore be eschewed. Also, of course, Jews need to be granted concessions, but not Meskhetians or Crimean Tartars: these peoples have no foreign lobby at all, let alone one in a position to influence matters affecting the Soviet economy.

But for dissenting groups to win some *de facto* freedom of expression, and thus be able to articulate their demands loudly, is one thing. To have the demands satisfied is another. Here the record of the last decade is very different. Only the Jews and the Germans have received much satisfaction, and that has been over emigration, not any reform of internal Soviet structures. The mainstream dissenters have scored some marginal, but usually reversible gains, such as an apparent reduction in the use of police psychiatry against dissent, and, especially in Moscow, a slight reduction in the arbitrariness of legal procedures in political cases. But most of their human rights proposals and demands have failed to produce even a tacit dialogue with the authorities, let alone any satisfaction. Even more has this been true of the broader political, economic, and social reforms for which various dissenters have pressed.

Perhaps, in the decade to come, the regime will discover in itself a hidden capacity for change, renewal, and constructive dialogue with dissenting groups. If not, however, Andrei Amalrik's assessment, written in 1969, will presumably have been proved right:

> The regime ... has no wish to change its ways either of its own free will or, still less, by making concessions to anyone or anything. The current process of "widening the area of freedom" could be more aptly described as the growing decrepitude of the regime. The regime is simply growing old and can no longer suppress everyone and everything with the same strength and vigor as before.[47] □

Notes

1. This article is a much revised version of a paper written for the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, but the conclusions are my own. I am grateful to the Commission for permission to print the material in its revised form.
2. I.e., if one views the nature of politics as does Bernard Crick in his *In Defense of Politics* (London, 1962).
3. A party, we may note, that claims to know the full truth about the past, the present, and the future, and proclaims in its 1961 Program the goals of rearing citizens "who will harmoniously combine spiritual wealth, moral purity and a perfect physique" and of producing a society in which observance of the rules of Communism "will become an organic need and habit with everyone."
4. E.g., the Leningrad "Social-Christians," a group of anti-Soviet revolutionaries, or "The Democrats," a Moscow-Leningrad-Baltic group. On the former see P. Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia* (London, 1972), pp. 376-80; also a forthcoming study by John Dunlop, *The New Russian Revolutionaries* (Nordland Press, Mass.). On the latter see the trials of Davydov, Petrov, Bolonkin, and Balakirev in *A Chronicle of Current Events*, no. 29, 30 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1975).
5. The nature of this intellectual opposition of course varies greatly, being colored by each author's temperament and view of his own role. Medvedev is above all a political animal; Sakharov a humanitarian and truth-seeker. Solzhenitsyn, a writer-teacher and prophet in the manner of Tolstoi (but with a different message), in some ways comes into this category too.

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6. E.g., R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (London, 1961), and Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64* (Baltimore, 1966).
7. The most penetrating discussion of most of the issues raised in this section is to be found in Valery Chalidze, *To Defend These Rights: Human Rights and the Soviet Union* (New York, 1974; London, 1975).
8. On the Khrushchev period see especially the documentary collections of Hugh McLean and Walter Vickery, eds., *The Year of Protest, 1956* (New York, 1961), and Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-64* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
9. The most useful books on the mainstream in the second half of the 1960s are: the collection edited by Max Hayward and Leopold Labedz on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, *On Trial* (London, 1967); the two collections edited by Pavel Litvinov, *The Demonstration in Pushkin Square* (London, 1969), and *The Trial of the Four* (London, 1972); the collection edited by Natalya Gorbanevskaya, *Red Square at Noon* (London, 1972); A. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (London, 1970); and A. Brumberg's anthology, *In Quest of Justice* (London, 1970).
10. The first 11 issues of the *Chronicle* appear in full in P. Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia: the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union* (London, 1972). Issues 16-27 have been published as individual booklets by Amnesty International Publications, London, 1971-73, and issues 28-31, published in 1975, as two books, from the same publishers. When the *Chronicle* was silenced in late 1972, the journal *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, V. Chalidze, P. Litvinov, E. Kline and P. Reddaway, eds., began to be published in early 1973 by Khronika Press, New York, operating on lines very similar to those of the Moscow *Chronicle*. It appears six times a year in separate but identical Russian and English editions.
11. This was the area of activity of the Human Rights Committee, founded in 1970 by Dr. A. Sakharov, V. Chalidze, and A. Tverdokhlebov. See *Dokumenty Komiteta prav cheloveka: Proceedings of the Moscow Human Rights Committee*, International League for the Rights of Man, 777 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017, 1972; also *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.*, no. 5-6 (1973), pp. 54-55.
12. Apart from the *Chronicle's* extensive materials, the most important sources on the contemporary forced labor camps are A. Marchenko, *My Testimony* (London, 1969), and Edward Kuznetsov, *Prison Diaries* (London, 1975). On the mental hospitals see United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1973), and R. and Z. Medvedev, *A Question of Madness* (London, 1971).
13. The most useful book on this subject is M. Dewhirst and R. Farrell, eds., *The Soviet Censorship* (Metuchen, N.J., 1973).
14. This very rough estimate is made up of about 1,000 such people named in the *Chronicle*, 1-32, plus several hundred more who appear in P. Litvinov, *The Trial of the Four*, but not in the *Chronicle*, plus the balance who do not appear in either of these sources but in the hundreds of other available *samizdat* documents and books that concern "mainstream" dissent. Less rough estimates than this would, incidentally, involve not only great labor but also severe problems in defining the precise criteria for distinguishing a "mainstream" dissenter from other categories of dissent, and in obtaining enough information about certain people to be able to apply the criteria to them with confidence.
15. Two useful collections of their writings and documents are George Saunders, ed., *Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition* (New York, 1974), and *Samizdat I* (Paris, 1969). Both books should be used with caution as regards their editorial interpretations, which wrongly suggest that Trotsky and Trotskyism are popular among dissenters and also give an exaggerated impression of the level of organized working-class dissent in the U.S.S.R.
16. E.g., the groups of Saratov and Ryazan students and the Leningrad group of Yury I. Fyodorov, all of whose cases are described in *A Chronicle of Current Events*; no. 12; *Possev: 4-yy spetsialnyy vypusk* (Frankfurt, June 1970).
17. See Grigorenko's collection of writings, *Mysli sumasshedshego (Thoughts of a Madman)*, Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam, 1973, due soon for publication in English by C. Hurst, London, in 1976.
18. See his books *On Socialist Democracy* (London, 1975), and *Let History Judge* (London, 1972). It should be noted that a much expanded version of *Let History Judge*, dated March 1973 and 1136 pages long, was published in Russian in 1974 by Knopf, New York, under the title *K sudu istorii: genezis i posledstviya stalinizma*.
19. *Politicheskiy dnevnik*, Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam. The first volume appeared in 1972 and the second, with a foreword by one of its compilers, Zhores Medvedev, in 1975. The two volumes total some 1,500 pages.
20. See the latter's *Sakharov Speaks* (London, 1974), an important collection of writings and documents with an autobiographical essay. See also Daniel Weissbort, ed., *Selected Poems by Natalya Gorbanevskaya with a Transcript of her Trial and Papers Relating to her Detention in a Prison Psychiatric Hospital* (South Hinksey, Oxford, 1972).
21. The most useful collection of materials on the relation of Solzhenitsyn to literary and human rights dissenters is Leopold Labedz, ed., *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record* (London, 1972). See also Solzhenitsyn's interview and essay in *Index*, London, no. 3 (1974).
22. See *Sakharov Speaks*, pp. 204-205.
23. See note 10. For extensive detail on the cases against the *Chronicle* and the *Ukrainian Herald* see *Chronicle*, 24-30.
24. Other important source books on Ukrainian dissent in the 1960s are Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London, 1971), and Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* 1st ed. (London, 1968) and 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1970).
25. Two useful and similar collections have appeared in English: J. Kolasky, ed., *Report from the Beria*

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Reserve (Toronto, 1974), and Y. Bihun, ed., *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*, Smoloskyp, P.O. Box 6066, Patterson Station, Baltimore, Md. 20231 (Baltimore, 1974).

26. Issues 1-4, 6-8 have been published in Ukrainian as five books by Smoloskyp (see previous note) and PIUF (3 rue du Sabot, Paris 6). No. 5 has so far reached the West only in a few extracts. No. 7 and 8 are edited in a markedly more militant and underground style than no. 1-6, whose style is similar to the *Chronicle's*.
27. See *A Chronicle of Current Events*, 21-23. The *Chronicle* began to report regularly on Lithuanian developments in late 1970 (and onward).
28. *Ibid.*, no. 26, 27.
29. Issues 4-7 have appeared in English as booklets, published by the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Priests' League, 64-14 56th Road, Maspeth, Long Island, New York 11378, and further booklets are due. Extracts in English are in *Religion in Communist Lands*, Keston College, Heathfield, Road, Chislehurst, Kent, no. 4-5 (1973) and no. 4-5 (1974). No. 1-7 have appeared as a book in the original Lithuanian, *Lietuvos Kataliku Baznycios Kronika*, LKRSR, 6825 So. Talman Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60629.
30. See *Chronicle*, 16.
31. See several items in *ibid.*, 32.
32. The most useful book on the Jewish movement up to 1973 is Leonard Schroeter, *The Last Exodus* (New York, 1974). The *Chronicle* also has reported on it extensively from no. 8 onward. Since 1972 a weekly bulletin of documents and information has been published, *Jews in the USSR*, Contemporary Jewish Library, 31 Percy Street, London W1.
33. No. 1, dated January 1974 and 110 pages long, has been published as document AS 1776 in Radio Liberty's Samizdat Archive series, which had registered by late 1974 nearly 2,000 items. For a useful account of the Germans' history since 1941 see Ann Sheehy's study, *The Crimean Tartars, The Meskhetians and the Volga Germans*, Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven Street, London WC2 (London, 1973). On the 1974 developments see *Chronicle* 32, and *A Chronicle of Human Rights*, no. 7, 10 (1974), and for an important document of 1965 see *Politicheskiy dnevnik* (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 92-96.
34. See 7, 9, 19-22; also Sheehy, *op. cit.*
35. On the Crimean Tatars see Sheehy, *op. cit.*, *Chronicle*, 31; P. Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia*, chap. 12; and *Tashkentskiy protsess*, Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam, due in 1976, the first large collection of documents on the subject. Nearly 100 such documents have been published in Radio Liberty's Samizdat Archive series.
36. See note 4. For several points in this section I am indebted to John Dunlop's article in *Frontier*, London, vol. 18, no. 1 (1975), and to the article on the press debate about neo-Slavophilism by Vladimir Pavloff in *Grani*, Frankfurt, no. 82 (1971).
37. See *Chronicle* 22, p. 43 of the Amnesty edition, no. 24, p. 139, and no. 26, p. 257; also, for the text of one of Osipov's sharpest statements, concerning the confiscation of *Veche*, no. 7, from his typist, *A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, no. 3 (1973), p. 48. *Veche*, no. 1-10 have been published in the Samizdat Archive series of Radio Liberty, and an abbreviated text of no. 5 in *Volnoe slovo: Samizdat: Izbrannoe*, Frankfurt, no. 9-10 (1973).
38. See M. Agursky's *samizdat* article, "The Increase in the Neo-Nazi Danger in the Soviet Union" and the attached anonymous document, "Critical Notes of a Russian about the Russian Patriotic Journal *Veche*," published as documents 1858 and 1858*b* in the Samizdat Archive series.
39. On these episodes see *Chronicle*, 32; also documents 1705, 1706, 1787, 1790-93 and 1845 in the Samizdat Archive series. *Zemlya* is no. 1909 in the series.
40. See *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Nov. 15, 1972, where the article occupied two whole pages. Yakovlev also attacked nationalist deviations in Georgia and Armenia.
41. See M. Agursky's essay on Yury S. Ivanov's book, *Caution, Zionism!*, in *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 16, 1972; also his article and its two attachments referred to in note 38, and *Chronicle*, 7, material on the Fetisov group in Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia*, pp. 431-33. The "Russian Patriots" document of 1970, "Message to the Nation," is strongly Christian and Orthodox but still belongs to this fascistic genre. See excerpts in *Survey*, London, no. 80 (1971), pp. 191–99, complete text in the Samizdat Archive, no. 590. See also the extract from V. Kapshitser's *samizdat* work, *The Trojan Horse of Fascism*, in *Midstream*, New York, April 1973.
42. It would now be possible, however, systematically to interview working-class Jewish and German emigrants of recent years and to compare the results with what can be gleaned from the Soviet press.
43. See Zhores Medvedev, *Ten Years after Ivan Denisovich* (London, 1973) chap. 19, for a vivid account.
44. It should be noted, though, that *Nash sovremennik* soon began to act as a forum for rather similar views and writers.
45. On the episodes in this paragraph see *Chronicle*, 30, 32.
46. See *Chronicle*, 32, especially the items concerning V. Pailodze, L. Alimonaki, Y. Gastev, and M. Kostava.
47. *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York, 1970), p. 30. □

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Roy Medvedev

Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*: Part Two

We print here the first English translation of a discussion of Solzhenitsyn's Gulag, II *by the distinguished Russian historian and intellectual dissident Roy Medvedev. Elsewhere in this issue, Peter Reddaway analyzes the exchanges of opinion going on among the Russian dissidents. We believe that the issues raised by people like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and Medvedev–including their differences of outlook–are among the most important political matters of our time.* – EDS.

The second volume of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* has now appeared. Where the first volume consisted in a detailed investigation of everything that preceded the arrival of millions of Soviet people in Stalin's concentration camps—the system of arrests, the various forms of confinement, interrogation with torture, judicial and extrajudicial persecution, prisoner transports and transit prisons—the second volume gets down to the study of the primary and fundamental part of the Gulag empire, the corrective or, as Solzhenitsyn rightly calls them, the "destructive" labor camps. Here nothing escapes the author's attention: the origin and history of the camps, the economics of forced labor, the administrative structure, the categories of prisoners and everyday life of the inmates, the position of women and juveniles, the relations between ordinary zeks and the trusties,[1] between criminals and politicals, the camp guards, the convoy guards, the "information" service and the recruiting of stool pigeons, the system of punishments and "incentives," the functioning of the hospitals and medical stations, the way prisoners died and were killed, and the unceremonious way they were buried—all these things find their place in Solzhenitsyn's book. The author describes the various types of hard labor and the starvation diet imposed on the zeks; he studies not only the world of the camps but also the world immediately surrounding them, the world of "campside"; and he surveys the peculiarities of psychology and behavior found among the prisoners and their jail keepers (or "camp keepers," in Solzhenitsyn's terminology).

Like the first volume, which came out in December 1973, this volume deserves the highest estimation, especially because it is a conscientious investigation, artistically presented and based on authentic fact. True, the second volume did not have the moral shock effect of the first, did not stun and shake the reader so. Perhaps because it was the second volume; or perhaps, for me, this impression has to do with the fact that I have read dozens and dozens of memoirs by former camp inmates (most of them, of course, never published) and have recorded hundreds of accounts and pieces of testimony about camp life. It is also significant that, while the basic facts are reliable (and there are noticeably

[1] *Zek*: In camp slang, abbreviation of the Russian word for "prisoner," *zaklyuchenny*.

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fewer petty factual inaccuracies in the second volume of *Gulag Archipelago* than in the first), many of the author's judgments and opinions are too one-sided and categorical and his general observations are by no means always well-grounded. This is particularly true of the way he obviously lays his colors on too thickly in depicting the world of "the free" in his chapter "Our Muzzled Freedom."

But, of course, none of the shortcomings of the second volume overshadow the artistic and social significance of this book, which has no equal in all our literature on the camps.

Several years ago I heard of a certain occurrence from a former "son of Gulag" who had gone to visit Vorkuta as a free citizen (many such veterans of the camps feel the urge to visit the places where their years had been spent working behind barbed wire; Solzhenitsyn too writes about this). It was an occurrence common in those parts. A foundation pit for a new school in Vorkuta had been started.[2] No sooner had the thin topmost layer of soil been removed than the teeth of the excavating machines revealed a huge deposit of human bones. This was not of course the site of a primitive human settlement, and no archeologists came there. It was one of those giant mass graves that grew near the northern camps—great pits, already dug in the autumn, into which thousands of corpses were thrown during the winter—prisoners who died or were shot—to be covered over later on, with the arrival of the brief northern summer. Construction of the school was temporarily halted, not for the purpose, naturally, of setting up a monument to the unknown convicts; the freshly bared bones of these zeks were carted off by night and buried somewhere outside the city limits, and this new cemetery was not marked in any noticeable way. At the original site of the mass grave, school construction was resumed and completed.

[2]*Vorkuta*: One of the largest labor camp complexes of the Stalin era, mainly set up for mining the coal of the Pechora River basin in the arctic northeast of European Russia. The town of the same name, center of the region, was built by prisoner labor in 1931–32 and is now a city of nearly 100,000. The Vorkuta camps were apparently dismantled after major strikes by prisoners in 1953.

Alas, we can have little hope that memorials will be erected even where the largest concentration camps stood, or that the camp barracks, compounds, towers, and mines will be restored in museum form, or that some sort of markings will be placed at the countless camp cemeteries, where there are probably more Soviet people buried than fell in the war against Nazi Germany. There is little hope that an eternal flame will burn here or that the names of those who died and were killed will be chiseled in marble. It is quite possible that books will remain the only monuments to these people. One such book, *The Gulag Archipelago*, will easily outlive those who wish to suppress it and will stand as an unforgettable tribute for those to whom its author dedicated it, all those who perished in the camps, "all those who did not live to tell it."

Camp Myths

IN OUR COUNTRY, where there is no freedom of the press or freedom of information, where most information circulates by certain secret channels, a multitude of rumors inevitably arise and dozens of different myths have public currency and are accepted by many as unquestionable truths. Under the conditions existing in the camps such legends, rumors, and myths—often far removed from reality—were all the more likely to find fertile ground. Natalya Reshetovskaya has recently contended that Solzhenitsyn's book is essentially based on this camp folklore.[3] That is certainly not so. Of course Solzhenitsyn, through no fault of his own, had no chance to check documentary evidence in order to verify much of the infor-

[3]*Natalya Reshetovskaya* (born 1920): Solzhenitsyn's first wife; they married in 1940, were separated by the war, then by his imprisonment in 1945; she divorced him in 1950 while he was in the camps. After his release and rehabilitation (1956–57), they remarried in the late 1950s, before he won fame with *Ivan Denisovich*. In the late 1960s they separated again, and he established a relationship with his present wife, Natalya Svetlova. The authorities, to harass him further, long supported Reshetovskaya in her refusal to agree to a divorce. They were finally divorced by the time he was expelled from the U.S.S.R. Reshetovskaya's memoirs were published outside the Soviet Union (English edition, *Sanya: My Life with Solzhenitsyn*, New York, 1975).

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mation he obtained from fellow inmates and from subsequent correspondents and informants. However, both his own camp experience and his intuition as an investigator and an artist enable him in most cases to distinguish sharply enough between truth and invention in the accounts he has recorded. If some legends do crop up in the pages of *Gulag Archipelago*, rare as they may be, this happens for the most part when the topic is the distant past or the lives and "affairs" of those high up in the "organs," for example, Minister of State Security Abakumov.[4]

I think that among such myths we must include Solzhenitsyn's story of the 14-year-old boy who on June 20, 1929, during Gorky's visit to the Solovetsky Special Purpose Camp asked to speak with Gorky in private and then spent an hour and a half telling the famous writer about all the illegalities committed in that camp.[5] According to Solzhenitsyn's account, Gorky, after talking with the boy, left the room in tears. But not only did he do nothing for the prisoners at Solovki; he even praised the Solovetsky Cheka agents many times thereafter—while the truth-loving lad was shot the same night by those Chekists.[6]

Now Solzhenitsyn himself writes that the first juveniles came to Solovki only in mid-March 1929. How could the newly arrived inhabitants of the children's colony, isolated from the adult prisoners, find out everything that had gone on at Solovki for years before? But if this particular anecdote related by Solzhenitsyn seems dubious, no such doubts arise over his own story of the many illegal and arbitrary actions committed at Solovki, a narrative that can be confirmed by other accounts and other witnesses.

Where the Camps Came From

SOLZHENITSYN DATES the existence of concentration camps for political opponents in our country from 1918. This is not slander, as some of his detractors contend. Solzhenitsyn quotes Lenin's telegram to Yevgeniya Bosh, president of the Penza Province Executive Committee, advising "lock up all the doubtful ones in a concentration camp outside the city." (Lenin, *Polynoye Sobraniye Sochineniy* [Collected works], 5th Russian ed., vol. 50, pp. 143–44). Other official documents may be cited to the same effect. Thus, a special resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of September 5, 1918, says in part, "It is necessary to secure the Soviet Republic against its class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps" (*Yezhenedelnik ChK* [Weekly Bulletin of the Cheka], no. 1, September 22, 1918, p. 11). In February 1919 Grigory Sokolnikov, a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party (Bolsheviks) and of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front, objecting to Central Committee directives on "de-Cossackization," the mass shooting of Cossacks who gave aid to Krasnov or served in the White Army,[7] proposed that instead of being shot

[4] *Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov* (1894–1954): Minister of state security under Stalin and Beria, 1946–52: tried and executed after Stalin's death.

[5] *Maxim Gorky* (1868–1936): Prominent Russian writer who had close ties with Lenin and other Bolsheviks before the 1917 revolution. Critical of Soviet regime in its early years; often interceded with Lenin in behalf of threatened cultural and intellectual figures. After living in Western Europe, 1921–28, he returned to the U.S.S.R. and was highly favored by the Stalin regime. Died under mysterious circumstances, allegedly poisoned, on the eve of the first great Moscow show trial.

[6] *Solovki*, *Solovetsky*; *Cheka*, *Chekist*: Solovki is slang for the Solovetsky camp, on the Solovetsky Islands; see the description of the camp in *Gulag Archipelago*, vol. II, chap. 2.

The Cheka was the first Soviet state-security organization (1917–22). The acronym derives from the Russian initials Ch. and K., the official name being Chrezvychaynaya Kommissiya, or Extraordinary Commission. The state-security organs (secret police) were frequently renamed, and at various times known by such initials as GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MVD, MGB, and now KGB. But over the years *Chekist*, originally meaning member of the Cheka, has stayed on as an informal term for any Soviet secret police agent, regardless of the official initials at the time.

[7] *Pyotr Nikolayevich Krasnov* (1869–1947): General of the czarist army; tried to suppress the October 1917 revolution in Petrograd; led rebellion against Soviet rule in Don Cossack region in 1918–19; resigned and went into exile in Germany, many of his forces joining Gen. A. I. Denikin's White army.

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they be employed in socially useful labor in the coal-mining districts, for building railroads and digging shale and peat. For this purpose Sokolnikov requested by telegram that "work begin immediately on the construction of facilities for concentration camps" (Central Party Archives, collection 17, shelf 4, file 53, sheet 54). The concentration camps of civil war times were quite primitive structures, and the regimen enforced in them bore very little resemblance to that of the camps of the 1930s. Sometimes the people in them were put to work. In other cases, in districts near the battle fronts, an area outside a city would simply be fenced off, the "socially dangerous elements" would be detained there but would not work, and their relatives and friends would bring them food and hand it to them through the fences. Toward the end of 1920 most of those confined in concentration camps were peasants arrested for "speculation," as can be seen from documents of the Cheka. With the end of the civil war many of these camps were dismantled and their inmates sent home. At the beginning of NEP,[8] the camps for political prisoners were apparently abolished nearly everywhere, with the exception of the Solovetsky Special Purpose Camp and several "political isolators"[9]—of which Solzhenitsyn writes.

Space does not allow us to explore here the question of which elements in the early history of these political camps were dictated by the stern necessities of those years and which constituted plainly excessive and unnecessary cruelty. But it would be wrong to place the camps of the civil war period and those of Stalin's time on the same plane and ignore the fact that in 1918–20 the Soviet Republic was fighting a war on several fronts against foreign-backed White governments and that the numerous concentration camps set up on territory held by the White armies and foreign interventionist forces were usually far more savage than those in the RSFSR. In Stalin's time, on the other hand, the terror of the camps was directed against people who were unarmed and defenseless, and were not hostile toward the sole existing, and firmly established, power in the land. For Solzhenitsyn this distinction seems not to exist.

The 1937 Wave

SOLZHENITSYN does not hide his distaste for the government, party, and economic leaders, top commanders of the Red Army, leading cadres of the Young Communist League and the trade unions, and especially the high-ranking personnel of the NKVD and the Prosecutor General's Office,[10] who themselves became the object of brutal repression in 1937 and '38. Even in the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago* Solzhenitsyn wrote:

> If you study in detail the whole history of the arrests and trials of 1936 to 1938, the principal revulsion you feel is not against Stalin and his accomplices, but against the humiliatingly repulsive defendants—nausea at their spiritual baseness after their former pride and implacability.

All these people, during the civil war or during collectivization and industrialization, so Solzhenitsyn asserts, were pitiless toward their political opponents and therefore deserved no pity when their own "system" turned against them.

In the second volume, we find the same attitude on the author's part toward the "1937 wave." With obvious satisfaction Solzhenitsyn cites the names of dozens of major Communist party figures shot on Stalin's orders in 1937–38. These people deserved their fate, he suggests; they got what they had made ready for, or given to, others.

[8] *NEP*: The New Economic Policy, introduced in 1921, under which peasants were allowed to trade on the market and were taxed a certain amount of grain or other produce instead of having it requisitioned by the state. Grain requisitioning had been the policy under "war communism" during the 1918–20 civil war. The NEP ended with the beginning of forced collectivization and industrialization in 1929–30.

[9] "*Political isolators*": Separate Soviet prisons for holding political oppositionists of the non-Communist left or dissident Communists.

[10] *NKVD*: Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, official name of the Soviet state-security organization (1934–46), made especially notorious by its role in the Great Purge of 1936–38.

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> And though [he writes], when the young Tukhachevsky returned victoriously from suppressing the devastated Tambov peasants, there was no Mariya Spiridonova waiting at the station to put a bullet through his head, it was done sixteen years later by the Georgian priest who never graduated.[11]

But we can in no way share these sentiments and opinions of Solzhenitsyn's.

First, one cannot ignore the fact that the leaders who perished in the 1930s were not all the same kind of people, either in their personal characters or in the degree of responsibility they had for the crimes of the preceding years. There were people who had already degenerated greatly, who had been so caught up in Stalin's system that they carried out the most savage and inhuman orders without thinking of the country or the people, but only of themselves and their power. These people not only carried out orders but "demonstrated initiative" on their own, helping Stalin and the NKVD organs to "expose" and annihilate "enemies of the people." But there were quite a few who acted in error, who were simultaneously victims and instruments of another cult—the cult of party discipline. Among them were many honest, self-sacrificing, and courageous people who, too late, came to understand a great deal. There were quite a few who thought about what was happening in the country and were tormented by it, but who believed in the party and the party's propaganda. It would seem, from today's vantage point, that we could speak of the historical and political guilt of the entire active party membership for the events of the 1920s and 1930s. But we cannot simply lump all these people together indiscriminately as criminals who got what they deserved. The fate of the majority of the revolutionary Bolsheviks remains one of the most awesome tragedies in the history of our country, and we cannot in any way condone Solzhenitsyn in his mocking suggestion that in the obituaries published in our country the words "perished tragically during the period of the cult" should be replaced by the words "perished comically." The best Russian writers never indulged in mockery of the dead. Let us recall Pushkin, who wrote these lines:

> Riego did transgress against Spain's king.
> There I agree. But for that he was hanged.
> Is it seemly, tell me now, for us
> To hotly curse the hangman's fallen victim?[12]

Earlier, in reading the first volume of *Gulag Archipelago*, I was unpleasantly surprised by Solzhenitsyn's words that he had somehow been "consoled"—when describing the trials at which People's Commissar of Justice Krylenko appeared as the accuser—"consoled" by the thought of the degradation to which Krylenko was reduced in Butyrka prison before he was shot, the same Krylenko who had condemned others to similar degradation.[13] It

[11]*Tukhachevsky, Tambov, Spiridonova*: Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893–1937), one of the group of top Red Army leaders shot on Stalin's orders in the 1937 purge. Came to prominence as a Red general in the civil war. Active in the suppression of an anti-Bolshevik peasant rebellion in Tambov province in 1921–22, which was led by members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs): Tambov province, in the Volga region of European Russia, was the center of SR influence from before the 1905–06 revolution. During that revolution the SR terrorist *Mariya Aleksandrovna Spiridonova* (1884–1941) shot the czarist official in charge of suppressing a Tambov peasant rebellion. Spiridonova was sent to hard labor for many years. In 1917 she emerged as a leader of the Left SR party, which joined the Bolsheviks in the first Soviet government but began to oppose them in 1918, led a number of revolts and assassinated Bolshevik leaders. Spiridonova was arrested in late 1918, imprisoned for a time, and after being amnestied, quit politics. Arrested by the NKVD in 1937, she died in the camps.

[12]*Pushkin*; *Riego*: Aleksandr S. Pushkin (1799–1937), Russia's foremost classical poet. These four lines are from his 1825 poem "Na Vorontsova," written in response to a remark made by Count Vorontsov, a courtier of the czar.

Colonel Rafael del Riego y Nuñez (1785–1823) was the leader of a constitutionalist rebellion in 1820 against Ferdinand VI, king of Spain. Czar Alexander I urged the Holy Alliance to intervene in Ferdinand's behalf, and in November 1823 troops of the Holy Alliance defeated Riego's forces, and Riego was captured and executed. When word of this reached Czar Alexander's court, Count Vorontsov was heard to remark, "What happy news, Your Majesty; one scoundrel less in the world."

[13]*Krylenko*; *Butyrka*: Nikolai Vasilyevich Krylenko (1885–1938), active Bolshevik from 1904. First people's commissar of war in 1917–18; chief state prosecutor for important political trials, 1918–31. Made commissar of justice of the Russian Republic in 1931, and of the U.S.S.R. in 1936. Arrested in 1937 and shot without trial. Butyrka—an old prison in Moscow that held political prisoners under the czars (built under Catherine the Great in

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seems to me that the author's attitude here is quite far removed from the simple standard of human decency, not to mention the Christian virtues of "understanding mildness" and "uncategorical judgments," which Solzhenitsyn proclaims at the end of the second volume.

Solzhenitsyn's position seems wrong to us not only because the government and party leaders destroyed were most often replaced by people who, it is common knowledge, were even worse. Thus, in Yezhov's and Beria's times one could with reason regret the passing of such Chekists as Latsis and Peters. The brutality of Latsis and Peters,[14] sometimes justified and sometimes not, was at any rate never self-seeking, sadistic, or aimed at currying favor. Those men apparently could not have gone down the road of crime as far as Yezhov, Beria, Zakovsky,[15] and their kind.

It must be said, simply, that no one deserved the dreadful fate that befell the leaders arrested in 1937–38. It is impossible to take satisfaction in the thought of their degradation and torment, even knowing that many of them deserved death.

One of Shalamov's *Kolyma Stories* tells the fate of a deputy head of the Leningrad NKVD, Nikonov, an accomplice of Yezhov and Zakovsky, who during "interrogation" had his testicles crushed.[16] Solzhenitsyn himself in the first volume wrote about this method of torture as the worst kind, one that cannot be endured. In reading Shalamov's story I did not feel any gratification. It is quite likely that this Nikonov fully deserved to be tried and shot for his crimes. But even he did not deserve such cruel torture and abuse. It is a profoundly mistaken notion of morality to think that Stalin's reprisals against the main cadres of the Communist party and Soviet government represented, even in an extremely distorted form, the triumph of some sort of historical justice. No, the death of these people was the prologue to a reign of injustice still more terrible, affecting not only the party but our entire people.

Solzhenitsyn is prepared, oddly enough, to regard the entire Soviet people, Russians and non-Russians alike, as having deserved the unhappy fate they suffered in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Even in the first volume, having in mind not just the party but the most ordinary people of our land, he exclaimed: "We spent ourselves in one unrestrained outburst in 1917, and then we *hurried* to submit. We submitted *with pleasure*! ... We purely and simply

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the 18th century). Under Stalin it was one of three main prisons where "politicals" were held for interrogation and sentencing.

[14]*Latsis and Peters*: Prominent Cheka officials of the civil war period, both Latvians. Martyn Ivanovich Latsis (1888–1938 or 1941, real name Yan Fridrikhovich Sudrabs), transferred to economic work in 1921; arrested in the Great Purge. Yakov Khristoforovich Peters (1886–1938), deputy chief of GPU, 1925–30.

[15]*Yezhov, Beria, Zakovsky*: Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (1895–1939 or 1940), minor party official promoted by Stalin in early 1930s; made people's commissar of internal affairs in September 1936, to preside over the Great Purge of 1936–38, which is often called the *Yezhovshchina* ("the time of Yezhov") because of his role. Replaced by Beria in December 1938; arrested and shot.

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, (1899–1953); chief of state security in Transcaucasia, 1921–31; head of Transcaucasian party organization after that. Replaced Yezhov as commissar of internal affairs; remained chief of Soviet security until his execution shortly after Stalin's death.

Leonid M. Zakovsky: A deputy commissar of the NKVD, 1934–38; supervised Leningrad and Moscow purges in 1937–38; liquidated soon after Beria replaced Yezhov as head of NKVD.

[16]*Varlam Tikhonovich Shalamov* (born 1907): Soviet writer; survivor of 17 years in the Kolyma camp complex in the Soviet Far East. His *Kolyma Stories* circulate in manuscript in the U.S.S.R.; published in a French edition: *Récits de Kolyma* (Paris, 1969). One of these stories, "Lend-Lease Comes to a Soviet Camp," appeared in the Summer 1974 *Dissent*.

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deserved everything that happened afterward'' (Solzhenitsyn's emphasis). Many similar pronouncements can be found in the second volume as well. The error and injustice of this view seems too obvious to spend any time refuting it.

The Communist Captives of Gulag

APPARENTLY the majority of those shot in 1937–38 were Communists. In addition, however, hundreds of thousands of rank-and-file members and middle-level cadres of the party and youth organizations were arrested and sent to the camps along with other prisoners. Solzhenitsyn devotes one of the chapters of his second volume to their fate and discusses the Communists at some length in other chapters of this volume. Touching very briefly on those for whom ''Communist convictions were inward and not constantly on the tips of their tongues,'' who did not make a great show of their ''party attitude'' and did not separate themselves from the other prisoners, Solzhenitsyn directs his attention mainly to those ''orthodox Communists'' and ''loyalists'' (the chapter on the Communists is entitled ''The Loyalists'') who sought to justify Stalin and his terror while they were in the camps, who would sing the [party-song] lines ''I know no other country/ Where a person breathes so freely'' while en route in prisoner transports, and who considered virtually every other zek to have been justly condemed and only themselves to be suffering by accident. Solzhenitsyn finds a number of occasions for making fun of such ''loyalists'' and ''orthodox Communists.'' Sometimes his irony is fully deserved. It is true that among the Communists arrested in 1937–38 there were quite a few who continued to believe not only in Stalin but even in Yezhov, and who held themselves aloof from, or were even hostile toward, the other prisoners. But insight came rather quickly, although for understandable reasons it was not always complete, and after several months of ''interrogation'' the number of the ''loyalists'' and ''orthodox'' among arrested party members fell off rapidly. And there were very few of them in the camps. For the majority of Communists, however, condemnation of Stalin and the NKVD organs did not mean the repudiation of socialist and communist convictions.

Solzhenitsyn plainly sins against the truth when, in describing the fate of the Communists in the camps, he declares that they never objected to ''the dominance of the thieves in the kitchens and among the trusties'' and that ''all the orthodox Communists ... soon [got] themselves well fixed up.'' The author of *Gulag Archipelago* even raises the following hypothesis: ''Yes, and were there not perhaps some written or at least oral directives: to make things easier for the Communists?''

No, Aleksandr Isayevich, no such directives ever existed, and you knew it well when, in your novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, you told of the fate of the Communist Buinovsky, thrown into the cold punishment block for no reason.[17] From the fate enjoyed in the camps by Boris Dyakov and Galina Serebryakova,[18] you cannot draw conclusions about the position and conduct of the bulk of the Communists who found themselves in Stalin's camps. In many respects their circumstances were even worse than those of prisoners in other categories and quite a few of them died in the camps—in fact it is likely they died in greater numbers than other prisoners. On this point there are of course no reli-

[17] *Buinovsky*: In Solzhenitsyn's story, the idealistic and defiant ex-naval commander, sent to the camps as a ''spy'' because an Allied officer he had met during wartime service had mailed him a gift. (Modeled after Boris Burkovsky, a fellow inmate of the author's.)

[18] *Boris Dyakov* (born 1902) and *Galina Serebryakov* (born 1905): Both are Soviet writers and former camp inmates (Solzhenitsyn dismisses them as trusties). In the post-Stalin era both became prominent on the conversative side in Soviet literary disputes. Dyakov, author of standard socialist-realist production novels, wrote memoirs of the camps that were published in a Soviet magazine in early 1963 and reissued as a book in 1966. These *Memoirs of Survival* (*Povest o perezhitom*) were praised by conservatives, who counterposed them to Solzhenitsyn's *Ivan Denisovich* because Dyakov stressed faith in the party despite the cruelties in the camps. Serebryakova's memoirs, entitled *Sandstorm*, were published in a soviet newspaper in 1964, but did not come out in book form in the U.S.S.R.

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able statistics. However, we know from the materials of party conferences, held after the 22d Soviet Communist Party Congress,[19] that of the party members arrested in Moscow in 1936–39 only about 6 percent returned there in 1955–57. The remaining 94 percent were rehabilitated *posthumously*. And throughout the U.S.S.R., out of a million party members arrested in the latter half of the 1930s, not more than 60–80,000 returned after 15 to 18 years imprisonment. The suffering they endured left a deep mark on these people, and very few were left among them who in any way resembled those Solzhenitsyn now writes of with such sarcasm.

Socialism, Revolution, or Religion?

IN PART FOUR of this book, on "The Soul and Barbed Wire," Solzhenitsyn specifically discusses his spiritual rebirth in the camps, his return to the belief in God instilled in him as an adolescent but abandoned by him as a young man in favor of Marxism. Although with reservations, the author, surprisingly enough, even expresses gratitude for the experience of the camps, for it was precisely the suffering he underwent in them that helped him return to the fold of Christianity. "*Bless you, prison!*" the author writes in emphatic type at the close of his chapter "The Ascent."

In this part of his book Solzhenitsyn expresses some profound though very bitter thoughts. But much of what is written here strikes a false note (at least to my ears). All these extremely impassioned outcries against Marxism, "the infallible and intolerant doctrine," which demands only results, only matter and not *spirit*, all these arguments about how only faith in God saved and elevated the human spirit in the camps, while faith in the future triumph of social justice, in a better way of organizing society, failed to prevent spiritual corruption and virtually led one straight into the ranks of stool pigeons—all this has an unproved and arbitrary sound. A regrettable state of embitterment leads the author to that very "intolerance and infallibility" of judgment of which he accuses Marxism.

Solzhenitsyn does not even consider it possible for nonreligious people to distinguish between good and bad.

Equating socialism with Stalinism, he naturally cannot understand that there are people for whom the tragedy they or their countrymen experienced can only become a further incentive to struggle for social justice and for a better life for humanity on this earth, for the elimination of all forms of oppression of one person by another, including pseudosocialist forms of such oppression. Solzhenitsyn does not understand that socialist convictions can be the basis for a genuinely humanist set of values and a profoundly humane morality. And if up to now the problems of ethics and morals have not yet found satisfactory treatment in Marxist-Leninist theory, this by no means implies that scientific socialism is incapable by its very nature of establishing moral values.

Summing up the thinking he did in camp, Solzhenitsyn writes:

> Since then I have come to understand the truth of all the religions of the world: They struggle with the *evil inside a human being* (inside every human being). It is impossible to expel evil from the world in its entirety, but it is possible to constrict it within each person.
>
> And since that time I have come to understand the falsehood of all the revolutions in history: They destroy only *those carriers* of evil contemporary with them (and also fail, out of haste, to discriminate the carriers of good as well). And they then take to themselves as their heritage the actual evil itself, magnified still more.

This juxtaposition seems to me neither accurate nor just. For it is necessary to fight against evil not only within each person, but also against the carriers of evil contemporary

[19] *The 22d Congress* of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R., held Oct. 17–31, 1961, publicly revived and extended the de-Stalinization campaign that had subsided a year or so after Krushchev's secret speech at the 1956 20th Congress. The 22d Congress set off a new series of official investigations and revelations about the Stalin era that were only brought to a halt in the latter half of the 1960s, under Brezhnev and Kosygin. A notable event during the 22d Congress was the removal of Stalin's remains from the Lenin mausoleum.

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with us, and against unjust social institutions. This struggle goes on in various forms. Well and good if it takes the form of peaceful competition between ideologies and is realized through reforms and gradual changes for the better. But there still will be times when revolutionary forms of struggle must be resorted to, and although these may be accompanied by many sacrifices and disappointments, they by no means necessarily lead to the magnification of evil in the world. It is not socialist doctrine alone that can be distorted and turned against individuals and against all of humanity; so can the tenets of any religion. History offers more than a few examples of this, including the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has its own peculiar traditions of obscurantism. It is well known that in the 16th century the Russian Church was still burning heretics alive. Incidentally, one may find in Stalin's behavior and criminal actions not only the pragmatic attitude held by many revolutionaries toward violence and the use of extreme measures but also the dogmatism, casuistry, intolerance, and other qualities that are undoubtedly, to some extent, the result of his five years in an Orthodox school and three in an Orthodox seminary.

Terrible are the crimes Solzhenitsyn so vividly depicts in his book, and we are all as one with him in the condemnation of those crimes. But I continue to believe that only the victory of a genuinely socialist society, of genuinely socialist human and moral relations, can provide humanity with a firm guarantee that such crimes will never be repeated.

Translated by GEORGE SAUNDERS □

Old Debates, Living Issues

It's hard to suppose that anyone who has lived through the experience of radical sectarianism would ever wish to go back to it, or would care to appraise it with anything but a complicated irony. Yet there are moments when it seems that some elements in that past had their value. Thus the distinguished Russian physicist Leonid Plyushch, speaking after his release from a Soviet mental hospital and discussing the role of the Russian oppositionists, said last February that in his *samizdat* writings

> I proved that Stalinism is a Thermidorian Bonapartist degeneration of the October Revolution, that state capitalism had been built in the Soviet Union, property belongs to a state which is alienated from all classes, property does not belong to the people. The bureaucracy is the servant of the abstract capitalist—the state.
> [Quoted in the *New York Times*, February 4, 1976]

A few of our readers may remember left-wing discussions of several decades ago as to the "class nature" of Stalinism. Was the Russian dictatorship "bureaucratic collectivism" as some of us said, or "state capitalism," or was it still, as orthodox Trotskyists said, "a degenerated workers state"? That there was no realistic sense in which the Russian party dictatorship could be called a "workers' state," any sensible person living in Russia must surely know—and Plyushch is clearly a man of sharp intelligence.

What is so interesting in his sociological characterizations is that, in his own way, he returns to the terms of debate that one could hear in the tiny world of the anti-Stalinist left several decades ago—terms of debate liberals unconcerned with theory, professors disdainful of left-wing categories, and other wise people looked down upon. Yet those debates, whatever their faults and excesses, really did touch on significant political issues, and it is of some political interest that the Russian dissidents, struggling to define the tyranny under which they suffer, should turn—on their own? through word of discussions in the West that has reached them?—to these terms and theories. It makes one feel a bit more hopeful about the possibility of connecting the thoughts of the past with the struggles of the future. □

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James Humphreys

Textbook War in West Virginia

The people of West Virginia are victims. They are the victims of powerful and cunning outsiders, of themselves and their own kind, and of social and historical forces with regard to which they have no control or understanding. For a full year now, a battle over "progressive" textbooks has convulsed Kanawha County. Set in an environment that might have been the creation of Faulkner or Steinbeck, the protest over some 325 secondary and elementary school books, selected by the local board of education upon the recommendation of the county's teachers, has brought political polarization and violence to this quiet industrial valley. Originally objecting to four-letter words in a literature series intended for high schools, the protest movement quickly expanded its objections and, in a 500-page report, alleged antipatriotism and antireligious teachings in the texts. The protest then escalated from appearances before the school board to wildcat strikes (which closed most of the area's mines), fistfights, threats, assaults, and the bombing of two elementary schools.

Two questions of primary importance are posed by the West Virginia conflict: What are the legitimate powers of the state in educating children of religious or social minorities? And at what point does the legitimate protection of minority rights become a minority tyranny?

Kanawha County, where most employment is in heavy and medium industry and governmental bureaucracies, is not typical of Appalachia. The population is urban and suburban, not rural, and the income and educational levels are roughly comparable with national averages. The bulk of the population is English, Welsh, Scotch-Irish Protestant. In Charleston, the state's largest city and seat of the county and state governments, about 7 percent of the residents are black, and there are noticeable numbers of Catholics and Jews. The movement to remove the textbooks has support throughout this Protestant, working-class community, but the dedicated shock troops come from the rural area in the county's eastern coal-mining half. This area believes itself ignored and forgotten, a poor cousin. Suffering from lower education, lower incomes, and fewer governmental services, this is the area in which the protest movement has found its heart.

Is the statement, "All first efforts are improved by revision," blasphemous? Should it be prohibited in the public schools?

Many of the protesters would affirm that the statement mocks the ultimate perfection of the Bible. For them there are no relative matters, no equivocations, no parables, no legends. There is faith. These people have fallen back upon a simple and dramatic religion that promises reward for their daily suffering and gives special merit to their apartness from the bulk of society. The simplicity of their faith is often astounding. They are like no other group so much as the Pilgrim Fathers who first settled the wilderness of the New England forest. And like the Pilgrims, the protesters of Kanawha County are often not prepared to tolerate those whose religious or moral

The author wishes to thank Kay Michael of the Charleston *Gazette* for sharing with him her experiences and thoughts regarding the textbook protest movement.

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standards deviate from their own fundamentalist creed.

Their complaints fall into three categories. The objectionable passages from the disputed books are said to be antireligious, antipatriotic, and obscene or pornographic. Listed below are some of the protesters' objections as found in their 500-page document:

Unsuitable as antireligious:

(1) "...it [the human brain] is produced by unskilled labor."
Objection: "Is God considered unskilled labor?"

(2) "All first efforts are improved by revision."
Objection: "Would this include the Ten Commandments?"

(3) "When copies [of Christian holy writings] were needed, priest and scholors transcribed them letter by letter, word by word. Unfortunately, many errors crept in, for the priest often mistook one letter for another or lost their places and omitted letters."
Objection: "Questions the authenticity of the Bible. The God who gave the Bible can keep it against error. 'The Bible was written by holy men as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.' II Peter 1:21."

(4) From a literature series entitled "Man in Action," a wide-ranging collection of stories and articles ... "good Lord."
Objection: "Taking the Lord's name in vain."

Objectional as antipatriotic:

(1) "The Hopi Indian language is said ... to be superior to English."

Objection: "Un-American writings."

(2) "Liberty, just the word by itself, means nothing."
Objection: "Un-American statement."

(3) From Joseph Heller's *Catch-22*, "Major Major bore a sickly resemblence to Henry Fonda."
Objection: "Fonda played the role of the hero in movies about World War II. This is an attack on the war."

(4) "Dirge," by Kenneth Fearing.
Objection: "Pokes fun of democracy, Sears Roebuck, Roosevelt, etc. Uses the word hell. This is pure slop. Do away with it."

Offensive as being obscene:

(1) "The Highwayman," by Alfred Noyes.
Objection: The heroine shoots herself in the breast.

(2) The phrase "poor bastards."
Objection: "Cursing."

(3) "That damned wild man...."
Objection: "Profanity."

There is more. The early leaders of the movement, while using the complaints of obscenity and antireligious teaching to consolidate a following, are frequently more interested in the more subtle political overtones of the books. One chieftain, critical of the fundamentalist ministers who became prominent in the protest, speaks almost solely of the political importance of school texts and admits that if the offending language was removed, but the stories and articles were otherwise unaffected, no more than 20 percent of the movement's following would remain active. This faction complains that the textbooks promote rebellion and turn children against their parents and proper authority with stories of protest elsewhere (interesting that protesters should protest against this).

The report to the school board says,

> Disillusionment is a prime result of not having absolute values in which to believe or faith that will abide with the young person throughout any adversity. Books such as these tend to destroy absolutes and tend to cause doubts upon an absolute faith. This is why children rebel.

There are also objections to the alleged "prosocialistic" bias of the books, such as references to Social Security.

Certain authors are objected to without reference to specific writings, including Eldridge Cleaver ("he is not worthy of admiring as a writer or anything else"), Norman Mailer ("noted for his contributions to depraved writing)," Ring Lardner ("a leftist sportscaster, his son ... was one of the infamous Los Angeles 10 who were known Communists"), and Bernard Shaw ("Most Americans would object to having George Bernard Shaw grouped with patriotic Americans such as Benjamin Franklin and Theodore Roosevelt"). *Rolling Stone*, cited simply as "a newspaper with a radical point of view," is

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found unacceptable, as are the works of James Fenimore Cooper (*Deerslayer*), Ralph Waldo Emerson (''*Brahma*''), John Steinbeck (*Travels With Charley*), and many others. Stories critical of the nation's foreign policy or social structure will not be permitted if the textbook protesters are victorious. Evolution also, the bugaboo of fundamentalists since before the Scopes Trial, is among their prime targets.

Is it possible to avoid the 20th century? This ultimately is the goal of those who object to gestions, common expletives, and to an admission of the reality of today's mores.

The leaders of this movement realize that the sort of reading to which they object and, more important, analysis of ideas and events will destroy the vision of the world they wish children to hold. The parents, with honorable intentions, want to pass on to their children an America with ''absolute values,'' revered leaders, firm and distinct roles, behavior patterns, and expectations, and an America sharing a consensus on the propriety of fundamentalist religion. It is a simple, uncomplicated America, without anguish, without a blemish. It never existed, it never will. And for that reason alone the protesters are ultimately doomed to failure.

Typical of these parents is their leader, Reverend Marvin Horan, self-styled minister, former driver of a cement truck, convicted conspirator in a series of bombings of public school buildings, buses, and private cars belonging to parents who ignored Horan's call for a school boycott.

Finding Horan isn't difficult; Campbell's Creek Drive turns off U.S. 60, going east away from Charleston. High on a hill is a sign proclaiming, ''Ye must be born again.'' The blacktop road is breaking apart and cars drive slowly, dodging potholes. Cinder-block buildings dot the roadside and everywhere the earth is visible—the hills are scarred by merciless incisions. The odor of burning coal is in the air. About a mile up the hallow from the main road, past the Midway Elementary School (one of those bombed) is the white cinder-block building that serves as the center of the antitextbook protests. A crude hand-lettered sign marks the headquarters.

Horan is late and the reporter has an opportunity to speak with the men and women in the outer office. But no one wants to talk to him, once they learn that he represents an eastern magazine of which they have never heard. So he reads the John Birch literature laid out in the reception area. If the federal district attorney is correct, as the jury of Horan's peers believed him to be, it is in the back rooms of this building that the plot to destroy a series of schools in Kanawha County was conceived and here the arrangements were made to obtain incendiary devices and explosives.

Horan arrives. He is wearing a T-shirt, is clean shaven and has short, cropped hair. The adults leave the room and shoo the children out before them. Horan is shown great deference, and soon he and the visitor are alone. The interview is held while the trial is pending, and so Marvin Horan now declines to speak of the charges brought by the government, other than to deny them and make vague allusions to the alleged hostility of local corporations against him. He does say that he has been woefully misrepresented, that he is not a violent man, and that if he were he would have plunged the county into civil war. ''Why, eight to ten thousand armed men were in the palm of my hand, just waitin' for me to give them orders,'' he boasts.

What about his appearance with the Klu Klux Klan, with its national leader, James Venable, and a local leader, Ed Miller, who had become active in the book protests?

A tough question that might cost allies on either side if answered improperly. The Reverend hesitates: ''I think the Klan has some real good ideas. They're a strong organization and have fine men as officers.'' But, he continues, he shared the podium with the national Imperial Wizard in order to be with his people, the protesters who were also present, not to show support for the Klan.

''What are the chances for a settlement with the school board?''

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The answer comes quickly and sharply. No compromise! The school board must surrender. The books are a threat to the nation and they cannot be given to children under any condition. What he wants in the schools, Horan explains, is a program of "basic" education that will include the three Rs, with no profanity taught in the literature, plus shorthand, typing, patriotism, and respect for authority. Loyalty to government and parents must be stressed.

Horan is an impassioned, if not eloquent, speaker and his passion rises as he launches into a tirade against Communism. Several times he repeats, "No Communist nation would allow these books in their schools." Perhaps that is the point, that a tyranny would not allow teaching methods encouraging the young to raise questions.

Violence is an integral part of life in West Virginia. Violence was required in the very act of settlement when the land was taken from the Indians. Later, industrialization brought enormous hardship for the workers. The battles of the union in the coal fields were as bloody as any in this country. And in the mines life touches closely on death. So violence was the response of some men and women when they perceived threats to their children, indeed to their way of life. Violence became, too, a way of expressing their anger at being forgotten, at being badly and coarsely used.

Whether or not Marvin Horan is guilty as charged by the government isn't as important as the fact that he *was* charged and was, in turn, found guilty. The impact of his indictment and conviction, by men and women who were truly his peers, was surprising to local observers and brutal in its effect upon the movement. Combined with the public announcement of support by the Klan and the Birch Society, and with conciliatory maneuverings by the school board, the conviction served to bank much of the fire of the movement. The board of education adopted guidelines dictated by the protesters that, if followed in letter and spirit, could easily cause the removal of the controversial books. The board further announced there would be the establishment of an alternative series of elementary schools featuring strict and conservative dress and behavior codes, a stress on "basic education," and an abandonment of progressive texts.

Marvin Horan represents the great bulk of the protesters. Lacking a serious formal education and long employed as a semiskilled laborer, he has lived as they do. Now, for the past several months he has been supported by contributions of his followers. There has been no full accounting of these contributed funds. Horan will say no more than that in excess of $14,000 has been spent during the period of September to January. Other leaders sometimes give contradictory figures.

Alice Moore represents a smaller segment of the protest in terms of life-style, but there was, until recently with the emergence of such fundamentalist preachers as Horan, no denying that it was *her* movement. Alice Moore has the appearance of someone once known, a pretty coed, a sorority girl. She would be out of school now, and a bit heavier, but still with a shy, knowing smile, and only slightly less attractive. At 34, she looks five years younger. Her voice is soft, without the Appalachian twang. A small scar runs down her cheek, to the left of her mouth, but it enhances her looks, making her more a woman of flesh *and* spirit.

But Mrs. Moore is not a coed turned suburban housewife. She never completed high school, but she is a power in the politics of education. Elected to the school board five years ago chiefly as the result of her crusade to keep sex education out of the Kanawha County schools, she has since established herself as the local conservative sentinel over education.

Alice Moore handles the press well, knowing when to flatter and cajole, and when to intimidate. She is tough, resourceful, shrewd. There are many women like her, particularly in the South. A reporter comes away believing that if circumstances had not cast her into a marriage with a fundamentalist

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preacher at the age of 15, she would have been a remarkable woman concerned with more than complaining about dirty words.

The county superintendent of education who had favored the adoption of the textbooks resigned over lack of support by the school board. On the day his successor was chosen, Mrs. Moore was speaking with reporters. (She had cast the only vote against the new administrator—he had supported sex education.)

Mrs. Moore speaks boldly. What she identifies as The One World Philosophers are, she claims, instigating the new and objectionable school programs. There are but two philosophies, she says, and an individual must choose: one is moral absolutism, the other moral relativism. There is no middle ground.

Alice Moore is often confusing and contradictory. After stating that there is no alternative to choosing between absolutism and relativism, she admits she would be content to have the schools neutral—though, by her own argument, achieving neutrality is an impossible task. She reverses the field later and demands that the schools teach what she simplistically terms "the values of the community." "Liberalism is not what the parents want," she announces with the finality of a papal Bull. But who in Kanawha County truly knows what the parents want?

One measure of support given to the protest is the number of children who were absent from the public schools as a result of a boycott called by the antitextbook leaders from the fall of 1974 until the present moment. At the height of the protests, in late 1974, and following the violence, attendance figures indicated that 27 percent of the student body was absent; the normal absentee rate for the system is 8 percent. Less than one in five children were out as a result of the protests. This was at a time when many parents were concerned over the safety of their children, and some clearly kept them out of school because they were afraid.

Another measure was employed by the school board: the parents were asked to sign approval slips for the disputed texts, and in the more affluent sections of Charleston there was up to 99 percent acceptance. In the blue-collar and solidly middle-class western portion of the county, approval ran about 75 percent. The school board estimates that of the 44,000 school-age children in the county, only 400 are being held back from attending the public schools at present.

In the coal-mining eastern half of the county, miners staged wildcat strikes during that fall in what was said to be an attempt to force the books out of the classrooms, but the strikes came just before the national expiration of the mine workers' contract and may have been motivated by a desire to deplete coal reserves in anticipation of a long strike. Local politicians who had sought to use the controversy as a campaign issue were defeated in Kanawha County, but also defeated was the judge who had sternly found many of the protesters guilty of violating injunctions regarding picketing.

The interviewer then put a crucial question to Mrs. Moore: "Would you accept the compromise solution of the school board's establishing alternate or optional schools, allowing use of the texts only in the established system (with parental approval)?" Her response: "No."

If the books are unwholesome, indeed, dangerous in the classroom, do they not remain fatal to her world view everywhere? Yes, she smiles and names her next objective: an assault upon the school libraries. The public libraries? "I'm not concerned with that, *now*" she replies, her smile broader and deeper. The unasked question hangs in the air, "And our homes?" From such logic come inquisitions.

Textbooks with four-letter words and references to Henry Fonda aside, there is little doubt that the education provided the children of the great majority of protesters is not as good as they want—or deserve. Too many of the teachers view the sons and daughters of the miners as slow, less than desirable students. School becomes for these students an elaborate, expensive, and frustrating form of day care. The best instructors and facilities

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gravitate to the urban and wealthier sections of the valley. Little wonder the parents in Cabin Creek or Campbell's Creek believe their children are being destroyed by a bureaucratic system that has placed a child in the sixth grade without the ability to read well or to multiply. Dirty words may have provided the spark that ignited the blaze, but the elements for a conflagration were long present: a terrible sense of alienation and near-total lack of trust in a system that is supposed to care for all.

Rather than wait for the county's alternate schools, many parents enrolled their children in so-called Christian schools, organized overnight. Marvin Horan operates one, which, he states, has more than 130 students. But he has only one state-certified teacher; the remainder of the instructors are parents.

The best-established Christian school is that directed by the Reverend Charles Quigley. It is housed in a squat, red brick church and the adjoining building, formerly a parsonage. A colorful sign, emblazoned with two clasped hands, heralds "Cathedral of Prayer."

The Reverend Quigley is almost a caricature of a fundamentalist minister. Small and wan, pale, with dark, thick plastic glasses, short hair, and quick nervous gestures, he is best known in Charleston for reportedly proclaiming it was his prayer that God strike dead the protextbook members of the board of education. (He now denies praying for it to happen; he simply explained that God sometimes deals with His opponents in that manner.)

"The majority of public school teachers are not morally fit to be in contact with young people," claims Quigley, whose school faculty consists of "born again Christians." The Reverend has just administered a dozen solid whacks to a heavy, strapping youth nearly as large as Quigley himself, as punishment for failing to bring his books to school. One sees that the lesson, as Quigley explains it, is firmly rooted in working-class experience and ethics. If a workman were to forget to bring his tools to the job, he could not expect his employer to pay a day's wages. This philosophy is the norm for the school.

The students resemble their counterparts in public schools. The narrow, confined halls are loud with raucous bedlam as classes change. But there are differences. The origin of man as told by Genesis is taught in the school; there are no science labs; prayers are abundant. This school, unlike most of the Christian schools, employs a staff almost entirely composed of men and women holding college degrees. The school doesn't plan to seek certification from the standard regional accrediting agency. How this will affect the 175 students who now attend the school is not known.

There is another very real difference between this private fundamentalist school and the more elaborately endowed public schools: the children seem happier. They seem pleased to be here. Overwhelmingly, they respond that here the teachers care about them. There is little ambiguity, even among those who tell a visitor that the work is more difficult, the homework load heavier, corporal punishment more frequent, and grades are lower.

It is speculation, but one important factor in determining student attitudes toward the Christian school such as the Cathedral of Prayer is that there is a substantially higher lever of expectation among the faculty. The children are expected to work hard, complete their daily assignments, and make good grades. The expectation is likely to be perceived for what it essentially is, a confidence in the student that the public school might not demonstrate.

Harry Stansbury and Russell Isaacs are two members of the public school board who have given support to the newly adopted textbooks. Yale educated, Stansbury says in defense of the books, "They give a broad viewpoint of people and cultures and social conditions, not only in America, but around the world. This type of exposure will produce better, more understanding citizens." Isaacs, educated at West Virginia University, says succinctly, "I want my children to think."

This is the heart of their support for the embattled books; they see a more complex world than do the protesters; they are less certain of absolutes. Both men have been threatened, Isaacs repeatedly so. Son of a coal

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miner, he has been successful in business and, out of a genuine old-fashioned sense of responsibility, he has sought to help public education. It had been his pathway out of the mines, and now he would help others. But the threats and violence (including a death message delivered to his young son on Christmas Day) have taken their toll, and another decent man has been driven from public service. Stansbury vows to "fight Alice Moore all the way," but Isaacs, a quiet, friendly man with a wry sense of humor, is tired. He will continue to oppose Mrs. Moore while he remains on the school board, but he wants out.

The questions remain: Are internationally recognized works of literature to be withheld from American children because such works portray life and language as it truly is, because they contain controversial or minority opinions, or because the religious sensitivities of an organized group find those works repugnant? Is rebellion brought about by injustice, or, as the protesters have written, through a lack of "absolute values"? What can a politically dominant group, possessing the power of the state to enforce compulsory education laws, teach other people's children? Do parents have the right (never mind the question of power) to prevent their sons and daughters from reading Norman Mailer... or Ayn Rand? How far does parental authority extend? Can an electoral majority exile Darwin from the classroom and the library?

Alice Moore gained a great deal of sympathy from the public and press—including many of those who supported the textbooks to which she objected—when she demanded that beliefs contrary to her conscience not be forced on her children. Going a step further, she now seeks to impose her beliefs upon the majority. Having won recognition of the right not to read, she now fights to prohibit others from reading.

It does not seem likely that the kind of primitive fanaticism that has characterized the West Virginia protest will spread widely throughout the country. But in this time of national malaise there is always the possibility that among segments of the population feeling themselves neglected or scorned the sad and bitter story of Kanawha County may be reenacted. □

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Jon Wiener

Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Nixon: Watergate in Theory

Watergate is history. The time has come to seek a theoretical perspective on those tumultuous events, to move away from yesterday's feverish absorption with "the facts" and confront the significance of Watergate for American politics and society—particularly to consider the relative merits of liberal and Marxist attempts to deal with these questions.

The dominant interpretation of Watergate has been a version of Tocquevillean pluralist theory: Watergate has significance as a despotic attack on pluralism by Nixon and his associates. This was the orientation of most House Judiciary Committee members in their hearings, as well as of most interpretations by the liberal press.

From this perspective, the Nixon administration's attacks on the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic presidential contenders were a violation of the rules of pluralistic politics—that political groups accept each other as equally legitimate; that party competition, by mutual agreement, remains within clearly defined limits; that no one seeks the annihilation of his opponents. The winners are magnanimous and willing to compromise; they do not use their new power to retaliate against those who opposed them.

This was not, of course, how the Committee to Reelect the President behaved. It refused to go by the rules; it played dirty, played for keeps, played winner take all. Patrick Buchanan, Nixon's speech writer, openly affirmed the strategy of seizing power, and keeping hold of it permanently, in his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee.[1] Gordon Liddy told Mike Wallace that the break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters was an "operation by one group of persons who were seeking to retain power, against another group who were seeking to acquire power. That's all it was. It's like brushing your teeth, Michael; it's basic." Nixon's only flaw, in Liddy's eyes, was that he was "insufficiently ruthless" in dealing with those who opposed him. Charles Colson said he would stomp on his own grandmother if it would help Nixon win—a sentiment clearly incompatible with the spirit of democratic pluralism. John Ehrlichman had an even more revealing exchange with Senator Talmadge:

> TALMADGE: If the president could authorize a covert break-in, do you think his power could include... murder or other crimes?
> EHRLICHMAN: I do not know where the line is, Senator.[2]

The usually restrained R. W. Apple of the *New York Times* referred to this as advocacy of "fascist tactics."[3] This was precisely Tocqueville's concern: that there would be no check on the powers of central authority to move against citizens. The Nixon reelection

[1] U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), Testimony of Patrick Buchanan.
[2] *The Watergate Hearings: Break-In and Cover-Up* (New York: Viking [hardcover], Bantam [paper], a New York Times Book, 1973), p. 521.
[3] *Watergate Hearings*, p. 53.

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campaign was dedicated to the idea that winning was the only thing that mattered. As the President said to a trusted lieutenant, "*We gotta win.*"[4] That is not a pluralist idea. Nixon and his staff apparently developed this unprincipled commitment to victory-at-any-price in the wake of the razor-thin victory of 1968. Never again, they vowed, would they exercise genteel restraint in the face of such a risk.

Tocqueville was particularly concerned about political corruption in democracies.

> It is useless to say that dishonest passions are found among all ranks, that one may find despicable men at the head of aristocratic nations as well as democracies. ...There is, in the corruption of those who reach power by chance, something coarse and vulgar which makes it contagious to the crowd. But in the depravity of great noblemen there is often a certain aristocratic refinement and an air of grandeur which prevents it from being communicated. It is difficult for the people to discover the baseness hidden under elegant manners, refined tastes, and graceful phrases. But stealing from the public purse or selling the favors of the state for money—these are matters any wretch can understand and hope to emulate in turn.[5]

Selling favors of the state was precisely the kind of corruption that led to Agnew's fall, but it was not what Watergate was about.

Nixon probably was financially corrupt, and it is possible that public outrage over this issue was the major cause of his downfall. But the crucial issue of a pluralist politics has to do not with money but with power. Tocquevillean liberals fear that centralized power will destroy individual rights. Only voluntary associations could serve as a check on such despotism, defending individuals against the tyrannical tendencies of the state. "If each citizen of a democracy did not learn to combine with his fellow citizens to defend their freedom...tyranny would unavoidably increase," Tocqueville wrote.[6] This argument overlooks the possibility that some citizens might combine, not to defend freedom but to attack it, and that some voluntary associations might not play by the pluralist rules—as CREEP, for instance, did not. Americans join not only the League of Women Voters and the PTA but also the Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan. Liberals hope that such groups will balance one another out, at least so long as the government itself does not tip the balance.

Nixon sensed that the case against him was based on a concept of pluralism, and defended himself by calling for a reassertion of pluralist virtue in words that Tocqueville himself might have uttered:

> Ultimately the answer...lies in a commitment by all of us to show a renewed respect for the mutual restraints that are the mark of a free and civilized society...respect for the system by which our conflicts are peacefully resolved and our liberties maintained.[7]

Nixon was not the only Watergate figure to explain and justify his actions in Tocquevillean terms. "The American revolution was not a class revolution, but a successful separation of a colony from an empire. Class warfare, therefore, is of foreign origin." This eminently Tocquevillean statement comes from, of all people, E. Howard Hunt.[8] For him, the implication is that class warfare of the kind exhibited by, say, George McGovern, is un-American, outside the American consensus, and thus a legitimate target for ruthless tactics. There is an irony in this use of Tocqueville's notion of consensus to justify despotic treatment of political opponents.

Why was Nixon forced out? This is a crucial question for any theoretical account of Watergate, and there is a Tocquevillean answer to it. Nixon was forced out because America is a society of consensus—a society that recognizes limits to what those in power can do to their opponents. The Republican

[4]*The White House Transcripts* (New York: Viking [hardcover], Bantam [paper], a New York Times Book, 1974), transcript of June 23, 1972.
[5]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, J. P. Mayer, ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 513.
[6]Tocqueville, pp. 220–21.
[7]Nixon's TV Address of August 15, 1973.
[8]Cited by Gore Vidal in the *New York Review of Books*, December 13, 1973, p. 6.

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party is part of this consensus; its members do not challenge the fundamental rule of pluralistic politics that neither major party seek the annihilation of the other. This is what Theodore White was referring to in arguing that Nixon broke faith with the American people—and even with fellow Republicans. It was his own party's refusal to defend him that led to Nixon's downfall. For CREEP was set up beyond the pale of pluralist consensus, which is to say, outside the Republican party. It was Barry Goldwater, and Hugh Scott, and Orange County's Representative Charles Wiggins who sealed Nixon's doom.

All this suggests that the public debate over Nixon, the terms in which he was accused and in which he defended himself, were basically Tocquevillean. It suggests that behind Woodward and Bernstein's investigations, behind Leon Jaworski's indictments, behind Eric Sevareid's pear-shaped phrases lie the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville.

But if Watergate was a despotic attack on pluralism, it was not the kind of threat Tocqueville imagined would confront democracy in America. It was neither a case of the tyranny of the majority, the lack of protection for minority might (after all, the Democrats were the majority party); nor was it an example of the benevolent despotism that Tocqueville believed found fertile soil in the egotism and isolation of mass society (there was nothing particularly benevolent about the Nixon social policies of "benign neglect"). While it is possible to find in Tocquevillean theory an analysis of the significance of Watergate—indeed, it is the dominant conception of Watergate—Tocqueville himself did not foresee the possibility that this *kind* of despotic attack on pluralism would be a significant threat to democracy in America.

II

An alternative liberal conception of Watergate is the Weberian notion that it was a consequence of the growth of bureaucratic power to the point where it threatened democracy. From this perspective, argued by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Archibald Cox, Watergate was a conflict between the administrative officials of the executive branch, with their characteristic attachment to secrecy, and the elected officials of the legislature, more committed to democratic values.[9] This was a classic confrontation in which "democracy inevitably comes into conflict with bureaucratic tendencies." For Max Weber, "bureaucracy is a precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied interests in domination. The mechanism is easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control of it"—even Richard Nixon.[10]

Watergate has been interpreted as the culmination of a long process of the centralization of power in the executive branch, a centralization that began as a response to foreign policy needs. Arthur Schlesinger has written that, as the presidential bureaucracy "overwhelmed the traditional separation of powers in foreign affairs, it began to aspire toward an equivalent centralization of power in the domestic polity."[11] The Watergate crisis was resolved by a reassertion of power by the elected officials of the legislative branch.

An alternative Weberian conception of Watergate is that it was a conflict, not between bureaucracy and democracy, but between two different conceptions of legitimate authority—between the rational authority of a set of legal rules, and the charismatic authority of the president. This conception is richer than the first but in some ways more problematic. Politics for Weber is first of all a question of the "inner justifications" people give to their acts of domination and obedience—the meanings people attribute to their relations with the powers that be. Thus Weber would have us ask, what were the inner justifications with which the Watergate principals acted? (They claimed in their own defense that "everybody did it," a bastardized version of the "authority

[9] Archibald Cox, "Ends," *New York Times Magazine*, May 19, 1974, p. 28.

[10] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), "Bureaucracy," pp. 226, 229.

[11] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 205. I am indebted to Keith Nelson for calling this to my attention.

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of the eternal yesterday.") From this perspective, the Watergate principals rejected the notion that their highest obligation was to a rationally created system of legal rules (the Bill of Rights). They did not believe that they had an ultimate duty to legal statute, that obedience to the rules is required in discharging statutory obligations.

Instead, Nixon's staff people saw themselves as acting on the basis of an absolutely personal devotion to Nixon's individual leadership; for them, Nixon possessed an extraordinary and personal value, the kind of appeal Weber called "charismatic." Instead of believing in the rules, they believed in him.

While George Gallup never hesitated to ask Americans "How much charisma does Nixon have: a good deal, some, or none?" today the notion that Richard Nixon possessed a unique gift of grace seems ludicrous—this man who was called "Tricky Dick," or of whom it was said, "would you buy a used car from him?" In retrospect he does not seem to have been capable of the kind of prophetic revelation and heroism that in Weber's terms inspire an absolutely personal sense of devotion. Nixon himself found it necessary to issue a disclaimer against charismatic justifications of Watergate. He denounced "a few overzealous persons who mistakenly thought their cause justified violations of the law," and he refused to accept the "blame" for their excess of enthusiasm.[12] Haldeman coldly denied that Nixon had been a charismatic figure for him: "I do not love Richard Nixon," he said. But by early 1975 few were about to admit that they had loved Nixon, and Haldeman had never been the kind of person of whom it could be said that he was in close touch with his emotional life, much less given to effusive TV statements while his conviction was under appeal. In any case, devotion to charismatic criminals is not grounds for overturning trial verdicts in the American legal system.

Nixon seemed to doubt his own charismatic appeal, to have a gnawing suspicion that he was not what Weber described as "an innerly called leader of men." Would such a person tell the nation "I'm not a crook?" But for Weber, charisma is not restricted to rare appearances of saints and prophets. Charisma is the basis of political party life in modern democracies; it is the bread and butter of electoral competition. Thus it seems completely appropriate in Weberian terms to regard Nixon as a leader exercising charismatic authority.

In the Weberian conception, White House assistants committed the Watergate crimes for *him*, because keeping him in office was their most important task. Weber would have to say that Nixon's staff valued him not so much for any rationally constructed political program as for his own status as a uniquely valuable individual. Here the contrast with a Marxist position is striking. In modern politics, for Weber, the message is not what counts. It is heroes, not party programs, that win the enthusiasm and devotion of followers, of the staff as well as the masses.

Weber makes a distinction between two ways of making politics one's vocation. One can live "off" politics, or one can live "for" politics—a distinction worth pursuing in relation to Watergate. Watergate was not a matter of living "off" politics. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Liddy, and Hunt didn't do it for the money, but rather because Nixon was *their life*. Nixon himself labored mightily to acquire the sense that he too lived "for" rather than "off" politics, to persuade himself that he was one of those leaders with what Weber called "an inner balance" and a firm knowledge that their "life has meaning in the service of a cause."[13] Thus Nixon told the country that his leadership had brought not just the end of a war but a generation of peace.

Yet living "off" politics—corruption in the common Tocquevillean sense—turns out always to have lurked beneath the surface of Nixon's vocation—e.g., his tax deductions, his home improvements. What Tocqueville denounced as "corruption," Weber describes neutrally as one way of making politics one's vocation.

[12]Nixon's TV address of April 30, 1973.

[13]*From Max Weber*, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 84.

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Why did Nixon fall? What forces brought him down? Weberian references to Nixon's "loss of legitimacy" coming in the wake of a "failure of charisma" offer no real analysis. Weber's writings lack any elaboration of the process by which charismatic figures lose legitimacy. (His work on "routinization" deals only with the cases in which charisma succeeds.) Similarly, Weber did little work on the social origins of charismatic authority. The conditions favoring its demise, like the conditions favoring its appearance, remain largely unexplored in his work.

We can understand the outcome of the Watergate affair as the triumph of a rational-legal system of authority over charismatic claims to legitimacy. For Weber, however, such a development was by no means necessarily a desirable one. Weber welcomed charismatic "interruptions" of legal rationality as the only force that could keep modern society from becoming an iron cage of bureaucratic stagnation. He seems to have assumed that charismatic leadership is, in principle, fully compatible with an otherwise instrumentally rational political system. But according to his definition of charisma, the successful authority figure is "entitled to unrestricted obedience from his followers," who by definition see no conflicting obligations to a system of laws.

Indeed, for Weber, political commitment and action are fundamentally emotional and irrational responses to the claims of heroic individuals. Politics in democratic states, he wrote, consists of "a sort of charismatic rule concealed behind a legitimacy which is formally and rationally derived from the will of the governed...but in fact, the leader rules by virtue of the devotion of his followers." This leadership does not base its appeal on a rational political program. Weber writes scornfully of the "merely abstract program of a party consisting of mediocrities" (and what party doesn't?); adherence to a program, he feels, provides little inner satisfaction compared to devotion to great leaders. He rejects the description of democratic politics as rational consideration of alternative policies—the classical Tocquevillean conception—and argues instead that it has become a "dictatorship resting on the exploitation of mass emotionality."[14] This he does not see as a threat to democratic government, or a problem for liberal states; this is the essence of liberal democracy. Weber thus lacks a conception of a possible conflict between charismatic and rational-legal forms of authority.

Weber also lacks a conception of "illegitimate domination" that could accompany his theory of legitimate authority and would be useful in understanding Watergate. This was an explicit rejection on Weber's part, not an oversight. To develop a concept of illegitimate domination he regarded as an unscientific undertaking, a value judgment that belonged properly in the realm of politics rather than science. A judgment that Nixon's administration engaged in illegitimate activities might be necessary, but it belongs in the political arena and not the scientific. For Weber a stable political administration was by definition legitimate, and a genuinely unstable one would apparently not last long enough to require analysis.[15]

Weber believed that the greatest threat to human freedom lay in the steady growth of bureaucratic structures, which brought with them a social ossification and a life-denying stagnation. Charismatic leadership alone could break this deadening routine by its dynamism and creativity. He apparently did not foresee that such a process could bring to power leaders whose "dynamism" and "creativity" would threaten freedom in a fundamental way.

III

Watergate seems to pose problems for Marxist analysis. Some Marxists contented themselves with the observation that Watergate was not a class conflict; others argued that Nixon's "real crimes" were not against Larry

[14]Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), vol. I, p. 268; *From Max Weber*, "Politics as a Vocation," pp. 103, 107.

[15]Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. IV, esp. pp. 84–85.

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O'Brien, but against the people of Vietnam, and to a much lesser extent, against American radicals, black and white. Noam Chomsky called Watergate a "tea party" in comparison to what Nixon was doing in Vietnam.[16] The implication here was that Marxists should not be overly concerned with Watergate; that it was only an exaggerated case of politics as spectacle functioning to conceal the "real" historical developments with which Marxists ought to be concerned; that all there is to be revealed about Watergate is politics as usual in bourgeois society—corporate domination of the candidates and dirty tricks against the people. Had there ever been a candidate who refused corporate contributions? Had not John F. Kennedy gained the presidency through a suspicious counting of votes in Chicago?

But if presidents from Roosevelt through Kennedy and Johnson accepted corporate contributions, played dirty tricks, and covered up with public lies, they did not get driven from office for it. The argument that Watergate was "business as usual" cannot explain why *this* piece of political business should provoke the greatest political crisis in modern American history. Watergate was an unprecedented disruption of politics as usual, a genuine crisis rather than simply a media spectacle. Even though we need to be reminded that Nixon committed more serious crimes elsewhere, such a unique political development deserves the Marxists' attention. Indeed, the question is precisely why these lesser crimes led to a president being forced out of office for the first time in history, when far more serious ones did not.

One possible Marxist approach to Watergate is the argument that the McGovern campaign represented a genuine threat to the hegemony of the corporate elite, something close to a popular radical movement that could bring a fundamental transformation in the structure of power in America. It was therefore necessary for the corporate elite to discard the veil of legality, the pretense to pluralism that prevails in normal times; in the words of one Marxist, Watergate reveals that "the American ruling class can no longer exercise its power without resorting tc the increasingly systematic use of methods which are illegitimate and illegal by this class's own standards."[17]

Though Nixon and his staff seem to have held precisely this view of McGovern, there are serious problems with such an analysis. First, McGovern was never close to winning, and thus there was hardly a need to "strip away the veil of legality" at this historical moment. There was no threat that the power of the corporate elite would be diminished or abolished; Watergate was at best a bizarre overreaction, a major miscalculation by the President and his staff, not an objective necessity required by deepening contradictions. Second, McGovern was no threat to the capitalist class even had he won. His was not a socialist party, not an anticapitalist party, not a working-class party, hardly even a party; he did not lead a national organization capable of pushing a program through Congress. It was essentially a single-issue campaign that was not incompatible with corporate interests, especially since many corporate leaders themselves no longer supported the war in Vietnam.

What was Watergate? From a Marxist perspective, it can be seen as a split in the ruling class, a split of the kind Marx described in the *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, between capitalist groups with different economic interests that had been developing since World War II.[18] In the *New York Review* and *Ramparts*, Kirkpatrick Sale and Carl Oglesby have called this the "Yankee-Cowboy" theory of Watergate, a conflict between the eastern old money elite and the new money of the "Southern Rim."[19] Nixon represented the "new money" group in challenging the dominant position of the "old"; the challenge succeeded tempo-

[16]See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, "Watergate: A Skeptical View," *New York Review*, September 20, 1973, p. 3.

[17]Bruce Brown, "Watergate: Business as Usual," *Liberation*, July–August 1974, p. 17.

[18]Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. I refer here to Marx's discussion of the way different legitimist factions represented different capitalist economic interests. His analysis of Bonapartism does not seem appropriate for Nixon and Watergate.

[19]Kirkpatrick Sale, "The World Behind Watergate," *New York Review*, May 3, 1973; Carl Oglesby, "In Defense of Paranoia," *Ramparts*, November 1974.

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rarily but was followed in the Watergate affair by the reassertion of the eastern group.

The Yankee-Cowboy theory describes the same regional class coalition as do the theories of the "emerging Republican majority" and "the southern strategy." In the view of Sale and Oglesby, the Yankee group consists of the eastern establishment, of second- and third-generation elite families, of Wall Street and the Ivy League, with interests primarily in international finance and manufacturing. This old money, represented above all by Nelson Rockefeller, was challenged by men of new money from the Sun Belt, above all by Goldwater, and later by Nixon. The Southern Rim is anchored at one end in Orange County, California, land of the Birch Society, and particularly in Newport Beach, home of Nixon's personal lawyer Herbert Kalmbach, of his partners Frank DeMarco, who prepared the fraudulent deed for the donation of Nixon papers to the people of the U.S., and Arthur Blech, the President's notorious tax accountant. The Sun Belt of the new money goes south down the San Diego Freeway, past San Clemente, the Versailles of the Rimsters, further south, past La Costa Country Club, where Nixon's staff retreated to plan the Watergate coverup; then east by Lear jet into Goldwater's Arizona, to Texas, home of John Connolly and H. L. Hunt, and finally to Florida, to Senator Gurney, to Bebe Rebozo, to the Cuban emigrés who did the dirty work for the Nixon reelection campaign. "It is no accident," as the Marxists say, that one end of the Southern Rim is anchored in San Clemente, the other in Key Biscayne.

But this is not just a geographical theory of American politics, not just an argument that too much sun makes capitalists into right-wing extremists. In the Sun Belt, it is argued, there has arisen a new breed of capitalists in the post-World War II period, men who based their recent rise to wealth on government contracts in military and aerospace industries, on the oil depletion allowance, and on farm price supports. Their interests tend to be in domestic enterprises rather than foreign. The newness, the rawness of their wealth has made them typical self-made men, reactionary "individualists" with all the self-assurance, greed, and simple patriotism of the heroic first generation of robber barons. Reiterating the development of their predecessors two generations ago, they are relatively unrestrained in pursuit of profits and political power; they are militantly anti-union, antiblack, and anti-Communist, with a lack of interest in high culture and little concern for "social problems" as perceived by the foundations of Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie. Their political ethics match their business and social ethics; they tend to be ruthless, to avoid the "civilized" restraints practiced by their eastern rivals.

This "new money" group seized control of the Republican party in 1964 when Goldwater defeated Rockefeller to win the nomination. Nixon represents them, he is their man—not just because he too is from Orange County, but because he found his financial backers, his personal staff, and his political ideology among them. What we see in Watergate is a display of the political attitudes and practices characteristic of this group—a willingness to use ruthless tactics considered illegitimate by their eastern rivals for power.

According to the Yankee-Cowboy theory, the conflict between the two groups was not only about the Cowboys' attempt to exclude the Yankees from power, but also over policy matters. The Cowboys are foreign policy hawks and the Yankees more conciliatory. The Cowboys seek high military budgets as the principal means by which the state can augment their capital, while the Yankees' interest is in a relaxation of international tensions and active government support for increased foreign trade.

Some of the eastern rivals of the Cowboy new money were members of the Democratic party, which has always found leaders from among the more liberal members of the elite—the Roosevelts, the Harrimans, the Stevensons. What was the crime for which Nixon was forced out of office? One Marxist answer is that he treated the liberals as if they were radicals. He aimed the same weapons at the liberal members of the Democratic party elite

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that previous Democratic administrations had aimed at radicals in the antiwar and black power movements: bugging, sabotage, infiltration, acts of provocation. This was the crime to which liberals objected—treating them as if they were beyond the pale, like radicals. As long as Nixon confined his "fascist tactics" to radicals, he was not investigated, much less driven from office.[20]

It is useful to recall that the attacks on liberals in the campaign were only one part of a general push toward the right for which Nixon was gearing up at the end of his first term. This was Nixon's response to a domestic crisis of authority fostered largely by opposition to the war in Southeast Asia, and to an international weakening of American corporate power in relation to Japanese and European rivals. Nixon mounted a general attack on the liberal welfare state, which centered on revenue sharing to reduce federal social programs, and on turning the Supreme Court from an activist agency of change into a bulwark of the *status quo*. The push toward the right included an attack on working-class organizations, centering around wage controls, plus Republican support for the Teamsters in their struggle against the Farmworkers—pitting the most reactionary against the most progressive union. The turn to the right also included an attack on the radical left unprecedented since the days of Joseph McCarthy. This was accompanied by vicious attacks on the leading liberal ideological organs, particularly by Agnew's diatribes against network television news, the *New York Times* and the Washington *Post*. All this was justified by a strident assertion of nationalistic ideology around the notion of the "Bicentennial Era," which was to correspond to Nixon's second term of office.

Nixon's strategy was thus a comprehensive and far-reaching attempt to shift the country to the right. His staff was explicit about this. John Mitchell said in 1972, "This country is going to go so far to the right you won't recognize it," and the *New York Times* itself anxiously announced in January 1973, that with Nixon's second term, "a tide of reaction...is sweeping across America."[21]

It was in this context of a highly self-conscious attack on the liberal policies advocated by the eastern corporate elite that Watergate became an issue, and it was made an issue by precisely those elite groups Nixon sought to drive from power—network television news, the *Times* and the *Post*, the liberal members of Congress.

Marxists must also ask, how was it possible that such a deep split between two groups within the ruling class was permitted to come out into the open? Why weren't these differences ironed out in private, at the Burning Tree Country Club? First, because Nixon wasn't interested in compromise, he was interested in defeating the eastern old-money elite; he thought he had the power to do it. But then it must be asked, why was the eastern group willing to take such drastic and unprecedented measures against him? Here it seems that the absence of any radical threat in the country convinced many that the society could take a large dose of political disruption at the top. There was no significant radical movement left on the campuses or in the ghettos arguing that the political system was illegitimate; and, because the 1972 election had been so overwhelmingly one-sided, there would not be any Democrats who would argue that dirty tricks determined the outcome and therefore that McGovern deserved to be president.

Thus, from a Marxist perspective, Watergate was not simply unpluralist behavior; it was unpluralist behavior with a specific class content and a specific ideological orientation. Watergate was the "battleground of a national struggle for power" between two groups within the corporate elite that had different politics. The Nixon campaign consisted of a reactionary attack by the more right-wing element in the capitalist class against the older and more liberal, and the subsequent crisis and investigations were a successful counterattack.

But there are serious problems with the Yankee-Cowboy theory of Watergate. First of

[20]Geoffrey Barraclough, "The End of an Era," *New York Review*, June 27, 1974, p. 19.

[21]New York *Times*, January 15, 1973, p. 28.

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all, the economic interests of the two groups have not been shown to be clearly distinct. It does seem that the Cowboys are more immediately dependent on government contracts, but the Yankees too have their share of federal help. And Cowboy capital is often linked to Yankee capital through interlocking boards of directors, holding companies, and stock ownership.

Second, the political differences between Yankees and Cowboys are not fully explained by their different economic interests. The "dovishness" of the Yankees is at most a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind. The hawkish American intervention in Vietnam was the creation of the Yankee circle around Kennedy and Johnson; Yankee-Cowboy theorists would presumably describe counterinsurgency and limited war as policies whose purpose was to defend the global interests of international Yankee capital. It was not until late in the conflict that the Yankees backed off from the war they had created, while the Cowboys continued to defend the old Yankee position. Indeed, Goldwater has said of Rockefeller's foreign policy views, "he'd make me look like a dove."[22]

Nixon's foreign policy, created by Rockefeller representative Henry Kissinger, was pure Yankee—disengagement from Vietnam, détente, and trade with Russia and China. From the perspective of the Yankee-Cowboy theory, Nixon's role was not so much the Cowboy antagonist of Yankee interests, but the Cowboy who gained his place in history by turning U.S. foreign policy down the road of new Yankee interests in détente and trade.

Even the apparently more liberal social concerns of the Yankees are open to question. Rockefeller's actions at Attica are difficult to explain from the viewpoint of Yankee-Cowboy theory; his policy there was more brutal than anything the archrimster Ronald Reagan ever did as governor. Can it really be argued that the Yankees are more "civilized" in their domestic social policies?

A final problem with the Yankee-Cowboy theory of Watergate is that the linkages between the two economic groups and the political structures through which the Watergate crisis developed are not clear. Rockefeller never pushed for exposure of Nixon's Watergate activities or for impeachment. McGovern got virtually no support from the Yankee press in arguing that Watergate was a presidential crime for which Nixon should be excluded from office. The Senate and House committees were not dominated by Yankees; Sam Ervin and Peter Rodino would never pass for Cabots or Lodges.

These three problems with the Yankee-Cowboy theory of Watergate—a lack of evidence of distinct economic interests, an unclear relation between the politics and the economic interests of the groups, and an absence of linkages to the politics of the Watergate crisis itself—have led some Marxists to argue that Watergate was a conflict between ruling groups that do not represent consistently well-defined sectors of the economy. This kind of analysis stresses the relative autonomy of political developments and the shifting nature of political coalitions in American society.

For the "Kapitalistate" group around James O'Connor, Watergate was a Habermasian crisis of legitimation for the entire ruling class.[23] Watergate constantly threatened to turn into an indictment of American "democracy" as a whole, as evidence kept appearing and suggested that Nixon didn't do anything his predecessors hadn't done. Confronted with this problem, Congress and the liberal press defined the issues in such a way as to focus on the personal corruption of Nixon and his associates, rather than on American war crimes, systematic denial of civil rights to radicals, or corporate domination of the two-party system. The public impeachment hearings in July 1974 served as the vehicle for relegitimation as committee members and commentators pitted the

[22] Associated Press dispatch, June 16, 1975.

[23] "Watergate, or the 18th Brumaire of Richard Nixon," by the San Francisco Bay Area Kapitalistate Group, in *Kapitalistate: Working Papers on the Capitalist State* (No. 3) Spring 1975, pp. 3–25. This in turn draws on James O'Connor, *Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York and London: St. Martin's Press, 1974), and Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

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Constitution against a corrupt president. Finally Gerald Ford proclaimed that the entire episode demonstrated that "our system works," Theodore White enshrined this success in his book, and Dustin Hoffman and Robert Redford are playing Bernstein and Woodward in the Hollywood version of *All the President's Men*.

In general, Marxists have been considerably more successful at describing the social and political forces that form the background to Watergate than at describing the crisis itself. The major weakness of the various Marxist approaches is that they penetrate too quickly the ideological surface of political events—in this case, the terms in which the crisis was fought out and eventually resolved. Liberals, under an attack from the right unprecedented since the days of Joseph McCarthy, chose to fight back on the terrain of pluralist rules of the game and the rational authority of law by reasserting constitutional freedoms. This has significant consequences for American politics in general and radical politics in particular.

One would think that "relegitimation" would conclude with a celebration of American political virtue once the corrupt president had been expelled. But in fact the opposite has occurred; the past year has seen revelation after revelation of abuses of power by the federal government. Nixon's resignation did not close the books but on the contrary has led to closer scrutiny of government attacks on the political freedom of radicals during the past 25 years. Watergate was followed by revelations of massive illegal FBI and CIA surveillance of Americans that began under FDR and took a great leap forward on the orders of Lyndon Johnson; of American efforts to "destabilize" Chile, Kennedy's secret war against Cuba, and so on. And it has been congressional liberals and the Yankee press who have done the investigating and made the revelations. In so doing, it is they who have been providing evidence for the case Marxists themselves were making during the Watergate crisis: Nixon's acts were not unique but were part of a pattern of repression that includes the nation's most celebrated liberal presidents. In this respect, what has occurred is not a relegitimation of politics as usual but, on the contrary, a legitimizing of crucial elements of the radical critique of '60s liberalism, previously viewed as a paranoid fantasy. Those who savor paradox and irony will find this development particularly tasty. □

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
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Philip Green

Race and IQ: Fallacy of Heritability

This article is the first of three dealing with the subject of Genetics, IQ, and Equality. The next two articles, to follow in our summer and fall issues, will deal with "Race and IQ: Arthur Jensen's Hoax" and "IQ and the Future of Equality." –EDS.

In 1969 Arthur Jensen first made the claim that it is "a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference." That "hypothesis" has since been defended by Jensen and his epigones with all the zeal often brought to that most dogmatic creed, the orthodoxy of "scientific" truth. The social and intellectual ramifications of Jensen's original essay in the *Harvard Educational Review* (hereafter *HER*), as well as his subsequent work (especially *Educability and Group Differences*, hereafter *Educability*) will be with us for a long time.[1] Sober and influential persons in the worlds of academia, journalism, and politics have taken it all with deadly seriousness. No one can talk about the subject of equality without dealing with those writings, and the "hypothesis" has become a political weapon.

Yet one need have no hesitation in saying that the doctrine one critic has called "Jensenism" is a hoax, the Piltdown man of social science. It consists of theoretical propositions that are foolish or even nonsensical. The "data" on which it is based—where they exist at all—are distorted, misreported, and virtually worthless. These points must be made in some detail, in order to set the record straight, especially since most of the people who quote Jensen have not read him carefully, if at all. Otherwise Jensen's writings on race will continue to be treated as unpalatable, demanding refutation of a "difficult" kind, but generally to be given credence as having been offered in good faith.

According to Jensen, "success" in the American society is legitimately a function of a particular kind of intelligence that might best be called "conceptual" intelligence or "cognitive ability"—the kind of intellectual skill needed to make complicated technical decisions, do essential scientific research, etc. This particular kind of intelligence is allegedly encapsulated in various intelligence or IQ tests (which have in common that their results, for a given individual, tend to show a high rate of intercorrelation).

If the results of these indicative tests are then summarized for certain population subgroups, it turns out that there are marked differences in the average scores obtained by some of them. Most notably, class, race, and certain other ethnic statuses tend to be predictors of IQ. *On the average*, the lower one's

[1] *Educability and Group Differences* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). The original *HER* essay is "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" *Harvard Educational Review*, Winter 1969, pp. 1–23. The same article also appears in *Environment, Heredity*, and Intelligence, Reprint Series # 2 of the *Harvard Educational Review*, with the same pagination, accompanied by various responses and a counterresponse by Jensen ("Reducing the Heredity-Environment Uncertainty," pp. 209–44); and also in a collection of his essays, *Genetics and Education* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 69–203. All mere page references will be to the *Review*; the "hypothesis," as quoted, appears on p. 82.

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social class by the usual census indicators, the more likely one is to have a below-average IQ, and the less likely to have an IQ well above average; the same is true for blacks as opposed to whites:

> ...on the average, Negroes test about one standard deviation (15 IQ points) below the white population in IQ, and this finding is fairly uniform across...81 different tests of intellectual ability....This magnitude of difference gives a median overlap of 15 percent, meaning that 15 percent of the Negro population exceeds the white average. [P. 81.]

If that were all the information we had about IQ in American society, our most likely response would be, first, to note that of course we expect people who live less well to do less well on tests of various kinds, and, second, to redouble our efforts in the direction of making social conditions more nearly equal for all. It is at this point, though, that the biological antiegalitarians, led by Jensen, take a crucial step.

According to Jensen, the kind of intelligence measured by IQ tests is largely *heritable*; that is, the difference between the average IQs of any two groups of people with different average IQs can be much more easily accounted for, statistically, by positing a genetic rather than an environmental influence. Jensen reaches this conclusion by reviewing a series of studies of genetically related persons, ranging from mere siblings to one-egg (monozygotic) identical twins, who, from birth or a very early period in their lives have been reared apart (there are also a few studies of unrelated children reared in the same home). Jensen postulates that by separating the environmental influence on these children (their places of residence and the people bringing them up) from the genetic influence (their actual blood ties), and then comparing their IQ scores, one can estimate the genetic influence—the heritability—quite accurately. Thus we can put a hard number to the old argument about "nature" versus "nurture."

Estimates of this heritability figure, by people who have followed Jensen's procedure, range from a low of 0.25–0.35 (that is, 25–35 percent as a proportion of the statistical variance between two different IQ sets accounted for by postulating a heritability factor), through a midrange figure of 0.50 to a high of 0.80 (Jensen's estimate, which he justifies chiefly by discounting almost all studies but those involving identical twins and adopted foster children, and by ignoring necessary caveats about interpretation of the data other authors have pointed to.)[2]

If the postulated heritability factor indeed exists, and is as high as he claims (or close to it), certain unpleasant conclusions seem to follow, according to Jensen. We cannot easily close the intelligence-as-IQ gap that already exists between different classes or groups by educational effort or other environmental interventions, and we are doomed to the continued existence of a society based on real, "naturally" transmitted, and thus permanent group differences: ie., a "naturally" inegalitarian society. The core of Jensen's message is revealed most tellingly in a passage in which he denies uttering it—expounding the concept of "associative intelligence" (or ability to learn by rote) as a level of intellectual understanding at which it would be more constructive to approach and teach black people, on the average. Since he has just finished telling us that *conceptual* ability is the cornerstone of true success in our kind of society, and since "associative" (rote) ability in his description clearly fails to reproduce the important types of intellectual linkage that are ascribed to conceptual ability, e.g., the hidden prescription that low-IQ blacks and their descendants should be adjusted to a permanently secondary role is unmistakable.

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[2]Compare, e.g., Christopher Jencks *et al.*, *Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 64 ff. and Appendix A; Richard Herrnstein, "IQ," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1971, pp. 54 ff.; also Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Nature with Nurture: A Reinterpretation of the Evidence," in the excellent collection *Race and IQ*, Ashley Mantagu, ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 114–44.

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The Heritability of IQ

CRITIQUES OF "JENSENISM" ordinarily begin with the recognition that the notion of heritability is very questionable, regardless of what "statistics" allegedly show. IQ tests of the various kinds used today—and from hereon I shall use the single phrase "IQ tests" to describe all those with which Jensen's work is concerned—do not measure "intelligence" against some independently "real" standard, the way mercury in a thermometer measures temperature, or the distance between grooves on a bar of platinum alloy in a vault in France is used to define our standard unit of distance. All IQ measurements are relational: that is, my IQ score relates my performance to the mean performances of persons of my chronological age, rather than to any particular concrete standard of intellectual attainment. Whether IQ scores defined in a wholly relational manner can sensibly be thought to measure a trait of the kind we could conceivably inherit is a complex and interesting question that must clearly be troublesome.[3]

Yet it is not necessary to go into this question here, for where the subject of race is at issue, Jensen's use of the notion of the heritability of IQ is clearly and unequivocally defective in an even more fundamental sense.

First, it turns out—surprising no one familiar with the difficulty of arranging controlled social observations—that the "data" on which Jensen based his "finding" about the high heritability of IQ are worthless. In those early studies the true home/foster-home differences were not nearly as great as claimed; IQ figures, sample sizes, and variance analyses were misreported; relevant comparisons among the children and their backgrounds that would have returned much lower heritability estimates were overlooked. The only scholar who has actually gone to the trouble of reanalyzing the classic heritability studies, Leon Kamin, has given a detailed report of his findings in a book that stands as a fascinating exercise in scholarly detective work.[4] He concludes, on the basis of the available data, as reanalyzed, that there is no evidence for a heritability figure of greater than zero even among the white subjects of those studies themselves, and that there is at least some reason to believe that IQ simply is not heritable at all—on the basis of those studies.

Of course, Kamin could be wrong. It is always possible that properly conceived studies, permitting of genuine comparison and correctly reported, would have demonstrated an IQ heritability figure of some value or other. But that does not matter: for the most striking point in Jensen's work is that his proposition on the heritability of IQ distributions, *true or false*, is of no relevance at all with respect to the black/white (or any similar) IQ difference.

The "heritability" of a trait refers to the extent to which variations in measurement from the average value of the trait may be traceable to genetic variation in the measured population. The key word here is "population," for heritability statistics only apply to a specific breeding and rearing population (as geneticists put it). Thus, for a population that has regularly interbred to the exclusion of outsiders, a heritability of, say, 0.50, would mean that half of the total variation from the mean (average) would be accounted for by genetic differences in the population. But that figure is not, as Jensen has erroneously implied, simply a function of the "innateness" of the trait being measured.

On the contrary, the heritability of a trait, assuming that there is any cultural effect on its expression at all, can equally be conceived of as nothing more than a function of the extent to which salient features of the *environments* the observed population live in are themselves

[3]The defense of IQ as representative of a single real trait is given by Jensen, *HER*, pp. 8 ff., and by Herrnstein, *IQ in the Meritocracy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), chap. 2. The counterargument is presented by N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, "IQ: Heritability and Inequality, Part I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Summer 1974, pp. 331–409.

[4]*The Science and Politics of I.Q.* (New York: John Wiley, 1974). Other decisive critiques of the methodology and findings of these studies are David Layzer, "Heritability Analyses of I.Q. Scores: Science or Numerology?" *Science*, March 29, 1974, pp. 1259–66, and Harry Munsinger, "The Adopted Child's IQ: A Critical Review, "*Psychological Bulletin*, September 1975, pp. 623–59.

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alike or unlike. (At least this is true among humans, who are not being bred, raised, and observed in "controlled" environments.) That is, suppose two environments very much alike regarding those aspects that have the strongest impact on measured intelligence in a given society. Then, obviously, genetic variations will *seem* to account for most of the variance in a variable trait that is manifested within those environments. But the variations may themselves be trivial, and the genetic "imprint" on the trait very weak or malleable. On the other hand, if people grow up in sharply unlike environments, then the heritability of the very same trait will seem to be low. Therefore, the heritability of a trait in subpopulation X is wholly irrelevant to knowledge of its heritability in subpopulation Y. The members of population X may live in environments that are on the average pretty much like each other compared to the more dissimilar environments that members of population Y live in, and in that case the genetic variance for the particular trait would seem to be greater.

Now let us suppose that groups X and Y live together in a single society, and we are trying to determine the heritability of a trait like intelligence for the whole population (X+Y), so that we can determine whether the manifest average differences between X and Y (if there are any) are the result of genes or environment. Unless the two populations are so interbred that we can no longer distinguish between them (making the original question meaningless), *it is impossible to do this*. It is easy to see why. In the two populations, we may under ideal experimental circumstances (which never exist for social research) be able to say what causes variation *within* each population, but the methods for doing this have no applicability to the prospect for determining the causes of variance *between* populations. What Jensen is doing is analogous to a geneticist's arguing about the causes of variance in the average different size of wild sheep in the Scottish highlands and domestic sheep in an English barnyard. Geneticists, as their texts reveal, do not do that sort of thing. (See note 7.) The method "human geneticists" have adopted for determining within-population variance is to study children who have been separated at birth—preferably identical twins, but also siblings—and raised in sharply different environments. If the environments are truly unlike, and there is a strong environmental determination of trait variance, the separated children ought to manifest the particular trait, as measured, more closely adhering to the value exhibited by their adoptive rather than their biological parents. But if the separated children have IQs like each other's, and unlike those of foster parents who reared one of them from birth, that would seem to be good evidence of a genetic inheritance that can't easily be effected by changing social circumstances.

Obviously, such studies are no help in trying to determine between-population variance. In fact, as Kamin demonstrates, the studies that have been done are actually of no value for determining even *within*-population variance. For since we don't know precisely what aspects of our environment stimulate or retard our intellectual maturation in precisely what degree, we can have no idea, given a finding of high "heritability," whether the trait and its parameters are really being inherited. It may well be, alternatively, that some unobvious likeness in the allegedly different environments is having a strong and similar effect on the separated children, masking the environmental impact and producing a spurious picture of high heritability. As for between-population variance, the Scandinavian, English, and American siblings who were the subjects of the most cited heritability studies lived considerably more like each other, and closer to the cultural and economic mainstream (or average environment) of their societies, than American blacks, whose typical life experiences have been comparatively deviant; thus the *statistical heritability* of "intelligence" in the more environmentally integrated and more mutually similar population can tell us nothing about the *genetic inheritance* of "intelligence" in the less integrated and similar population.

It is neither satirical nor cynical, but a simple statement of fact, to say that there is at present one way we could determine the extent

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to which genes account for the IQ variance in population X + Y, where X are American whites and Y American blacks. That would be if the two races had thoroughly interbred; some parents then had genetically identical twins except that one of them was genetically "white" and the other was genetically "black"; the twins were separated at birth, the black twin (say) moving into an environment significantly above the mean environment (a mansion), and the white twin remaining in an environment significantly below the average environment (a slum); and the black twin never encountered any discrimination or other derogating behavior. If in that circumstance the black twins' IQs were consistently the same as or lower than those of the white twins—even though they were receiving significant social advantages, including most prominently the noticeably higher IQs of their foster parents, unmatched by the white twins—*then and only then* could we say that the hypothesis of the genetic inferiority of average black cognitive ability had been supported. No other evidence having to do with the statistical study of trait variance is at this point even remotely relevant to Jensen's proposition. As one researcher puts it: "Only if black children could be reared as though they were whites, and vice versa, could the effects of different rearing environments on the genotype distribution of the two races be estimated."[5]

Needless to say, we have not studied the behavior of such children any more than the behavior of gryphons or sphinxes: Jensen has attempted to pass off the worst kind of pseudoscience as the real thing. Indeed, the discussion of heritability studies in the context of racial IQ differences is a waste of time, made necessary only by Jensen's original error in asserting their relevance. Jensen himself, in fact, offers a similar analysis in chapter 5 of *Educability*, and then adds that "the higher the within-group heritability, the greater is the *plausibility*, or the *a priori* probability, that genetic differences exist between the groups. Plausibility is a subjective judgment of *likelihood*." So it is, but italicizing words does not increase their truth-value, and it must be repeated that nothing in the literature of within-group heritability has the slightest bearing on an informed estimate of that "likelihood." On the contrary, because the genes for intelligence are so many and so diverse, there is no conceivable reason why the original gene pools for intelligence should have had, overall, different genetic value in any of the human races. And as for the possibility of differential natural selection, the only concrete suggestion ever offered—that mostly unintelligent Africans were sold into slavery—is historically ludicrous and statistically incredible.[6] As we shall see, the "plausibility" of Jensen's "hypothesis" really has nothing to do with the literature of human genetics but rather with the entirely unrelated question, discussed at length below, of whether *environmental* effects can "plausibly" be said to account for the known IQ difference between the races.

The only factor that could legitimately cause us to give a high *a priori* probability to the notion that significant genetic differences in intelligence exist between racial groups would be the general existence of significant genetic differences among the human races, especially among behavioral traits heavily implicated in social interactions. We have no knowledge of human genetics with respect to such traits—Jensen is a "pioneer" here. But we do know a fair amount about the genetics of what seem to be more strictly biological traits, among both animals and humans. Among domestic animals, for example, the heritability of traits having to do with size is generally quite low.[7]

[5]Sandra Scarr-Salapatek, "Race, Social Class, and IQ," *Science*, December 24, 1971, 1287.

[6]The improbability of these genetic "explanations" is described by W. F. Bodmer, "Race and IQ: the Genetic Background," in Montagu, *op. cit.*, pp. 280 ff.

[7]Compare the table in Srb, Owen, and Edgar, *General Genetics*, 2nd ed. revised (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1965), p. 490. It is instructive to contrast the presentation of the idea of "heritability" in this standard textbook with Jensen's. The authors of the text emphasize not deductions about "nature" and "nurture," which the concept allegedly enables us to make (according to Jensen and Herrnstein), but the limited and controlled circumstances under which geneticists are able to make any statements at all about heritability in animals. Their cautious treatment of that topic leaves a strong impression that Jensen has confused people with fruitflies.

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And among humans, though there is much within-population variance for most traits, we have no evidence for anything but marginal racial variations except among certain trivial matters of physical appearance. Some races or cultural groups might be said to be averagely of different stature, strength, etc., but no human group (with the exception of the Pygmies, perhaps) falls outside the normal ranges for such traits or is deficient in significant physical talents. Moreover, what differences do exist seem to shrink with changes in diet and health care, and this is even true of within-population variances.[8]

Furthermore, although almost nothing precise is known about the placement of genes for intelligence, much is known about the genetic loci for blood type, blood serum protein composition, etc. With respect to those well-observed traits, one geneticist has reported that "Less than 15% of all human genetic diversity is accounted for by differences between human groups! Moreover the difference between populations within a race accounts for an additional 8.3%, so that only 6.3% is accounted for by racial classification."[9] These figures are probably no more reliable than any others in this area, but it would certainly require some ingenuity to explain how the genetic influence on a trait like intelligence, which is so dependent on surrounding social circumstances for its expression, could be much greater than the genetic influence on a set of traits whose almost wholly genetic nature is not in doubt.

The Malleability of IQ

AS WE HAVE SEEN, there is no evidence for Jensen's contention that any innate genetic factor is implicated in the IQ gap between the races. There is, however, still another byway through Jensen's morass of pseudoscience we have not yet explored: that is, even if genes were implicated in the racial IQ gap, this fact would have no relevance at all for social policy, nor any necessary implications for the long-run prospects of an egalitarian, interracial society.

When we state or imply, as Jensen does, that the heritability of intelligence gives cause for concern, we are obviously suggesting that the more trait variance is heritable (traceable to genetic differences), the more difficult egalitarian social reform must be. That suggestion is unwarranted.

From a policy standpoint, the only fact of importance about differences in manifestation of a trait is not whether those differences (and by implication the boundaries of expression of the trait itself) are "caused" genetically, but whether the trait itself is malleable. There are highly heritable traits that are almost totally unmalleable, to be sure: blood type, for example. There are also acquired traits that, once widespread, are probably unmalleable: habits and customs can endure for millennia despite strenuous efforts to erase them. But most important of all for our discussion, there are traits, highly heritable in *all* populations, that are thoroughly malleable, and in some cases quite easily so.[10]

For example, susceptibility to tooth decay through softness of dentyne ("poor dentition") is such a trait. Poor dentition, in this sense, is both heritable and endemic, yet the simple addition of a goodly amount of fluoride to all water supplies (plus the general inculcation of good dental habits) would virtually wipe out caries within one or two generations. All our previous "measurements" of poor dentition, its incidence and variations in incidence, would turn out to be of no importance, though the trait indeed represents an "innate" disposition. Moreover, it would be possible to arrange things so that poor dentition would seem to be "carried" racially, in the same way that IQ seems to Jensen to be carried racially. We need only eliminate all fluoride (including natural fluoride) from our water supplies, give fluoride pills in copious amounts to all whites

[8]Human height is the best-known case; see L. L. Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer, *The Genetics of Human Population* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1971), pp. 609–10.

[9]R. C. Lewontin, "The Apportionment of Human Diversity," in Theodosius Dobzhansky *et al.*, eds., *Evolutionary Biology*, vol. VI (1972), p. 396.

[10]E.g., height; see note 8.

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and to whites only, and prohibit dentists from treating black patients in any way. Within a very short while our "statistics" would show that white children "inherit" good dentition from their caries-free parents, and black children "inherit" poor dentition from their caries-ridden parents. This is exaggerated, of course, but my scenario is not totally removed from an accurate description of those societies where a separate (by and large) breeding and rearing population also has a sharply different average social-class attainment than the dominant population. That is, pluralist but inegalitarian societies should, other things being equal, produce roughly the same trait measurements for cultural phenomena as Jensen has produced for "intelligence." It would be astonishing if they did not. His air of a man who has courageously produced a tiger from a hat is thus without any justification.

The only relevant question, then, is not whether intelligence as measured by IQ is inherited in some way but whether it is malleable. The evidence on this score is absolutely unequivocal; the existence of strong effects from what one observer has called "ecological intervention" is beyond cavil. Observed phenomena of IQ modification include such well-known cases as:

- a dramatic rise of IQs in a single generation of American blacks involved in migration from the rural South to the urban North;
- the identification of drastic changes in individuals' IQs from infancy to adulthood, related at least partially to degree of environmental enrichment;
- the raising of the IQs of "retarded" or low-IQ children to the overall social mean or above through lengthy, intensive educational programs, including a case in which the "new" IQ levels have been maintained in adulthood;
- the general raising of average American IQ levels in the 20th century, as indicated in the need to rewrite and toughen the standard IQ tests on several occasions in order to prevent the national mean from rising.

Some of these studies or experimental programs are, as Jensen has remarked, theoretically questionable, in that the researchers or experimenters have done an incomplete job of establishing the exact causes of either the initial IQ deficit or its subsequent erasure. But the successes themselves remain as a dramatic critique of those who claim that "heredity" cannot be modified by "environment." Jensen, whose pursuit of egalitarian arguments is indefatigable, has never answered the statement by Stein and Susser who, summarizing all the available data, conclude that "*improvement in the social environment of groups at a marked disadvantage can bring about a substantial improvement in IQ levels and a decline in the frequency of mild mental retardation.*"[11]

These findings are not at all in conflict with Christopher Jencks's notorious conclusion that "the evidence suggests that equalizing educational opportunity would do very little to make adults more equal" (Jencks, p. 255), nor with

[11]Zena Stein and Mervyn Susser, "Mutability of Intelligence and Epidemiology of Mild Mental Retardation, "*Review of Educational Research*, February 1970, p. 64; see also the excellent summary (from which I take the term "ecological intervention") by Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Is Early Intervention Effective? Some Studies of Early Education in Familial and Extra-Familial Settings," in Montagu, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–322. The most dramatic studies are by H. M. Skeels, "Adult Status of Children with Contrasting Early Life Experiences," Monograph # 31, No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Society for Research in Child Development 1966); and R. Herber *et al.*, "Rehabilitation of Families at Risk for Mental Retardation" (Milwaukee: Regional Rehabilitation Center of the University of Wisconsin, 1969). The Milwaukee Project (as Herber's work is known) is described by Stephen P. Strickland, "Can Slum Children Learn?," in Carl Senna, ed., *The Fallacy of I.Q.* (New York: Third Press, 1974). An equally dramatic account concerning individuals rather than structured learning groups is that of Robert B. McCall *et al.*, "Developmental Changes in Mental Performance," Monograph # 38 (No. 3) of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1973. That monograph and Bronfenbrenner's article both have full-length bibliographies; see also B. S. Bloom, *Stability and Change in Human Characteristics* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), and Martin Deutsch and Associates, *The Disadvantaged Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1967). See the migration study by Otto Klineberg, *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935); it was replicated 15 years later, with similar results, by E. S. Lee, "Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration: A Philadelphia Test of the Klineberg Hypothesis,"*American Sociological Review*, vol. XVI (1951), pp. 227–33.

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Jensen's summarizing remark that "compensatory education has been tried and apparently it has failed" (*HER*, p. 1). Neither general public education nor even the particular 1960s compensatory education programs for preschoolers have anything in common with known cases of successful selective intervention. The Head Start experiments to which Jensen refers were thinly scattered among the nation's school districts and usually instituted in precisely those neighborhoods where the cards are heavily stacked against scholastic accomplishment well before school age is reached. The Head Start projects also were poorly funded. Only infrequently if at all was any follow-up program maintained consistently throughout the pupils' scholastic (let alone their extrascholastic) experience. Even within the programs, moreover, different pedagogical methods were used, consisting more often of experimental attempts to find new methods for successful instruction than known methods of remediation. Remedial education (especially as limited to the institutions of formal schooling) is even now probably a lot like remedial dentistry used to be: capable of patching up holes but not of modifying the organism's disposition. "Success" in Jensen's terms—permanently improving IQ and scholastic achievement for many children—would in these circumstances have been surprising, if not miraculous.

The *New York Times* "News of the Week in Review" for April 27, 1975, describes the immense success of a much more carefully focused compensatory education program in Philadelphia. Here the sort of work Head Start programs by and large did *not* engage in is illustrated in an anecdote from the experience of a teacher working with Eskimo children:

> "Evon was badly damaged when he was born unexpectedly at a fishing camp with no one to attend his mother. He has cerebral palsy as well as some intellectual retardation. The question is how best to teach him in a two-teacher school with no special equipment except interest and concern. A later visit proves that those were the essentials; and a careful, patient teacher aide (with a ninth-grade education) is working a minor miracle with Evon, who now can stand almost straight, can talk in sentences, can count and recognize colors...."[12]

Evon's, of course, is a much more severe case of intellectual deficiency than that afflicting most low-IQ children.

As for American schools generally, we must be very careful in interpreting Jencks's findings (as his critics have not always been). Jencks in no way denies that schooling increases cognitive ability—and one might well ask, what else does? Jencks merely argues that schooling has not *equalized* measured cognitive abilities. Again, one wonders why anyone should be puzzled by this conclusion, since schooling has never been intended to "equalize" children's IQs. Public schools in this country at least have been meant to domesticate the uncivilized or countrified, Americanize the immigrant, tutor the untutored, train the potential worker, *and* provide assistance in the form of educational opportunity to the upwardly mobile.[13] This last aspect of American educational history produces the raised expectations many believe Jencks has deflated. But Jencks has only punctured an illusion that should not have been aloft in the first place. "Providing opportunity" is not "equalizing." At best (and rarely), the former has tended to mean treating everyone equally—but treating people who are unequal equally simply insures their continued inequality.

The most the American educational system accomplishes as an equalizing force is to provide everyone capable of taking advantage of it with threshold resources. Above this threshold, ambition, aggressiveness, and sheer luck (as Jencks notes) will, in an expanding economy, carry some of the system's beneficiaries upward: enough to fuel the ideology of equal opportunity. But many children are not equipped to take advantage of the resources of public education and many who are lack the right kind of ambition, aggressiveness, or

[12]Barbara Bowen Doak, "Life Out There Is Good," *Swarthmore College Bulletin*, July 1975, p. 22.
[13]See Colin Greer, *The Great School Legend* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

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"luck." For many if not most of those who begin with less than equal advantages, therefore, not merely equal treatment but *compensatory* treatment only (both within and without the schools) would suffice to overcome their initial deficit.

Compensatory treatment, however, is exactly what the American educational system has never offered and has never been intended to offer. Indeed, to the extent that "compensatory" treatment is offered, it is often overcompensation for the already advantaged. People living in well-off communities, whose children are already advantaged by most indices, benefit from a richer tax base and therefore are able to spend more money on education than people living in poor communities—just as for generations the South supported the education of whites more generously than that of blacks, or as upper-class Protestants had special access to private schools providing considerably more social opportunity than the parochial schools available to working-class Catholics. Today, even leaving such comparisons aside, "tracking" systems in many jurisdictions regularly guide middle-class children toward college and the well-paying professions, and lower-class children toward vocational training and the lesser wages of skilled or semiskilled labor.

Jencks's findings, then, tell us quite accurately what our schools have done: with respect to the selective, compensatory raising of scores on various aptitude and intelligence tests, not very much. But since the schools have not especially been trying to do that, it would be an absurdity to think that the data he summarizes tells us anything at all about what *education* can do.

Reliance on the much-cited Coleman Report (cited as authoritative, for example, by Jensen) also provides us with nothing but delusions about the possibilities of education. It is quite true, as Jencks claims, that "the largest and most comprehensive school surveys" (as of 1971) support a finding that "no measurable school resource or policy shows a consistent relationship to schools' effectiveness in boosting student achievement," and that "the gains associated with any given resource are almost always small" (p. 96). But these studies, on the whole, have measured only the "value added" by additional, marginal dollar expenditures, and by marginal decreases in average class size. Jencks's comment on experimental school programs is equally true of the schools studied in the Coleman Report and others like them: they are schools that, when observed, were doing pretty much what schools generally had always done.

On the other hand, more carefully focused and imaginative studies of single schools or school systems, conducted since the Coleman Report, have found correlations between scholastic improvement and such simple matters as faithfulness of school attendance (a very strong correlation with suggestive policy implications) or the college background of schoolteachers.[14] Of course, *no one as yet has studied a school or school district where, over time, receipts and expenditures took a quantum jump, average class size was reduced not marginally but virtually to tutorials, and dramatically new and improved methods of remediation were implemented by intensively trained and highly skilled teachers absolutely dedicated to their task*. So far no one has studied any school of this kind, because no such school exists to be studied; and the nonexistence of such schools demonstrates that the Coleman Report and other studies have not been analyzing the results of our commitment to educational equality—but rather the results of our lack of commitment to it.

Jensen expresses his approach to this social problem in his injunction "to examine those schools which have taken pains to give Negro children every advantage that is provided for

[14](See, e.g., David Wiley and Annegret Harnishfeger, "Explosion of a Myth: Quantity of Schooling and Exposure to Instruction Major Educational Vehicles," *Educational Researcher*, April 1974; see also Anita A. Summers and Barbara L. Wolfe, "Which School Resources Help Learning? Efficiency and Equity in Philadelphia Public Schools," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia *Business Review*, February 1975. A recent book, *The Enduring Effects of Education*, by Herbert Hyman, Charles Wright, and John Shelton Reed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), sums up the evidence we have for the positive effects of schooling.

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the white children, and in which the teachers, both white and Negro, have been specially selected for their dedication and favorable attitudes toward minority pupils....'' He couples this junction with a rhetorical question (that can only be taken as ironical): ''Where these conditions exist, has there been found an appreciably smaller achievement gap between the races?'' (*Educability*, p. 272.)

Those who doubt that education can be effectively compensatory should ask themselves how they would react to a proposal that we take the resources and teachers presently engaged in public education, add to them by a significant amount, and then devote this total primarily to the education of those, say, who scored in the bottom third of the IQ tests or other aptitude scores—that, in other words, we deprive IQ-advantaged children of all education while spending $20,000 to $30,000 a year on each IQ-depressed child. Leaving aside considerations of the fairness of this Draconian measure, can anyone doubt that it would have an effect? Once we have discovered that intensive, selective educational interventions can have a compensatory effect on the IQs or learning abilities of small groups of children, as in the studies mentioned above, and that even the minimally efficient efforts of our public schools have succeeded in raising the national IQ level noticeably in this century, then it is no longer either logically or empirically possible to say that compensatory schooling cannot be effective. All we can say for certain is that our existing noncompensatory schools do not compensate.

It is hardly surprising that schooling does not always overcome the effects of environment. A leopard born and brought up in a cage will never attain the running speed of its siblings born and raised on the veldt; we do not need a ''genetic hypothesis'' to explain that. Our educational systems, despite the best efforts of educators, are still in their philosophical and historical infancy; it is quite likely that we are *all* living in educational cages of unknown dimensions, and with unmeasurable effects. It may even be that schools as we know them are a relatively inefficient educational instrument. There may also be all sorts of reasons, from fiscal stringency to lack of political will or even considerations of justice, why we cannot drastically increase and dramatically reallocate the resources we spend on formal and other types of education, including on-the-job training. But the biological intransigence of the human material is not one of them; it is mythical. As with most human traits—certainly those that are properly classed as dispositions or potentialities—our best guide is still the commonsense observation that whatever the natural limitations of our various intelligences, their force can be and has been greatly attenuated by concerted human action.

The Effects of Environment

TO REASON as we have done here, and to suggest that the expectable ''failure'' of the schools can easily be accounted for without a ''genetic hypothesis,'' requires us to specify with some plausibility the nongenetic components of the black/white average IQ difference. That is not difficult to do. If we begin by considering the most obvious facts about race in the United States, it is clear that we would expect average black IQ scores to be lower than average white IQ scores in some unpredictable but noticeable degree. That is so because average black social class is considerably lower than average white social class; because blacks are proportionately much more likely to be found among the American poor than are whites, and because black people have been and perhaps still are excluded from the cultural mainstream in a much greater proportion than whites. (At one point in his *HER* essay [p. 87] Jensen makes this unsurprising datum seem much worse than it really is by comparing the unrepresentative ''failure'' rate of *southern* blacks on the Armed Forces Qualification Test with a *national* sample of whites, and by also neglecting to mention that draftees were not necessarily representative of the two total populations in the same way. Jerry Hirsch has called this aspect of ''Jensenism'' to our attention; though Jensen suppressed this ''mistake'' in his later writings, he

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has never, as far as I know, apologized for it.[15])

The statement about social class, by itself, may not tell us very much; despite many dogmatic remarks by Jensen to the contrary, we have little hard information about the relationship between social class and IQ. Where correlations have been reported, the exact causal sequence is almost impossible to disentangle. But, generally, there is some correlation between measurements of the two concepts; it is greatest at the extremes (i.e., shows up most strongly when high-status persons are compared with lowest-status persons), and the relationship becomes more pronounced the more one studies the real culture of poverty.

To the extent that this phenomenon exists, one can invent complicated genetic explanations for it: one can imagine that people who are genetically of low intelligence become poor because of their low intelligence, marry each other (what is called "assortative mating by intelligence"), and produce a lower class carrying low intelligence genetically. Once again, however, there is literally no evidence that this has happened. And since Jencks reports (on the basis of the very few studies of this kind that we have) that there is little correlation between "adult income" and "cognitive skills," and the "best estimate is that we would find only about 3 percent less income inequality in genetically homogeneous subpopulations than in the entire American population," there is a good deal of evidence that it has *not* happened (p. 220). Thus a reasonable person must look elsewhere than to genetics for an explanation of this IQ phenomenon.

The list of conditions that have been observed by teachers, psychologists, and social scientists to impinge on intellectual performance is almost endless. Many of them go together in what can correctly be described as the average life-style of poverty in the urban (or rural) slum.

That life-style is compounded of constricting surroundings, reduced expectations, and injuries to physical well-being. Merely to survive in the present requires more energy, often expended in a state bordering on desperation, than is necessary for middle-class people to "get ahead." Less energy is left over for instrumental purposes, especially those bearing on long-range goals that are difficult even to conceptualize under the circumstances. There is less than average incentive or opportunity for parents to foster aggressively careerist orientations in their children, protect them from "bad" or even "dull" company, etc. The instability and penuriousness of family life add their effects, as does the greater susceptibility of the poor to chronic disease (often undiagnosed), their poor nutrition, poor prenatal and obstetrical care, and all the other components of the ill health of the poor. Even the simple lack of enough sleep is an important element in this life-style. To think that these conditions might have no effect on an organism's performance is clearly absurd.

To be sure, millions of upwardly mobile children of lower-class parents "succeed" in conventional terms much better than many children of middle-class parents. Equally certain is that millions of children of lower-class parents have higher IQs than many children of middle- or upper-class parents, and the psychosocial pressures on many middle- and upper-class children are disastrous. But we are only trying to account for the *average* differential in what we have noted as a purely relational statistic (IQ scores).

Usually, such particular conditions as mentioned here have an impact on lower-class life. And so these conditions can be called to account for some of that differential, especially as many of the apparent causes of what are now called "learning disabilities" are visited predominantly on the poor or the excluded.[16] Moreover, in many cases it isn't even possible to distinguish genetic from nongenetic causes

[15]Jerry Hirsch, "Jensenism: The Bankruptcy of 'Science' Without Scholarship," *Educational Theory*, Winter 1975, pp. 3–27, discusses several of Jensen's errors and distortions, which altogether are too numerous and complex to receive adequate discussion in less than a full-length book.

[16]The most compelling treatment, by far, of "The Hidden Injuries of Class" is the book of that title by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb (New York: Random House, 1972).

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of poor performance. Genetics and depressed environments exert mutual influences on each other, as when a better diet helps a child seem brighter and so able to benefit from the disposition of teachers to favor "brighter" students. What may have originally been a slight and potentially inconsequential genetic disparity thus increases, perhaps sharply.[17] This can happen to anyone, of course, but where class position disposes of so much of our fate, it is more likely to happen to those in a lower-class position.

We can describe here an imaginary paradigm case that alas seems all too real. The case is that of two untrained rural people who marry and bear children whom they also bring up without much training, and who develop various chronic ailments that are never treated medically. They in turn marry others like themselves ("assortative mating"). Their descendants, similarly untrained and ill-cared for (by misfortune rather than design of the parents), eventually move to the city and discover the additional chronic ailments and obstacles to ambition that slum living offers, as well as the inattention of educational institutions. They again marry others like themselves, have too many children to care for successfully, and do not get adequate help from the social order that surrounds, ignores, or oppresses them; and so it continues, unto the nth generation....All of that can happen and has happened thousands or millions of times in every modern nation. That chain of circumstance can produce and has produced, after a number of generations, large subpopulations that in every respect seem to manifest congenital intellectual deficiency: seeming to be genetically "inferior" subpopulations. *Yet not a single aspect of that history of inherited deficiency is ascribable to genetics: it is all a product of social conditions, and thus potentially susceptible to social amelioration.*

[17]See Arthur L. Stinchcombe's discussion, "Environment: The Cumulation of Events," in *Science, Heritability, and IQ*, Reprint Series # 4 of the *Harvard Educational Review*, 1969, pp. 28–39.

Effects of Environment: Race

USE OF THE TERM "EXCLUDED" in addition to "poor" suggests that if we turn now to the subject of race rather than class, our picture of an averagely depressing environment becomes even more striking. At the simplest level of analysis, some of the deleterious side effects of poverty (lead poisoning and parasitism, for example) are visited primarily on black children and perhaps one or two other groups of minority children. But there are various more substantial reasons why we should, again, expect average black IQ scores to be lower than average white scores, again in some unknown degree. For the disproportionate injury done to blacks in America is not merely what we would expect to be imposed on just any group of low-average social status. The concepts of class or status (the latter term referring more to perceived social position than to measurable economic position) are not by themselves sufficient to compare, even crudely, black and white accomplishment. In the United States, black people have also constituted a separate *caste*, that is, a group of persons marked off from the rest of society by special and, in this case, discriminatory and restrictive treatment.

(Edward Banfield, it is true, has argued that black people no longer constitute a caste but are now discriminated against only because of their lower-class life-style. His own data, however, show that even non-lower-class blacks suffer from immense discrimination. Moreover, he also provides plentiful evidence that discrimination against blacks in its inception was definitely caste-oriented, and the expectation that one is going to be mistreated for one's race can hardly be got rid of overnight, especially on the mere basis of Banfield's very equivocal evidence. One reviewer has written an extended and telling article on Banfield's propensity to attribute people's accurate perceptions of the way they are being treated to their "irrationality."[18])

[18]On pp. 87, 95, and 99 of Banfield's *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), one finds examples of his self-contradiction on this fundamental

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Of course, there are similarities in the fates of the various ethnic (immigrant) groups in the U.S., but the differences do make a difference: conscripted slavery is hardly similar, psychologically or sociologically, to voluntary emigration. Over the generations black people, in contrast with most other immigrant ethnic groups, have correctly perceived American society as continuously closed, tyrannical, and hostile. That hostility, too, could be implacable, perhaps most dangerously so *after* the abolition of slavery. Thus even the middle-class black trying to make a way in America—especially in the past—has had to put excessive energy into avoiding destruction, figuratively or literally. Not a few black people, expecting the most violent repression for any display of independent behavior, have in the past found it most rational to "play dumb" (as is often true generally among women) and to teach their children to "play dumb," and thus effectively to *be* "dumb," for their own protection: a message reinforced by the institutions the children encounter later, which expect nothing but failure from blacks. White society has never wholeheartedly repudiated the attitudes that made such behavior seem reasonable.[19]

Although the black middle class has grown greatly, there is still strong resistance to black entry into many walks of life, and black income as a percentage of white income, having risen briefly in the 60s, has once again begun to fall. Most significantly, it is only very recent that black parents of any social class have realistically been able to think of preparing, or have been encouraged to prepare, their children for a career in professions that make particular intellectual demands most apparently associated with IQ-type tests (nor, obviously, was there a tradition of such careers either in slave society or in the preslavery African communities). Children generally imitate the behavior of adults around them, and thus the general intellectual talent of black people has tended to flow elsewhere: differential expectations will clearly dictate differential behavior; supply adjusts to meet demand.

These tendencies, which militate against positive IQ behavior, are strengthened by an educational system that has generally hastened the integration of aspiring social groups in exchange for their agreeing to become "Americanized." For blacks, these institutions have posed a special kind of obstacle. By virtue of their encountering exacerbated conditions of frustration (being prevented, in effect, from becoming "Americanized"), in addition to their disproportionate vulnerability to physical disabilities of certain kinds, black children are often (by comparison with whites, on the average) less well prepared than they might be for constructive interaction with a structured learning environment. The schools themselves, confronted with a relatively ill-prepared and stigmatized population that is suspicious of their intentions, very often perceive this population as a social problem to be "dealt with" in a merely custodial way, rather than as a human resource to be nurtured and encouraged. The education of black children is taken less seriously than that of whites; it is made clear to them that the credentialing function of the schools will not be fulfilled for them as predictably as it would be if they were white, and that even when it is fulfilled it will be less meaningful to their futures. Thus there is produced the notorious condition that the performance of black children on the average *declines* with attendance in school, relative not only to that of whites but to the level of potential suggested by their first-grade performances. (According to the Coleman Report, this phenomenon does not occur in nonsouthern "metropolitan areas." Jonathan Kozol, writing about Boston's schools, offered impressive first-hand observation to the contrary. In any event, the Coleman data are of little use, since

point. See also William Muraskin, "The Moral Basis of a Backward Sociologist: Edward Banfield, the Italians, and the Italian-Americans," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1974, pp. 1484–96.

[19] Hannah Arendt has commented on the effects of the nation's failure to pass a constitutional amendment explicitly aimed at racial segregation and discrimination in "Civil Disobedience," in *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). See also William H. Grier and Price Cobbs, *Black Rage* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

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they do not take into account the many black children who are defined as "problems" and forced out of the schools early, in all cities.)[20]

We may all live in environmental cages of unknown dimensions, but black people have surely been more stringently "caged," *on the average*, than most of us. In every way they have been, as a group, more removed from the cultural mainstream, and thus from a realistic sense of mastery of its most important artifacts. Jensen insists at one point that American blacks have not been subjected to "extreme" negative environmental conditions—by which, it turns out, he means total sensory deprivation! That comment merely highlights his social insensitivity. An environment does not need to be "extreme" in that peculiar sense to have a chilling effect, any more than black children need be actually caged or beaten on exhibiting creative intellect for their exhibition of it to be inhibited. It is not necessary that the developmental environments for behavior be "extremely" different but only that they be different in relevant ways; that they have been for many black children there can be no doubt. Furthermore, the condition of being especially subject to disadvantageous social circumstances has always been perfectly apparent to black people of all ages. Even today perhaps—when, in conventional terms the "successful" black middle class is much larger than it has ever been before—a style of life that at key moments substitutes the "affective blockages" of anxiety, defensiveness, withdrawal, and suspicion of "white institutions" for more securely rooted behaviors may remain a seemingly realistic option for black children in much greater proportion than for white children. This certainly has been the case in the past, during the pre-1960 period from which most of our IQ studies date. We hardly need look farther to explain the shortfall of American blacks in average IQ scores.[21]

Conclusion

WHEN PEOPLE TAKE IQ TESTS, their performance is determined more by their whole life experience than by their "innate capacities." Although Jensen continually works to cast doubt on it, that proposition is surely beyond any doubt; we do not need technical refutations of his statistical manipulations to support such a perfectly obvious observation. (Binet himself, who should have known, said specifically that intelligent thinking was an art that improved with practice, and with the opportunity to practice.[22]) We must never forget that test scores by themselves are in no way a direct outcome of the organism's characteristics, whether genetically or culturally induced. Rather, they represent a translation of the relevant characteristics by some mediating behavior, whether purposeful or not. And behavior, of course, is based not merely on the innate ability to perform a task but also on one's momentary ability to perform it according to instructions, and on the (conscious or subconscious) willingness or desire to perform it.

All IQ-type tests, whatever their apparent and superficial dissimilarities, have in common that one must be tuned in to the idea of abstract testing behavior, which includes the existentially arbitrary notion that tests ought to be finished quickly and as specified by authority, in order to do well at them. *All* the tests are abstract in the sense that none of them involve solving a concrete life problem. They all require that the subject treat competitive paper testing as a legitimate institution that makes sense and to which energetic attention ought to be paid. The "intelligence" they measure, then, like all but a few human traits, is socially constrained if not defined. It consists in some part of (1) the ability to understand conceptually abstract questions; (2) the

[20] *Death at an Early Age* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967); also James S. Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, vol. II, U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 220.

[21] See, e.g., Alvin F. Poussaint and Carolyn Atkinson, "Black Youth and Motivation," *Black Scholar*, March 1970, pp. 43–51. "Affective blockages" is a term used by S. Biesheuvel, "An Examination of Jensen's Theory Concerning Educability, Heritability, and Population Differences," in Montagu, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–72.

[22] A. Binet, "Les Idées Modernes sur les Enfants" (Paris: Flammarion, 1909), p. 143. Jerry Hirsch, again, has called this passage to our attention.

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ability to answer conceptually abstract questions speedily and as commanded; (3) the ability to answer conceptually abstract questions for existentially abstract purposes speedily and as commanded; (4) the *willingness* to answer, the *interest* in answering, or *physical* ability to answer conceptually abstract questions, speedily, and as and when commanded, for existentially abstract purposes.

Of those subtraits, only (1) has to do with what we might mean by genetically transmitted "intelligence." The others are all the results of transactions between the tested individual and that individual's experience, culture, environmental background, hopes and fears. Jensen himself, interestingly, reports (in *HER*) a difference of 8–10 points in the IQ scores of a group of black children between a standard pretest situation, in which no attempt was made to overcome fear, racial distrust, resistance, etc., and a final test situation that he supervised very carefully with an eye toward overcoming those external constraints. He denies that the difference indicates a change in "ability," and he is certainly correct. It is much more consonant with our sociological information to attribute the difference to his having mitigated, by his personal intervention ("environmentally"), the inhibitory effects of some of the factors discussed above. His report, furthermore, replicates the findings of a 20-year-old study by another psychologist who was able to produce even more dramatic changes in the measured IQs of "disadvantaged" children, using trust-inducing techniques that did not have nearly so great an effect on the test efforts of middle-class children.[23]

Those two studies tell us clearly that measurements reflecting the way people live will more or less faithfully reflect differences in the ways various identifiable *groups* of people live. And therefore these measurements can tell us little or nothing about how those groups "really" or "innately" differ from each other (if such a distinction is meaningful). Child psychologists who use IQ tests diagnostically, in an individualized therapeutic setting (the only legitimate use for such tests) have always known that it is impossible to make generalized comparisons using a measurement instrument that has been standardized according to the norms of a particular population or subpopulation (such as white Americans). The real meaning of the often heard criticism that IQ tests are "culturally biased" is not merely that bias inheres in their language, or in the specific questions asked, or in the expectations of what constitutes a "right" answer—though there is certainly much of that.[24] The tests' fundamental bias is in the more general, and foolish, notion that children will approach the tests at an equal level of physical and emotional morale. (Jensen continually assumes that "culture-loaded" equals verbal, whereas "culture-fair" is anything that has to do with numbers or abstract shapes. "Naive" is the kindest characterization of that assumption.)

Jensen himself, thinking he is showing us more support of his "genetic hypothesis" about radical differences, demonstrates the existence of this fundamental cultural bias when he isolates the kind of performance he calls "associative capacity," for which the measured black/white difference is allegedly not so great when social class is "held constant" (*HER*, pp. 111 ff.). For at that point Jensen is simply measuring a form of behavior (memorization and rote learning) that does not demand a great commitment to optimism about one's future ability to control one's environment—as compared to the search for conceptual mastery, which does demand such a commitment. "Associative capacity" is also a form of learning behavior that is much more easily coerced into being. Thus, if Jensen is correct in his assertion that black

[23]Ernest A. Haggard, "Social Status and Intelligence," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, vol. 49 (1954), pp. 141–86.

[24]Fascinating examples of the kinds of materials to be found on allegedly "objective" standard IQ tests can be seen in Kamin, *op. cit.*; Clarence Karier, "Testing for Order and Control in the Corporate Liberal State," *Educational Theory*, Spring 1972, pp. 154–80; and especially Jane R. Mercer and Wayne Curtis Brown, "Racial Differences in I.Q.: Fact or Artifact?, in Senna, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–114.

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children benefit, comparatively speaking, from coercive forms of learning that do not demand high levels of morale, then he may have added something useful to our store of knowledge about the cultural fate of black people in America; but he certainly has discovered nothing at all about anyone's genetic abilities.

To sum up: it is plain that, genetics aside, there is considerable room for improvement both in the comparative preparation of black children for scholastic performance (including their use of the abilities measured by IQ tests), and in the nature of their typical educational experience—whether directly through interventions aimed at learning behavior or indirectly through the abolition of arbitrary racial barriers in society at large. The conditions discussed in the preceding pages—conditions inhibiting and constraining the expression of cognitive skills—also exist in some form or other for many white children. But they exist disproportionately for black children, and the extent of the disproportion seems directly and logically related to average performance on "intelligence" tests.

Moreover, "intelligence" in its various measurable aspects is far from being the only indicator of comparative social welfare. When we look at other apparently unrelated indices we discover, for example, that an almost exactly similar relationship obtains with respect to the relative life expectancies of blacks and whites (at age one year) as holds for IQ. No one has ever thought to explain life expectancy genetically, since a genetic explanation would be so *outré*, and an environmental explanation is so obvious. (In the Union of South Africa average life expectancy is about 65 for white males, 50 for black males. One wonders if anyone would attempt to explain *that* disparity genetically, or to argue that American blacks live longer than South African blacks because their genes are superior?)

The same is true for IQ scores. Despite his impressive apparatus of studies in statistical genetics, Jensen's genetic hypothesis is ultimately unnecessary and misconceived for explaining the racial IQ gap. Indeed, given the history of race in the U.S., what needs to be explained is not why the gap is so large, but why it is not even larger.[25]

Of course, there is probably some genetic influence on all our intellects, or at least genetically influenced limitations setting an outer boundary to our intellectual potentials as individuals. But this influence is of wholly unknown dimension and magnitude,[26] and there is no theoretical reason to believe that it varies between racial groups. All in all, then, to deal with the subject of race by offering what careful analysis shows to be an unsupported "genetic hypothesis" that would be of no social significance, even were there merit in it (given the malleability of intelligence), can only be attributed to prejudice. We shall see in a succeeding article how Jensen has misused and distorted the data on race and IQ in his attempt to bolster that prejudice. □

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[25] I am paraphrasing from a comment by S. L. Washburn in a presidential address to the American Pyschological Association, quoted by I. M. Lerner, *Heredity, Evolution, and Society* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1968), p. 23.

[26] See the summation of what we know about the genetics of intelligence by Lloyd G. Humphreys, "Theory of Intelligence," in Robert Cancro, ed., *Intelligence: Genetic and Environmental Influences* (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1971), p. 34.

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Nicola Chiaromonte

History, Freedom, and Utopia

Nicola Chiaromonte was one of the most admirable intellectual figures of our time–a man of complete honesty, a writer utterly committed to freedom, and radiant in his spiritual strength and independence. Though he did not think of himself as a socialist, at least not in any doctrinal sense, he was a friend of Dissent *and its editors until his death in 1972, honoring our pages with some of his most provocative essays. An appreciation of Chiaromonte by Joseph Frank appeared in our Winter 1974 issue.*

This spring, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich will issue a selection of Chiaromonte's political and literary essays, entitled The Worm of Consciousness and Other Essays *and edited by his wife Miriam Chiaromonte, copyright © 1976 by Miriam Chiaromonte.*

The piece from this volume that appears below, with permission of the publishers, was written in 1951 (in Coletta, Livorno) as a letter to a friend, Andrea Caffi. Never before printed in America, it remains as fresh and pertinent as the day it was composed —I.H.

My dear André,*

If I have not written to you until today it is not out of laziness or forgetfulness, but because, after our frequent and somewhat inconclusive conversations, I felt I owed it to myself (and to you) to try to set forth, with what little order I can muster, the few reasons why I do not share your views on "revolution," "nihilism," and the duty of the "good citizen." The reasons are not merely polemical. . . .

In broaching the subject about which I should like to converse with you, I should immediately point out that when I say "your opinion" I refer to those views you dwelled on recently. I do not mean this or that view (with which I might even agree) on the present state of society, social justice, etc., so much as the general position you seemed to hold with a certain tenacity during the conversations we had lately and which, through my fault, were all too frequently interrupted. As far as I can define it, this position seemed to me to consist of a combination of three elements: (1) philanthropy, that is to say, the insistence on the necessity of siding with those people whom the present organization (or disorganization) of society keeps in a state of social inferiority or economic oppression; (2) a relativism, which claims to be absolute (and which seems rather fitful to me), respecting the *order* of ideas, that is, of propositions that we should consider true or false in the course of a discussion; (3) a dogmatism that, if not absolute, is at least fairly insistent about our moral duty to accept certain notions about the class struggle or private property, under pain of being classified with outcasts and monsters.

What distresses me most about this triple combination is the moralism—or, rather, the substitution of the moral duty to take a particular side for the intellectual duty to accept only notions that are unequivocal. The confusion of the "moral" with the "intellectual" seems to me especially mortifying. Sartre's maxim "Man is responsible for the whole of humanity" strikes me as being the formula *par excellence* of modern sophistry and false mo-

*Andrea Caffi (1887–1955) was an Italian writer born in Russia. He took part in the 1905 revolution in the ranks of the Mensheviks. A volume of his writings, *A Critique of Violence*, with an introduction by Chiaromonte, was published in New York by Bobbs-Merrill in 1970.

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rality. It is evident that if we cease to regard a thought as such and look on it, instead, as a potential act, every single thought can be transformed into a "crime against humanity." Any idea can be invalidated if one considers all the *possible* reasons supporting it, just as any act can be made to appear criminal if one projects all the *possible* consequences deriving from it. But that procedure has no meaning —or, rather, it is the metaphysics of Vyshinsky.* At this point, moreover, the remedy is easy. All we need to do is to protect an idea, be it true or false, with the hard shell of a system and to provide an alibi for our acts by placing ourselves symbolically on the "right side" (for example, that of the "oppressed" and of the "sense of history").

I am not saying (far from it) that you are guilty of such excesses. I simply mean that this sort of conclusion is inherent in a certain mentality that seems to me inappropriate: it appertains to church and state, not to free men. The whole Marxist critique of human attitudes is rooted in such a mentality, and this is one of the reasons I reject it so radically. Finally, what I demand is the right to regard as false—or, rather, as equivocal—such notions as that of the class struggle, without being accused of being a tool of capitalism. I can say more: I regard it as unfair to try to force me into the dilemma of either proclaiming that I endorse the *total* abolition of social oppression and all its causes or viewing myself as guilty of acts of oppression—and, more generally of social evils—for which I am not responsible and which I am far from sustaining or countenancing in my conscience and in my behavior. The idea of an "unconscious" or "objective" responsibility seems to me to be utterly unenlightened and to lead nowhere but to abusive criticism. Let me add that Ivan Karamazov's exclamation that the mere fact of hearing a child cry would be sufficiently outrageous to induce him to return his entrance ticket to Heaven has always struck me as both histrionic and incomprehensible—for I cannot imagine it to have any such possible effect. The "materialist" and "critical" revolutionary might go still further; for if I say that the idea of a world without children crying seems to me tantamount to a world without any children at all, he is capable of replying that my vocation is that of child executioner. The truth is, far from longing for Heaven, I simply want to see things as they are (and not as they are interpreted by me).

Not long ago I came across the following quotation from Marx:

> The "popular" economist thinks he is making a great discovery when he dismisses the explanation of the "inner bond" by confidently saying that *in appearance* things are different. It is as though he were proud of bowing before appearances and of *regarding them as the final explanation.*

I shall not trouble to defend the "popular" economist, who, as far as I know, could easily be wrong (or right). What disturbs me is the contemptuous contrast of the "*final explanation*" and "*appearances.*" I do not see this as the calm assertion of the scientist who *accounts for* "appearances" by stating the truth that he has discovered and that he upholds against popular opinions or current ideas. I see it as quite the contrary: as the statement of the dogmatic thinker who has opposed the ("apparent") reality of "appearances" with the "superior" truth of the system he has constructed.

Moreover, when we talk about social reality and not about nature, the distinction between "appearances" and "reality" (not to mention the claim to possess the "final explanation") seems to me very dubious. To start with, the illusions men have about their "real" situation have no less "reality" (practical consequences) than their "final explanations," for in society we are faced with men's *real* errors no less than with their true opinions. Myths, dreams, religions, superstitions, fear, cowardice, vices, and weaknesses have no less reality or importance than any "final explanation," or even than any obvious common-sense truth. It is only by excluding all awareness of psychological reality that the individual and *individuals* can be made to fit into a type or a class. The ideal statesman can decide to en-

*Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky (1883–1954), the chief state prosecutor in the Moscow show trials of 1934 to 1938. —Ed.

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courage reasonable inclinations and impose measures demanded by common sense. But the man convinced of being in possession of the "final explanation" will, in the long run, be exclusively concerned with eliminating the "appearances" that contradict him.

It is "apparent," for example, that the worker (or any other economically handicapped individual) is naturally inclined to demand the improvement of his condition. But it is also "apparent" that does not always lead him to subscribe to the notion of the "mission of the proletariat." This is to say that the "final explanation" of the workers' condition by the struggle between capitalism and proletariat is, in many cases, contrary to appearances. In order to prefer the "final explanation" to "appearances," we must rely on authority and not on knowledge.

If we were asked to account for the fact that the majority of the workers in France and Italy today belong to Stalinist organizations, we could choose between two "final explanations." The first explanation would be that the support of these organizations by the workers is genuine, real, and motivated by the interests and struggle of their class (which would mean that these same workers accept and support the most oppressive party and regime of modern times and, purely out of social resentment, pay little heed to the proletariat's mission to fight for freedom). The second explanation would be that their support is only apparent and artificial, that it is the result of a momentary mistake, which will be dispelled once the workers become aware of their true interests. Now, it does, indeed, seem that "appearances"—if we really can credit them—contradict both explanations, or, to be more exact, do not confirm either of them.

For "appearances" bring to mind the political tactics by which the Communist parties gained control of the workers' organizations and the fact (which does not need to be explained by "final" causes) that these same parties do what they do for purely political motives (at least, to the extent that the "superior" political interests they serve allow them to do so), in order to retain the power they have thus acquired. On the other hand, the fact that American trade unions today have agreed to act within the existing organization of the state proves absolutely nothing with regard to the American workers' partiality for Standard Oil and the ideology of the National Association of Manufacturers. Nor does it prove that the workers of Detroit and Pittsburgh are Marxists without realizing it. It is an "appearance," a fact, not the manifestation of a hidden idea, and we can understand it only by examining it in relation to other "appearances." Beyond that, there are simply mental attitudes. There is the proletarian individual and there are proletarians, but the proletarian "class" is an abstraction. It is not a notion on which we can base valid arguments.

I feel that there are two orders of ideas that prevent us from seeing a social fact as it is. In the first order, it is contended that what will be (or *must* be, more or less necessarily) is a seed contained in what is, and all we have to do to discover it is to go beyond appearances. The analogy between social life and plant life seems false to me. When we talk of human life, what will be (or must be) always entails the essential modification, if men want it to be. And this makes the image of the germ totally misleading. In reality, however we formulate it, what will be always signifies what *must* be—a moral imperative that goes way beyond all previous reality. From what is to what must be there is always a sudden leap, because of a transition from the domain of facts to the domain of the ideal (which we can also call "imaginary" or "unreal," if we like). What characterizes the human world is the impossibility of finding in it facts unaccompanied by an ideal image or an ideal image unsustained by facts. But this does not mean that we can derive the one from the others or, still less, reduce the one to the others. Between the two domains there is not only human liberty but also the contingency of the facts—their ambiguity, their "polyvalence," and their individuality, in other words their specific character. The attitude in question fails to take this into account. But it also seems to me to have

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another disadvantage: it debases and obscures our faculty of awareness and encourages a spirit not of revolt but of inertia. For it is obvious that if there are social laws analogous to natural ones we must come to terms with them, obey them, and adapt ourselves to them. And, indeed, what Marxist and Saint Simonian socialism requires is a "rational" adaptation* of man to industrial society, far more than the transformation of the entire structure.

The second order of ideas that strikes me as being a source of confusion, not to say of mental paralysis, leads to the widespread habit among our contemporaries of judging every problem concerning social reality in terms of history. "Judging" is perhaps too strong a word, for what we are actually faced with is a suspension of judgment about the future. Political regimes, attempts at action, present situations, social upheavals—there is nothing, not even the individual's thoughts and feelings (cf. Freud), which is not appraised in terms of an ulterior development that is more or less imaginary. In fact, this is a form of skepticism, but a very special form of skepticism, for it is counterbalanced by the obstinate belief that the final answer to every question will be provided by the "facts" themselves; by history. So it becomes easy to cut short any argument or even to discredit any objection by calling it "metaphysical" or an "intellectual" subtlety. This mystical appeal to "*facts*" beyond the limits of ordered discussion and "appearances" seems to me to be at the root of modern fanaticism, whether Communist or Fascist, pragmatic or "realist." A certain "historical" mentality (not a historian's mentality) endows it with invaluable support, for it is by "temporalizing" every phenomenon and every argument that it is possible to maintain that what "seems" bad today will prove good tomorrow—or that a certain thought that seems to be correct "in reality" expresses only a momentary situation (or a particular interest).

The fanaticism I am talking about does not always assume a virulent form. It also has a gentle, nostalgic form, which consists in regarding the delays imposed by historical circumstances on the achievement of a goal deemed desirable or necessary as temporary refutations, which do not affect the essential part of the thesis—as deviations, after which history will resume its normal course. What we have then is the paradox of a faith based on the "event" over which the "event" has no control. To my mind this proves that a faith which started off by being secular and rational has been transformed into a religious faith and transported into the sphere of the Unchangeable and the Timeless, to which it should, by definition, be totally alien. It would, of course, be wrong to say that this logical error damages faith. On the contrary, faith can perfectly well be strengthened by it and established once and for all. For the unreal is undoubtedly a dimension of consciousness and of human existence, and it has an effectiveness of its own.

Believing, as I do, that such attitudes of mind are wrong, I am prepared to propose that we adopt as a principle the notion that "truth cannot be the daughter of time" and, consequently, that we make it a rule to exclude the "temporal" element from every judgment about what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad, what is just and what is unjust, what is useful and what is useless. We should, in short, consider only the phenomena, the facts and the individuals as they "appear" in the present and never as products of a "process" that prevents us from knowing what they are or what we should think of them, compelled as we are to judge them in function of the past and suspended toward the future or located in a present that is basically suspect, since it is transient.

I suggest that we could adopt such an attitude without any fear of forgetting the ephemeral, temporal, and eminently relative nature of each of our acts. That our being is temporal is a basic fact. That we are the characters of a history is equally certain. But in the "historicist" mentality history becomes what America is for the savages of Pascarella or prose for the *bourgeois gentilhomme.*"

I do not scorn history as a discipline and as

*An "adjustment"—the great principle of our times. —Au.

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knowledge of the past. On the contrary, I respect it all the more because I am ignorant about it. Which allows me to say without seeming insolent that history as a science (and a love of the past which continues in the present) is *useless*—and this ought to be its glory. It serves no purpose except to astonish us and make us aware of our smallness—it does this more directly than astronomy and other sciences, but in the same way. History, in short, is a sort of *theoria*. However, as a basis for our thoughts and our "existential" activities, historical knowledge seems to me to be of secondary importance and altogether inoperative. For I believe that no present judgment, no living attitude, no real action, is motivated by "historical" reasons. Historical reasons put in an appearance only after the event. They appear to the historian, in whose eyes the present enjoys no privilege whatsoever (and, indeed, it is impossible to write the history of the present; it is dubious by definition).

These considerations do not appear to me to be irrelevant to the question of the "public weal" and justice in society.

It seems to me there are various ways of caring about the "public weal." To start with, there is the "public weal" of the citizen who, without bothering about "final explanations," finds that a certain injustice or form of oppression can and must be removed and who acts, with others, to eliminate it. I do not see how we can reproach such an individual for not having gone far enough, for not having fought for the radical abolition of all forms of injustice or (and this comes to the same thing) of their first cause. All we can ask of him is to act truly (and effectively), in the bounds of possibility, to bring about the change he desires.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the intellectual position of such a man is not very strong, especially if he tries to bring about a change in a tyrannical regime without challenging the political system itself. For the principle of tyranny is that only what is considered good by the authorities in power can be regarded as legitimate, the authorities remaining the sole arbiters of what is good," in other words, what is useful.

But even in a nontyrannical state the same good citizen can easily be convicted of lack of perspicacity if he avoids (or fails) to take into account the full extent of social evils and to attack their "causes." Yet at that point the critic should also realize that we are leaving the realm of "sound empiricism" and what is "practical"—that is, what is possible in the more or less near future—in order to enter the domain of theories, of attitudes, and, finally, of intellectual speculation (if not pure imagination). However intellectually satisfying it may be, the attitude that stresses the necessity of attacking "final" causes in the struggle for justice has a corollary that makes us pause. We can produce real and sweeping changes, certainly, but we cannot be sure that the ultimate result will satisfy anything outside mere theory and abstract reasoning. It is the theory (or the plan, say, to abolish private property) that is at stake, not the *real* happiness of the multitudes *in whose name* we are acting. The more ambitious the plan, the more true this is. For if I give the man who can afford to buy only bread the possibility of buying cheese, I can be reasonably sure that he will be able to satisfy his appetite slightly better. But if I give the same man the abolition of capitalism or the Socialist state, I no longer know what he will have.

I am prepared to admit that hunger and the yearning for justice (or the resentment of injustice and privilege) are strong enough and legitimate enough passions to warrant harsh action and that they can turn into an impersonal will, which is necessarily insensitive to individual cases (for in actual fact this will to justice is a will of the state, and it ought really to be a pursuit of law). All I am saying is that such a will has only a *conceptual* connection (and not a concrete and empirically demonstrable one) with the human reality from which it claims to originate and by way of which it justifies itself. It can hardly be otherwise.

We might as well say that this will is *Utopian*, directed to an idea existing exclusively in the minds of those who invented it and who make it the object of an active faith.

I have nothing against Utopias. On the contrary, I am convinced that in this "nowhere"

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land lies the very source of human liberty, creativity, and spontaneity. This seems to me to be proved, too, by the fact that the more or less murderous priests and fanatics who gain a hold in this domain acquire a strength by which they can keep in check for a long time "historical" factors, individual interests, common sense, and reason itself; that is, every criterion of just limit applicable within the established confines of human existence such as it is. Human existence, as we know, is uncertain, relative, transient; and it loses all its rights in the unlimited horizon of "historical perspectives" and "total" demands.

Throughout this long discourse, what I have been trying to arrive at is the question of "limit." Not so much in the sense of "knowing where to stop"; the ideologist consumed by the lust for power can only stop at the very end, and it is foolish to want to teach him a lesson. The "pure" ideologist, on the other hand, can *never* stop, for he expects from the future the fulfillment of an Idea; or, at least, all he can see in the present state of things is the *negation* (the absence) of his Idea, and he therefore tries more or less hopefully to *destroy* this *negation*. No, I am referring to "limit" in the radical sense of the word. I mean the awareness of the *sacred* boundary (the adjective is not exaggerated) that separates ideas from facts.

I am all in favor of Utopias—but Utopias that say what they are: ideal *forms* and *models*.

No "reality" would be more monstrous or grotesque than the practical realization of Plato's Republic. His philosopher-governors would turn into priests swollen with hypocrisy, and his guardians would be ruthless automata. But the Republic is thought out in such a way that this kind of "realization" is inconceivable. The Republic is simply a *model* whose natural purpose is to inspire thoughts, not direct actions. The "passage to action" is entirely absent from such a construction, and if we ask "What real forces, what material means can we use to realize this Ideal State?" the only possible answer is "the human soul," or, in the words of Socrates, "the philosopher-kings and the king-philosophers," which amounts to the same thing. And yet there is no more majestic a monument to the human longing for justice and a city pervaded by reason. But it remains a "statue of words" and not a "plan of action" or a "blueprint" to be carried out by the social machine. In *The Republic* a certain order of ideas obeys its own laws of necessity and gives itself a completed *form* perfectly (or almost perfectly) free from any other concern. To ask it to translate itself into action would be exactly the same thing as asking a statue to move. This seems to me to be the case with every authentic idea, even ideas about society.

(I don't know whether the modern passion for the *fact* and for "historical" action developed at the time when the famous anecdote was told about Michelangelo losing his temper with his statue of Moses because it wouldn't speak and striking it with a hammer. Be that as it may, I feel that the legend is indicative. It expresses the baroque dissatisfaction with form, the idea that form is not enough and that it needs action, force, energy, movement. It is a passion that, as Malraux pointed out, ends with the cinema, with the "dynamic" realism of phantoms flitting across the screen.)

I am not saying that what I call the "pragmatic" Utopia has no historical justification. Far from it. But I am denying that it can satisfy the mind when the mind pauses and reflects upon the notions suggested to it, instead of allowing itself to be carried away by the romanticism of good intentions and the no less romantic idea of an "ideal" transfiguration of reality. And the most contradictory notion of all is that of an idea which is "realized." It contradicts both the experience we have of the nature of reality and the experience we have of the essence peculiar to every "ideal" construction.

It seems to me that common sense is closer to the Platonic Utopian than to the revolutionary, nihilistic, activistic Utopian. I don't know whether or not common sense is a good guide in philosophy, but when it comes to matters

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concerning collective life I tend to think it has unquestionable rights. In any case, I believe that the image of the "good citizen" is perfectly compatible with the attitude of the man who knows that the social reality surrounding him is very far from being "what it could be *if* men ... understood," and who longs for a state of things very different from the present but refuses to believe (and couldn't believe even if he wanted to) that the problem could be solved by siding with a particular group or class. The sophism of the pragmatist would prompt the reply that if we do not side with the proletariat or the democrats or some other ideological category we do nothing at all. But this is not necessarily true. The "good citizen" I have in mind could perfectly well have fought in the Resistance out of a horror of Nazism, he could perfectly well have voted Socialist or even Communist (why not?) after the Liberation without letting himself be recruited under the banner of a "cause." He might not have attached any further significance to his act than that of paying his dues, in all good faith, to the contemporary political situation, confused as it may be. For no man can remain completely outside it, being, after all, one among many others and not a privileged being destined never to make a mistake.

But the duties of the "good citizen" end there. He has the right to expect that no further demands be made on him. He has a Utopia in his mind, and he has a longing for a reasonable and just society, but he knows that he can best express these two desires in his behavior toward his neighbors and in his words, that is, in his efforts to communicate to his fellow men his views on human existence, justice, honesty, and the like. For, still in accordance with the dictates of common sense, the "good citizen" believes in the reality of human consciousness. He believes, too, that real transformations have to do with what men believe about reality, not with a mythical objective reality. "Reality," he believes, always remains the same; it is this sublunary world which nothing in our experience shows us to be transformable, but which everything shows to be simply changing. This world is given to us in its entirety and forever—with its *limits*. Our *will* can change very little, since we know very little about the roots of social change. It is even doubtful that important social changes, the few periods of "progress" or of "happiness" we may experience, have been brought about by a conscious and deliberate effort of the will, and it is absolutely certain that they have not been produced by the political will of a party or a class.

Of course, men deserve to be trusted. We should not deny *a priori* the possibility of their ever managing to create the Happy City. But it remains a pure possibility, an idea that is not self-contradictory and therefore cannot be rejected (unless we indulge in "realistic" comparisons with experience). It is because he has no preconceived contempt for men, nor any love for "humanity" in general, that the imaginary, but by no means implausible, "good citizen" does not consider men according to sociological classifications; he has no programmatic love for the "proletariat" or hatred for the "bourgeoisie," but he expects each man to reveal in direct experience what we ought to think of him. We can add that if he is born in a dark and violent period of wars of religion or of ideology, he does not feel that the respect we owe to "the witnesses who die for their opinions" also demands that we share their beliefs. He is partial enough to "appearances," alert enough to the complexity and diversity of facts, to think we should believe only in what appears to be true. In other words, he would prefer people to think he has a hard heart and a "metaphysical" mind, rather than pretending that he believes in something he does not believe in simply out of fear of some ideological Jehovah. ...

Your

Nicola

Translated from the French by Alastair Hamilton □

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Ludvík Vakulík

Impermissible Thoughts

The following is the text of a letter by a leading Czech writer to U.N. Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim. It was sent after the police had raided the homes of writers, historians, and philosophers, confiscating books, notes, and manuscripts of work in progress. (One of Ludvík Vakulík's novels is reviewed on page 219.) We reprint this letter from the English journal Index. — EDS.

Dear Secretary General:

Prague July 29, 1975

IN OUR neighboring countries, which for a period in history had formed a single entity, it used to be the custom to begin letters with a flowery opening in which one wished the recipient God's blessing, the protection of saintly patrons, patience in the trials of everyday life, and lasting health. In the more matter-of-fact usage of the day, let me wish you at least the health, patience in your trials, and protection of saintly patrons.

I have decided to write to you after much deliberation as to whether this is really the thing to do. A quarter of a year has now passed since an event which deeply offended me. I thought of writing to you then, but I dismissed the idea as being somewhat eccentric. A sober inner voice told me: "Don't be an ass. After all, what're you complaining about? All right, they crawled into your flat, rummaged about in your life, carried away some of your effects, but you are innocent, so why not wait a bit." I felt offended, yet at the same time I was glad that nothing worse had happened to me. But the months are going by and I have come to realize what I have to live with, day in day out: with the expectation that they'll turn up again, or subpoena me to go and see them, and with a wretched feeling of gratitude for every uneventful day.

I finally decided to write to you for the following reasons: my anger and feelings of outrage remain unabated, indeed are growing. The time I had set myself in which to wait for them either to explain what it is I am supposed to have done or to apologize is up. And in the meantime something else has happened which sounds a warning—the joint space flight of Apollo and Soyuz.

In April of this year you visited Prague. On that occasion Charles University added the title of Doctor of law *honoris causa* to your regular law degree from Vienna University, and you said: "Some two-thirds of mankind live in conditions that are quite alien to the developed world...." You were thinking of famine, illiteracy, disease, and war. Our country is one of the developed ones which, when viewed in relation to the world's poverty, can well be said to be spoiled. One cannot help but ponder on one's own responsibility according to Jasper's scale: from criminal responsibility to the metaphysical. And of course he who shares the responsibility ought to have the decency to keep quiet and not add his voice to the indictment.

That is why I tell myself more and more frequently that I—or we—have what we wanted, that I and we cannot blame anyone else for the conditions in which we have to live. As a Czech, for instance, surely I share the blame for the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire a long time before I was born. In my youth I started the Second World War and later participated in the creation and fossilization of the two zones of the Europe. Now I find hovering over me coresponsibility for the Helsinki conference and its, as yet unknown and unexpected, consequences. That is, so to speak, my *metaphysical* responsibility. As a former member of the Communist party I share the *moral* responsibility for what grew out of the collective

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revolutionary ideal of social justice in some kind of a higher, "people's," form of democracy. I fail to find any direct *political* responsibility in my case, since I never gained sufficient confidence within the Party to be entrusted with even the most menial office or function; as a journalist and writer I belonged to Her Majesty's internal opposition (this comes under moral responsibility). As for *criminal* responsibility, I neither feel it nor look for it. Yet it is this that they are constantly trying to pin on me. Naturally I have to defend myself against this, I fume and call down imprecations on their heads. But deep inside, when looking at the whole business somewhat more metaphysically, I am not really all that annoyed: that, I say to myself, is how it goes in this world, and who knows, maybe it is as it should be. However, on the first level of reality we all—they as well as we—act more in accordance with our daily roles than our better inclinations. And that is why I find it difficult to live in a state of enmity with anyone, which you, Secretary General, will no doubt find easy to understand.

Now mine is a hard nut for a lawyer to crack, Doctor. In the autumn of 1969, proceedings were started against me on charges of subversion because I had been coauthor of a petition addressed to the highest authorities in the country. The petition expressed disagreement with the way things had gone since August 1968. In the autumn of 1970 an indictment was issued against the eight authors of the petition and a date set for the trial. One day before this date, the trial was postponed indefinitely and the public told that in fact there was to have been no trial and that the whole thing was a malicious rumor. In the autumn of 1973 new criminal proceedings were opened against me for an interview I had given a British TV company. Again nothing happened, no indictment was ever drafted, but the proceedings have not been called off to this day, no one has told me anything, so that I do not know where I stand, which is what ought to have been done and would be done under a more normal legal system. I have been deprived of my passport, degraded from a first lieutenant in reserve to a private (not that I mind), and am subjected to surveillance (my mail, telephone calls, friends, contacts with abroad, sexual life, etc.) in order to curtail my social contacts and limit my activity in general to a few meaningless existential movements. What is this? Apart from anything else, once legal proceedings are started, the person concerned can be sent to prison, for example because of a "resumption of criminal activity," which could be applied to me if I again appeared on foreign television or wrote to the United Nations. What is one to call such a state of affairs? Is there a legal term to cover it, at least in times of peace?

I rather suspect that the postponed trial back in 1970 did take place, after all: in the absence of the public and of the accused. Not in the building of the Municipal Court but in the dusty attic of some anonymous house, as Franz Kafka described it with such foresight. There I was sentenced to an unknown term for an unknown crime—I and my sons.

I see that in an attempt to underline the foregoing paragraph I automatically, logically and truthfully mentioned my sons. I have three. And it is when I think of them that I again feel impelled to express myself with moderation, seeing everything on a higher plane and wondering whether everything that is happening is not happening for a good reason and perhaps even through my own fault—and maybe it even has a meaning that makes sense of it all. In which case it would not be a misfortune and a punishment for the children to share their parents' fate; on the contrary it would be far worse for someone to separate the children from the fate of their parents and thus break the continuity of the family's consciousness (or that of a nation, or the population of a whole continent). I even think (to my shame, again not without malice) that a state that excludes some child from its good graces is doing its best to nurture in its subjects the seeds of future courage and national honor. Or do you perhaps think that this is just pie in the sky on my part, following the age-old custom of guilty irony-mongers and skeptical optimists? If that were so, I would find it difficult to understand the sentence in your speech as Doctor h.c. here in Prague: "The condition of the world presents us with a great deal that is deeply disturbing and much that gives grounds for hope."

At the end of April this year I was visited by a group of members of the State Security. They came, with the approval of the Public Prosecutor, to carry out a house search because, they said, I was suspected of concealing written materials that provided proof of subversion of the Republic. Who was supposed to be guilty of this crime they did not say. According to the new criminal code it would appear that I do not have to be the alleged culprit for the proof to be sought in my dwelling. Thus it is possible to search *any* flat, and then something will be found or it will not. Is this possible in any other country in peacetime? I mean a country with a European tradition.

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When the search was over, various objects (chiefly books, magazines, notes, manuscripts borrowed from friends, correspondence, photographs, tape recordings) were taken away, but nothing had been found that would qualify as "illegal printed matter." Since that day no one has approached me, but at least 15 other people have been interrogated in connection with me. None of the confiscated things has been returned to me; my complaint about infringement of the law that I sent to the Public Prosecutor was passed on to the interrogator about whom I had complained.

Among the things that I may thus have lost is the manuscript of a book on which I have been working for several years. It is a novel whose plot is interspersed with notes and comments about the landscape, people, and history. As an author I harbor the fear that this will be no thriller. It is intended to be a specifically Czech work and, if I am very lucky and it turns out well, I would hope that it might be of interest to other, philosophically inclined readers from the basin bordered by the Alps, the Carpathians, and the Sudetenland. I myself do not as yet know how the book will end, what I'll add and what delete, but our State Security already knows that it's going to be a harmful book. Thus, if I lend it to friends or, worse still, have it published abroad, I'll commit the offense of spreading disaffection. This criminal offense is committed if one acquaints at least two people with the incriminating statement or text. It is therefore sufficient for me to: 1. give the manuscript to a typist for copying; 2. lend it to my friend Karel Kosík (he, too, had a manuscript confiscated but this was a philosophical treatise and they must find it heavy going!). Moreover, I dont't know what they teach at Vienna University, but at Charles University they tell law students that "Preparation to commit a criminal offense is punishable by the same term as the offense itself" (para. 7, clause 2 of the Penal Code). If I am writing a "harmful" book, I naturally intend someone to read it, therefore I am preparing to commit a criminal offense. That is not a literary exaggeration but a factual deduction. May I now be allowed a literary exaggeration: if by some mischance you had in recent years been awarded not an honorary doctorate at Charles University but a regular doctorate of law, and if you then had become a judge in this country, you would today, the six hundred years of Charles University notwithstanding, have to sentence many a Czech writer according to para. 100 to three years' imprisonment for a manuscript captured on his desk, and if he actually handed the manuscript over for publication, then to between one and five years. And in my case—a man with two pending cases—you would no doubt throw the book at me, if you will pardon the expression.

Forgive me, Secretary General, for conjuring up such an ugly image, but at least you can see what kind of a person I am and what it is that irritates them about me. I merely wished to make clear the difference between two types of doctorate, which have developed in this dear old basin of ours between the Alps, the Carpathians, and the Sudetenland. Accept my renewed apologies, and to show that I do not for a moment believe you could have become such a lawyer and judge, let me confide in you that my confiscated manuscript really did contain things that were tantamount to disaffection in our pre-Helsinki conditions. Perhaps you can understand what I mean when I say that I wrote them because I had succumbed to the impression that I was at home in my flat, where no one can see or hear me. It was late at night, say, and I felt sad or angry. And so I put my thoughts on paper, freely and without restraint, like before the war. Or during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Or as if it was peacetime.

SINCE THAT warlike incident last April I cannot collect my thoughts regarding that absent book-in-progress. Whenever I put a sheet of paper in my typewriter I seem incapable of writing anything but some kind of protest. The world rejoices at the sight of Americans and Russians, up there in space, screwing a joint vessel together, and here I am, down on earth, with my pettifogging worries about my papers. And I am spinning a layman's essay on the law, which I have decided to publish, this being the purpose behind my letter. I should like to ask you, Secretary General, to pass it on to a team of jurists so they can express an opinion on it.

Every state that wishes to appear in civilized company at splendid international conferences considers it necessary to guarantee freedom of the individual in its constitution. This freedom happens to be inseparable from the concept of Europe. It is the greatest European discovery throughout the whole of our history. It is not only *my* opinion that it requires greater care in its implementation. For instance: Where does a man's personality end? Hitherto it seemed to be permissible for a man to juggle thoughts from one half of his skull to the other. Is he, though, also to be allowed to cast them

(*continued on page 215*)

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A Debate on Affirmative Action

-Rose Laub Coser's article, "Affirmative Action: Letter to a Worried Colleague," appeared in our Fall 1975 issue. Below is a comment we received on it from Morton J. Tenzer and Rose Laub Coser's response. — EDS.

Morton J. Tenzer *Comments:*

I am not one of the old circle of acquaintances who write knowingly to each other and to a receptive audience in the pages of *Dissent*; yet I have read virtually every issue since a fellow graduate student who was then on your editorial board brought the first issue to my attention 20 years ago. Although I was trained as a political scientist, much of my truly political thinking has been shaped by the critical analyses offered in this journal; indeed, I have more than once said that Irving Howe has been the most influential writer affecting my political orientation. Of course, one has not always agreed with everything appearing in *Dissent* or written by Howe (I continue to believe that T. E. Lawrence was a liar and blackguard, not a hero). Nevertheless, *Dissent* has consistently been a source, a sounding board, and a touchstone for those interested in democratic socialism and resistant to the complacencies and hypocricies of liberalism on one hand and the moral blindness and ruthlessness of the totalitarian left on the other

These preliminaries indicate the standpoint from which I read Rose Coser's "Letter to a Worried Colleague," about affirmative action. It is, I believe, an example at least of forgetfulness about fundamentals and at worst an example of moral blindness and ruthlessness. Who would have thought that one would read in *Dissent* of all places the old Stalinist apologia, "you can't make an omelet," etc. And what else is Rose Coser saying with regard to her view that "every policy will hurt some people who do not deserve to be hurt"?

To use modern social science jargon: no, it is not true that all decision games are zero-sum. One could say that the whole insistence of democratic socialist opposition to the Leninist-Stalinist regimes is based on the notion that in real politics it is possible through complex processes of democratic procedures to arrive at solutions that satisfy all the players, in which no one is sent to the wall (*al paredon*!) as in Cuba, or to the GULAG as in the U.S.S.R.—or, in Ms. Coser's context, no one is denied a job on the basis of race, sex, religion, or other undemocratic criteria. Ms. Coser may believe in cracking eggs on her way to socialism, but I would have thought that other editors of *Dissent* had long since abjured the "off with their heads" philosophy she seems to espouse.

It would take a letter as long as Ms. Coser's original to rebut her article point by point, and it is hardly worth the effort to repudiate each step of her argument. Let me seize on what I think of as one glaring example of moral blindness. Coser asserts that we all know that certain elite institutions of higher education accept students from Nebraska over equally well qualified students from New York, and that this precedent can be used with equanimity as a reassurance to those worried about the application of irrelevant criteria in hiring under affirmative action. Twenty-five years ago I was rejected by an Ivy League institution, I was smirkingly told, only because I was a resident of the greater New York metropolitan area. This barely disguised anti-Semitic admissions policy hardly seemed proper then to a deeply frustrated teen-ager, nor did it seem acceptable some years later when I

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was teaching at an elite institution and struggling against its discriminatory admissions policies when I was told by its director of admission that, if he didn't use geographic criteria, he could "fill the freshman class with kikes from the Bronx High School of Science"; and nobody would want that, would they, Ms. Coser?

Certainly the most frightening thing about Ms. Coser's piece is its tone of close-minded self-righteousness. "There is no evidence," she says, "...that the level of excellence is being threatened through numerical goals." None? Not a single shred? What kind of evidence would satisfy Ms. Coser? The results of a massive educational sociology type of study that could provide data from which we could argue for decades, or subjective responses to her flat statement that she knows "of no department that has suffered in excellence by adding women or blacks..."? Dozens of her colleagues around the country may feel that they know of departments in their own schools or elsewhere whose standards have declined as a result of affirmative action, but who would be reluctant to single out publicly these places out of a sense of pity, helplessness, and fear of being accused of racism or sexism. "Excellence" is so difficult to measure, anyway, and if all departments are declining as a result of universally enforced government regulations, then it is difficult to measure the decline, and relative excellence is maintained. Can one offer more than gossip to help Ms. Coser see that some things have happened that do represent an alteration in the way things are done that is not all for the best? Perhaps the following mixture of fact and subjective impression will be somewhat persuasive.

1. There is no question that large members of blacks and women have been moved into jobs at universities that did not exist before affirmative action. Virtually every school preparing a detailed affirmative action plan for HEW was forced to create an Affirmative Action or Equal Employment Opportunity office. Many if not most of these jobs have gone to blacks or women. This whole administrative superstructure has been imposed in a time of relatively declining funding support for higher education, and has had to be purchased at a cost that might have otherwise been spent on more and better faculty. Furthermore, these Equal Employment officers, who have to review all faculty personnel decisions, frequently have no prior university faculty or administrative experience that qualifies them to review with the slightest shadow of academic credibility the expert peer-group opinion concerning candidates for appointment. Indeed, the very existence of these offices is a repudiation of faculty self-governance in matters of appointment, promotion and tenure, and requires the resort to nonacademic criteria in the procedure. At the very least this has added another expensive and time-consuming layer of bureaucracy within the university system, and at worst has led to the hiring, retention, and promotion of people who would *not* have been hired on straight academic criteria. This can hardly have failed to affect "excellence" in many departments.

2. Similarly, there are now many more blacks and women in line administrative positions in colleges and universities who are appointed to meet various aspects of the numbers game in affirmative action. In some case, they have been disastrously unsuited by background and experience for their jobs, and while errors were also made in the old, pre-affirmative action days, the fact that so many people in important positions don't know what they are doing (and even admit it, from time to time) must have had a somewhat serious effect on the institutions they help run, and the quality of education offered at those places.

3. I know of cases where blacks or women have been hired with clearly inferior qualifications to other candidates for the positions because departments felt constrained to comply with goals and timetables of the sort Ms. Coser thinks so positive. There have been lawsuits and other remedies taken by those whose equal rights were denied by these discriminatory practices. Files of such cases have been collected by the Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity and by HEW itself, and a review of such records might persuade even Ms. Coser that in more than one instance, injustice was done, quality was affected, and "excellence," if it existed, suffered.

4. Perhaps the worst victims of the affirmative action mania have been academic blacks and women in general who have in the past been found in smaller numbers proportional to their numbers in the whole population, but who in my experience over the last 20 years in large state universities, small elite private colleges and universities, and the Ivy League were assumed by all those I knew or ever heard mention it to be at least as good as everybody else—whether they were graduate students or full

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professors. In more recent years, however, the aberrations and mistakes made related to affirmative action have created new stereotypes and handicaps for blacks and women in the academic profession, who, in the vast, overwhelming majority have arrived at their positions through their own exertions and their own merit, but whose accomplishments are being contaminated by the affirmative action appointments.

Naturally, the editors of *Dissent* cannot be expected to agree with all of the articles they publish, but readers of this journal have a right to expect that such a difficult subject as affirmative action in higher education, which poses profound issues of bureaucratic control over the autonomy of higher education, (*pace*, Max Nomad) the use of bad means to achieve good ends, (rest easy, John Dewey) the meaning of the Civil Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination, and the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection, will be treated in more than the casual, brutal, and meretricious fashion accorded to it by Ms. Coser. It is hard to believe that we need to start all over with a catechism that begins, "Two wrongs don't make a right..." or to insist with Orwell that language may not be abused, that "bad" quotas don't become "good" goals and timetables, just because the regional director of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, acting under authority granted by the Contract Compliance Division of the Department of Labor to implement an executive order...says it is so.

It should be clear that those truly concerned with democracy and socialism will strive for a time when, among other things, blacks and women will be admitted and hired by schools and colleges without regard to their race and sex. Government policies, such as affirmative action, which enforce the use of these irrelevant criteria are inimical to long-range objectives that accept the legitimacy of racial pride and identity and sexual self-concern, but reject the concept of counting, sorting, and assigning by government-imposed criteria rather than by individual talent, merit, and effort. □

Grateful for Little Blessings

Although 27 percent of the sample [of 100 institutions of higher education studied by the Association of American Colleges] are in "serious trouble," it is not predicted that all are headed for extinction.

—From "Private Colleges Holding Their Own," in *Science*, December 26, 1975 □

Rose Laub Coser *Replies:*

I have good news for Mr. Tenzer. The man who told him at an elite institution that he "could not fill the freshman class with kikes from the Bronx High School of Science" would hardly say this today because he would be breaking the law. This is thanks to various antidiscrimination laws culminating in affirmative-action legislation. No, we would not send him to the wall or to the Gulag, but we would make it harder for him to make discriminatory decisions and to use offensive language against minorities.

It's all a matter of what name you give it. If you conjure up the broken-egg image, a whole set of other images are being evoked, and I become a Stalinist apologist, a Castroite, an advocate of the off-with-their-heads philosophy, and am guilty of closed-minded self-righteousness, moral blindness and ruthlessness. Some basis on which to conduct a dialogue! But suppose I call it the lesser-evil approach, a notion that should be dear to Mr. Tenzer's Social Democratic heart. Well, then, I consider it a lesser evil to have some increase in bureaucracy for the greater good of implementing our professed values of equality and social justice. I also find it a lesser evil if occasionally—and I emphasize what I said in my first letter, that it could happen only accidentally and not as a matter of policy—a white male is not recognized for his merit, if such is the price we regrettably have to pay for abolishing *systematic* discrimination against blacks and women.

That decisions always involve hurting some people is simply part of the human condition. Examples: if one decides to give written exams to students, one does injustice to those who cannot do good thinking under pressure; if one decides to give oral exams, one does injustice to those whose creativity is not on the verbal level; if one decides to give objective exams in order to minimize personal considerations, one does injustice to more sophisticated students. Or: if unions decide to insist on seniority rights they do injustice to those younger people who are better qualified. If such decisions are made through democratic process, so much the better. It may even ease our conscience, but will not change the facts. To acknowledge this does not make one "brutal"—another epithet Mr. Tenzer hurls at me; but it could make one a bit less obtuse.

Would Mr. Tenzer, with his socialist conscience

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of which he is so proud, not agree that people have an obligation toward their community to make up, collectively, for past injustices that this community has perpetrated? If we have a right to be proud of our society's accomplishments (such as, for example, the democratic process), should we not also be ashamed of its shortcomings? Are we not being asked to make sacrifices, in the form of taxes or giving time to worthy causes, in support of our values? If equality and democracy are important to us, if we believe that blacks and women have been given less than their share for decades and centuries, is it not justified, then, that we ask those who have most profited from this, namely white males, that they make *some* sacrifice?

I am glad that Mr. Tenzer agrees that "excellence is so difficult to measure anyway." I wonder what it is, then, that makes him so sure that it has declined as a result of affirmative action. I appreciate and share his concern for quality of education, and can only repeat what I said in my first letter: affirmative-action procedures can help improve excellence by giving recruiters longer lists of applicants to choose from and by helping eliminate particularistic criteria and arbitrary decisions. Example: I knew a department chairman who refused to hire somebody because the letter of recommendation said that this was a man who did not tolerate mediocrity. The chairman apparently couldn't take such a risk and instead hired someone (note: without peer review) whom he called a "peach." He could hardly have used this notion as a criterion of excellence had there been a search according to affirmative-action procedures.

I am astonished that an old socialist, and one who goes to pains to introduce himself as an intellectual, should, at times when there is a wholesale onslaught on the excellence of education by a penny-pinching federal government, by economy-conscious states, cities, and towns, at times when mediocrity in the schools is being deliberately fostered from the first grades up to graduate schools for "reasons" of economy—that an old socialist, I say, should get all that hot under the collar when women and blacks ask for their share. This, I submit, is a case of misplaced indignation.

Mr. Tenzer decries the growth of bureaucracy. I suggest that he encourage some student to study the increase over the last five years or so in bureaucratic personnel in Equal Opportunity Offices compared to the increase, during the same period, in college and university administrations, including a comparison of allotment of supportive resources. I have seen a number of Equal Opportunity Offices both in government and universities, and I can assure Mr. Tenzer that they resemble in their poverty more the old-time headquarters of a budding trade union than what we find today in the same government or in the same university administrations. Whom is Mr. Tenzer fighting? Has Parkinson's Law started with the Equal Opportunity drive? Has he not accepted the vast increase in bureaucracy that has come with most welfare measures, from social security and protective laws to Medicaid and Medicare?

I note that Mr. Tenzer believes that "academic blacks and women in general have in the past been ... *at least* as good as everybody else" (my emphasis, RLC). This is precisely why we need affirmative action: so that women or minorities won't have to be "at least" as good as white men to get the same jobs. If they get the jobs by being "just as" good, the world will go around faster. For, as the sociologist W. I. Thomas already recognized at the beginning of this century: "Certain it is that no civilization can remain the highest if another civilization adds to the intelligence of its men the intelligence of its women." □

DEATH OF THE LEADER *continued from page 118*

fulfilling our roles as free adults in the midst of events, of in some way participating in our own social destiny outside channels implacably and permanently delineated by him. As a result, we were all reduced to a limited sphere of action; of pursuing private lives, or pushing selfishly for personal well-being.

I'm not oblivious to the solving of immediate economic problems, despite his cruel and unjust procedures for doing so, which signified a considerable improvement of Spanish society. One has to acknowledge that a great number of Spaniards have adjusted relatively well to a material progress that precludes personal liberty. But for the socially oriented men and women of the last two generations, for whom material advantages alone couldn't satisfy their aspirations for equality and justice, the consequences of the system have been devastating. They faced moral genocide. Hampered by the practical impossibility of dismantling the repressive apparatus institutionalized by him, we all have been faced at one time or another with the dilemma of having to

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emigrate or to compromise with a situation that demanded we keep silent when we didn't want to give up our principles in a suicidal manner; resigning ourselves as if castrated, or becoming cynical and disillusioned.

A small, courageous minority chose a third and more difficult route: that of sharing the valor and misery of an underground struggle. The inherent conditions of a small, tenacious group of people fighting against tremendous odds has turned politics, until very recently, into a sort of drug. This addiction, so common in Spanish life, with its monotonous rhetoric, constantly prophesying victory, in spite of the crude reality, was a reflection of our political impotence. Exile, silence and despair, combined with wishful thinking, have been transformed during the long wait into mythomania. We have had years and years of pain, frustration, and bitterness while—for reasons that had little or nothing to do with his personal ability, and did not reflect the internal political situation—the landscape was being covered with the factories, housing developments, and tourist complexes that were destroying the face of Spain; rivers of automobiles were inundating the roads and highways; and the national per capita income jumped within 10 years from $400 to $2,000.

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HE ALONE did not change. There he was, Dorian Gray—on postage stamps, in newspapers, in his framed picture in official buildings. Meanwhile, children became adolescents; the adolescents became adults; and adults saw their hair thinning and their teeth falling out.

Picasso, Casals, and those like them who vowed they would not return to Spain as long as he remained in power were lowered into their graves, far from the land of their birth, where, under normal circumstances, they would have been able to live out their lives and express themselves.

His ubiquitous presence weighed heavily on us all; he was the authoritarian, castrating father who governed our destinies by decree. I remember as if it were happening now: when I was twenty, I wrote a naive story, denouncing his power. That night, I dreamed I had been put in prison. Along with the censorship he enforced, his regime imposed something far worse—a system of self-censorship and spiritual atrophy that condemned Spaniards to adopt the sinuous art of writing and reading between the lines. We must constantly keep in mind the presence of a censor having the monstrous power to mutilate our texts. Freedom of expression for our generation was not easily acquired. Through my own experience, I know that I had to exert great efforts to eliminate from my psyche an uninvited guest: the policeman who sneaked in, uninvited.

I am sure that when Spanish newspapermen and writers first sit down to write relieved from the load of this Superego they will experience the same fear that overtook me when I faced the vertigo of a sudden emptiness—the freedom that opens up under one's feet—to be able to say without reservation what one thinks.

The struggle is internal, rather than external: Freud called this type of intrapsychical censure part of the "mechanism of the soul." Perhaps, for many intellectuals who are my age, liberation comes too late. Already permanent victims of a sterilizing Superego, which is the internalized projection of *his* unlimited power, they may never easily accustom themselves to writing freely.

His political pragmatism, samples of which can be found in his testament—he was, as I recently read, "the only tactical man in a country of strategists"—do not encompass any ideological loyalty other than that of pure obedience. His official scale of virtues and merits measured people only in proportion to their faithfulness to him. With this system he created a corrupt minority that jealously hoarded for itself the spoils while the great

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mass of citizens were subjected into being a perpetual legal minority: there was no vote; one couldn't buy newspapers critical of the government's policies; one couldn't read an uncensored book or see an uncensored movie. We had no freedom to meet with other dissenting citizens, no freedom to protest against civil abuses, and, certainly, no freedom to unionize.

Vital sources of potential energy, shut off from normal creative outlets, inevitably were turned into neuroses, rancor, aggression, alcoholism, suicidal impulses, and other small private infernos. At some future date, Spanish psychiatrists must analyze seriously the results of this pernicious guardianship over a mass of adults constrained to tolerate a degraded self-image and adopt before others the conduct of an invalid, a child, or a guilt-ridden adult. The taboos and repressions, the mental habits of submissiveness to power, the uncritical acceptance of official values, which during this long period of time have conditioned us, can't be uprooted in one day. It is going to be a difficult task, in addition to surmounting obvious present political problems, to train each Spaniard to think and act on his own account. We all will have to learn step by step to read and write without fear, to speak and to listen with complete freedom.

The citizens of a nation whose population has been forced to live for almost 40 years in conditions of irresponsibility and impotence must necessarily be a sick people, and their convalescence will take some time.

Many times—while my bonds of affection with my country were breaking apart, and spiritual estrangement was being added to physical estrangement—I have thought of this person whose shadow has weighed on my life with more force than my own father. I never saw this person physically, and he probably did not know that I existed, but he was the origin of the chain of events that was the cause of my exile and of my vocation as a writer: the incurable trauma of the Civil War, and the death of my mother, caused by a bombing raid from his air force; the aversion to the conformist order to which his claque tried to mold me and whose hateful scars I still retain; the precocious desire to abandon for good a country forged after his image and in the midst of which I felt like a stranger. What I am today I owe to him. He turned me into a Wandering Jew, a sort of John Landless, unable to acclimatize myself and to feel at home in any place. He gave me the childhood impulse to write in order to exorcise my conflicting relationship with my environment and with my very self.

Others have been less fortunate than I. I'm not only referring to his numberless physical victims, but also to the destruction and ruin in the consciences of those who had to accept the downfall of their most noble ideals, their own moral death—those who saw their hopes crumble for the dismantling of the order that he imposed upon Spain. I'm thinking of Cipriano Mera, Commander of the Fourth Corps of the Republican Army, who died in a Paris hospital in poverty and obscurity—while the most modern surgical team in the world kept *him* alive by artificial means. I'm thinking of León Felipe, Max Aub, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, and so many others who, until the end, heroically maintained their loyalty to the principles for which they so generously fought. *His* end, worthy of Goya's brush or Valle-Inclán's pen, comes too late. No one will be able to bring them back to life.

For me also the news arrives too late. It is much like the acceptance of a lover's proposal long after it has been made, when the proposer has grown tired of waiting and has already built his life around another person. In order for it to have had all its impact, this news should have arrived 15 years ago when I still had my passion for my country and could have participated with greater faith and enthusiasm than I can now muster in its public affairs.

Now, in 1975, I am, as the poet Luis Cernuda said, "an unenthusiastic Spaniard"—one who is a Spaniard because he cannot be anything else. The damage has been irreparable in my case too, and I adjust to it in my own way, without resentment or nostalgia.

His stubborn hanging onto his life—that obstinate resistance that so surprised those who witnessed his endless agony—paints an even darker image of the character who, ignoring the protests of the entire world, a few weeks before had coldly sent to the firing squad five young compatriots, guilty of the unforgivable crime of answering with violence the legalized violence of his government.

I find the verbal formula difficult, but I shall tear it from my lips, on the condition, of course, that he may not continue to rule from his grave: so that at last, free from his presence, the country may live and breathe, I say, "may he rest in peace."

Translated by BARBARA PROBST SOLOMON *and* CARLOS RIVERA □

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David Bromwich

Bergman's *Magic Flute*

Considered as an allegory, *The Magic Flute* has skeptical things to say about the fate of art in society. (It fights a winning battle against any spectator because it says them playfully.) On a different level, the opera, among the few one hears of in childhood, is an initiation by magic into the universe of good and evil. (Like a number of profoundly grown-up works it can indeed be enjoyed by children.) Above all, and despite the fact that one does not meet remarkably imaginative characters in the story, *The Magic Flute* is about imagination and power. Here, as in other respects, it breathes a common air with *The Tempest*, where the shipwrecked sailor's dream of governing and Prospero's own abdication are moments in a dialectic: from the imagination of power to the power of imagination. Bergman chose to heighten this element in the drama by making Sarastro Pamina's father. To stress the function of the opera as *rite de passage*, he cuts now and then to shots of his daughter, who is watching the performance from her place in the audience.

These touches alone would be enough to indicate that Bergman's is an intelligent and carefully meditated interpretation. But an interpreter is not without honor save at the hands of those lesser interpreters, the critics: and several of them, otherwise enthusiastic, could make nothing of that attentive little girl. Perhaps the libretto is to blame? It has, certainly, a plot so rambling that it can seem to ward off all but the most relaxed attention.

> The initial idea of *Die Zauberflöte* [I am quoting Edward J. Dent's account as cited in Joseph Kerman's splendid *Opera as Drama*] was to be more or less as follows: the hero makes the acquaintance of the fairy queen, who gives him a portrait of her daughter and sends him to rescue her from captivity in the castle of the wicked magician, which he will be able to do by the help of the magic flute. For some reason, which has never yet been satisfactorily explained, the whole plot was completely changed at this stage.

Thus the enchanter Sarastro turns into the presiding force of good; he is ready—almost unreasonably—to establish the reign of Tamino and Pamina; what lies before them is the ascetic and heroic ordeal, separately endured, the trial by fire and water, and finally their recognition in the world of light. "Come to the temple, happy pair,/Advance. Advance./Gods and men your triumph share."

Yet the shift of sympathy from the Queen to Sarastro, the sudden bend of the story to cover an unexpected area of feeling, belongs appropriately enough to Quest Romance. For a pervasive concern of the genre is *order*: the sense of a hierarchy that is everywhere in action even though its workings and laws remain obscure. By the end of *The Magic Flute* one feels that the Queen, however involuntarily, has been Sarastro's agent from the start. (And Bergman strengthens this impression with a lively piece of invention, when the Queen's three ladies, asked for directions on the quest, are silenced by the falling of a black veil, to make room for the three male spirits more nearly associated with Sarastro.) The queen represents creative or instinctive energy in its darker aspect; and she is, by the same token, a sorceress of art, unconditioned art, art without civilization: it is from her that Tamino receives the magic flute. For his part Sarastro brings the sociable and serious gifts of culture. His virtues are less clearly appealing than the Queen's vices, even after Bergman has softened the masonic-ritualist tones of his religion, and what Tamino must learn therefore is to see past appearances. Unlike many quest heroes (yet this is an Enlightenment Quest), he succeeds without apparent difficulty.

Indeed the quest may seem wanting in emotional

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depth or complication. And here Bergman has been wonderfully clever, at that furthest reach of the imagination where wit becomes inseparable from feeling. Having shown Tamino fall in love with Pamina's image, Bergman allows the picture of her to grow magical and strange, as a night-mirror of Tamino's imaginings, and, when the Queen gives an unflattering description of Sarastro, Tamino in the glass beholds Monostatos. Single-state, like the familiar and depressing theory of the universe, Monostatos is the wicked servant of Sarastro who must be cast out before the Golden Age can begin. But this Caliban is altogether necessary to Sarastro's plan, since he is the inversion of society, and of all order, who negatively defines the value of those things. At the start of an opera immensely concerned with truth and lies—from Papageno's lie about slaying the dragon to Pamina's oath to follow "the truth, let come what may"—the Queen, in Bergman's version, speaks a half-truth that is the most terrible lie of all: Sarastro is like, imaginatively is, Monostatos.

WHY, IF it is a lie, does this judgment of Sarastro carry such force in Bergman's film? It may be that Bergman himself is uneasy about the sublimity of the moral life, a life without art, which Sarastro offers. In fact Sarastro's brotherhood of priests represent one political vision among others, and they are connected, by various tricks of costume, with the party of rebellion led by the Queen and Monostatos. But the distinction is never blurred. Sarastro is human and good; the rebellious crew, wanting to be more than human, make themselves less; and they are sent to hell or its Mozartian equivalent. The cinematic phrasing of all this is beyond praise. Again I think of the costumes: the helmet worn by a guard, when Sarastro first appears in his bright chariot, is shutting out the face and, without meaning to be, looks vaguely threatening. The helmets of the Queen of Night and her crew are weapons steeled for war. But when two guards salute the glorious couple who are about to enter on their final trial, they take off their helmets and sing.

Bergman's decision to make Sarastro Pamina's father has meant an enormous gain in the ambiguity that surrounds his tenderness for her. A spectacular tableau at the close of the first act—"theatrical" in a way possible only to film—shows an exchange of longing and sorrowful glances between Pamina and Tamino, Sarastro and Pamina. At this juncture the situation for all of them is queer: the lovers are Sarastro's latest novices but also his captives. If his solicitude for Pamina looks, subtly and for a moment only, like the repressed sexuality of an abductor, the final emphasis of the scene, once it is plain he is her father, manages to be disturbing in a whole new key. With its suggestion of heroic growth within a family, and the faintest hint of incestuous feeling, this is an extremely Wagnerian moment, and one of many in the film. (Bergman's staging of the trial by fire and water, for example, with twisted human forms moving among the shadows, alludes to *The Ring's* pattern of Orphic descent and triumph.) Later, in a playful touch Mozart would have appreciated, the actor playing Sarastro is seen behind-scenes reading *Parsifal*.

All this is to say that Bergman knows exactly what he is doing: an absurd enterprise that seemed to me worth taking seriously, on one or two points of detail, because of some critical and personal reactions I have encountered. Every cut or change Bergman introduces is proper to the widening circle of meaning that has at its center the most deeply moving gesture in the film: Sarastro, as he steps away to inaugurate the reign of Tamino and Pamina, setting the flute to his lips and deciding, no, it is not magic for him, and not his to play. Here, in a moment as concise as Prospero's renunciation of his own rough magic, is the last and resigned praise of one utopia, filled, as Sarastro leaves it, with his generosity and purpose, and utterly released from the thrall of magic. For *magic* read *art*? Yes and no. The imagination now, at any rate, will be directed to pure use, and it has no need for the conjuring instruments of a quest. But the irony remains that the flute was fashioned originally by Pamina's father, and in the film this means Sarastro himself.

SO THROUGHOUT Bergman's *Magic Flute* the moral complexity of the story is sharpened. And it is a very moral tale! "Rich men, poor men, all agree," goes a typical passage, "So do men of learning,/ Music, Love and Sympathy/ Keep our green world turning." At such intervals Bergman lets his actors hold up placards or somehow indicate their complicity in the fact that the words are being printed onscreen as slogans. The result is quite the reverse of Brecht's "alienation-effect," which called for titles or emblems or slogans to be featured onstage at a play, to jolt the audience from its merely spectatorial slumber and increase its political awareness. (Whether Brecht's plays actually work like that is another matter.) Bergman is, simply, congenial. He seems almost confiding. And his separation of levels, with the dogmatic meaning of an episode isolated from the narrative meaning, is a

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light-hearted acknowledgment of the power of moral statement: only something serious can afford to be joked about.

One point of interest that none of the reviewers, I think, has noticed is the staging of Scene 3 in the film. This is Tamino's dialogue with the darkness, and it was discussed at length in an earlier Bergman film, *Hour of the Wolf*. The episode is central to Tamino's assumption of the heroic role. He asks when the darkness will lift and is told: soon—or never. He then demands to know if Pamina is alive. "Pa-mi-na," the voices answer, in an echo whose sounds contain yes and no, "Pa-mi-na is alive." The screenplay for *Hour of the Wolf* is not available to me and I go by memory alone, but was it not the strongest vampire of that film—a Sarastro as he might at first seem to Tamino—who gave an enthralling analysis of the scene from *The Magic Flute*, relating it to the artists's perpetual quest for some corresponding voice in nature? And is not the "bird-man," among Von Sydow's sketches in *Hour of the Wolf*, a nightmare Papageno? In any case Tamino is here seen as a silhouette in the middle distance, a pose that connects him with a great many questers in other Bergman films.

The lasting and singular joy of this production is of course that it is obviously Mozart's opera and just as obviously Bergman's film. It has an Olympian grandeur of image—never an embarrassment for *this music*—which sets it beyond the reach of ordinary pleasure and pain and the plain accustomed dreariness. To be able to engage the question of good and evil in the universe with a certain childlike naiveté or ingenuousness is one mark of sublimity in art. When Tamino and Pamina, after their trial, run sprightly through layer after layer of scenery to emerge at last on the stage of the film proper, the arts of any criticism at all become useless. One thinks of Siegfried testing the newly forged blade before the astonished dwarf; of Pip, at Magwitch's bedside in *Great Expectations* to tell the dying man his daughter is living, "a lady and very beautiful"; but it is hopeless to look for anything really similar: one must be there and see it. I cannot imagine that the film will displease anyone except those who believe that close-ups and montage are inappropriate for opera, on the argument that the theatrical illusion requires the viewer at a steady distance from the stage. It seems an odd complaint. As for the story, "do not forget," wrote Shaw, "that an allegory is never quite consistent except when it is written by someone without dramatic faculty, in which case it is unreadable." That Bergman is no less gifted with this faculty than Mozart his film adequately demonstrates. □

NOTEBOOK (*continued from page 206*)

in front of him onto his desk in order to get a better look at them and put them in order? In my country this has now become doubtful, Doctor, and I am telling you about it because, unless it is nipped in the bud, we shall have created an ugly European precedent. And it cannot be put right merely by someone duly returning our manuscripts to me and my friend Kosík (and we are by no means the only ones!). Something more is required. Otherwise I see no guarantee to prevent the police, intent on protecting law and order with even greater alacrity, from entering my flat as soon as I sit down at my desk and asking me: "What is it you are going to think about now? Come along with us." From this it is only a step—in any other potential country—to the placing of instruments under the heads of newlyborn babies to plot the course of their thoughts as they travel from the left to the right hemisphere. These instruments will then, at a later stage of development, make it possible to direct the movements of populations from two spacecraft, one of which will fly above the Western and the other above the Eastern hemisphere. By this timely step, no more difficult than inoculation, it will be possible—naturally in the interests of peace and friendship on our planet Earth—to avert the danger that there might remain somewhere a single seed of future courage and national honor.

Dear Secretary General, that is almost all I had in mind. The rest I could perhaps only tell you as a metaphysical accomplice. And even that only, dear Doctor, if we both could be sure of at least a square meter of privacy in this dear old basin of ours.

I look forward eagerly to your reply. In the meantime I wish you confidence in the meaningfulness of your work, and also success. And, lest I forget, above all, health, patience in your daily trials, and the harmless protection of saintly patrons.

Yours sincerely,

LUDVÍK VACULÍK □
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Luther Carpenter

The Southern Elite

POWER SHIFT: THE RISE OF THE SOUTHERN RIM AND ITS CHALLENGE TO THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT, by Kirkpatrick Sale. New York: Random House. 310 pp. $12.95

Kirk Sale's hypothesis is that rapid economic and population growth has buoyed up the "Southern Rim" of the United States to a point where it competes with the "Northeast." Sale's Northeast includes Wisconsin, Illinois, and all points east—the Southern Rim everything south of a line stretching from San Francisco to North Carolina's border with Virginia. There is no doubt about the southern growth—65 percent of America's population growth between 1970 and 1975. This population growth results in new representatives in the Congress and new votes in the Electoral College.

The economic side of this growth is more difficult to assess. Sale bases his case on six industries: defense, oil, agribusiness, advanced technology, real estate and construction, and leisure. He does an impressive job on defense, piling up lists of involved contractors and states, citing the technological spin-offs, and showing how the peculiar rules of defense-contracting enable this industry to build up undeveloped areas. But despite the excesses of defense-spending, it is not clear that this produces disproportionate growth in the Southern Rim as a whole.

Sale's sketchier treatment of agribusiness shows basic flaws. He uses figures on farm profits and farm size to show the growth of corporate farming nationally, and to demonstrate that the Southern Rim is in the forefront of this process. He implies that farm income as a whole is exorbitant, but he does not go into the divisions between corporate farms, family farms, processors and middlemen. Instead, he approaches the problem geopolitically. The serious question in a geopolitical approach is, how much of the fruits of growth stay in the region? Sale doesn't ignore the question, but he doesn't answer it. He argues that even if the profits are creamed off by outside ownership, much income remains in property values, banking, and wages. He lists some big processors and distributors with headquarters in the area—Del Monte, Carnation, Sunkist, Tropicana, Safeway—but leaves it to the reader to remember those processors and distributors based elsewhere—such as General Mills, General Foods, Pillsbury, Ralston-Purina, and Kraft.

This kind of incomplete comparison, occurring throughout the book, builds a serious overstatement and distortion into Sale's hypothesis. The South is growing rapidly—but from a low starting point. Sale's refusal to admit this very low starting point does create the illusion of untold wealth. The Southern Rim's growth, in fact, has been uneven and vulnerable to depression. Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and most other southern states remain at the bottom in terms of per capita income. Much of the recent growth in the Southern Rim simply resulted from the creation of industries and services that had long been established in the rest of the country.

The book lends itself to interminable wrangling about geopolitical chauvinism, and is diverted from the hard questions of the effects of growth. Sale's one-sidedness gives his readers a picture that is at odds with the author's underlying populism. Sale means to portray the workers and farmers of the region as victims. But because he never asks explicitly how little the common people benefit from the growth, he allows southern nonpopulist readers to identify with the people he describes: they may be

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pirates, but they're our pirates, ripping off the Yankees.

For Sale, piracy is the essence of the "Rimian" elite. He tries to develop other descriptions: a "cowboy" style in business and politics; "the Three R's: rightism, racism, and repression." but these descriptions lead back to his real subject, the connection between political power and economic gain. The relationship is dialectical: political power creates new opportunities for growth and profit, and wealth provides access to political favors. The evidence is certainly there, in the familiar stories of C. Arnholt Smith, Howard Hughes, Bebe Rebozo, Roy Ash, Bobby Baker, the Milk Producers' Fund, John Connally, etc. In telling these stories, Sale brings together much of the best investigative journalism of the last 10 years, but there are also some problems in this classic muckraking approach. One of them is the shotgun effect in which congressmen's connections with mobsters, the Teamsters, banking, oil, and agribusiness all appear in the same paragraph. The sources or causes of the corruption get lost—and organized crime comes to look as important as oil or defense in the life of the Southern Rim.

Power Shift is not a systematic investigation of the "Rimian" elite. The book doesn't ask how coherent that elite is, whether local elites are bound into a regional elite, whether they have a sense of class interest or try to ruin each other in their rush to the trough. Yet, an implicit answer to these crucial questions does emerge, and that answer is Richard Nixon. Nixon is the symbol of all Sale doesn't like in the Southern Rim. And Sale suggests that Nixon drew together the "Rimian" elite. All the ties of self-interest led to him; the plentiful favors poured out from him.

There is a lot of truth in this contention, yet also much simplification. Perhaps we can see both sides best in Sale's treatment of Nixon's resignation. Sale contends that the Watergate break-in was done in "cowboy" style—paranoid, amoral, aiming at "total victory." Nixon based his strategy on holding the South—and the "Yankee" establishment used the report of that strategy to attack Nixon and his followers.

Up to this point, the geopolitical interpretation seems plausible. But then Sale sees Gerald Ford as the tool of the Northeastern elite in general and of Rockefeller in particular, and here again Sale overestimates the role of geography and underestimates the role of class and ideology. The elites of the Northeast and of the Southern Rim are not as distinct as he implies; they are merely different tendencies within the capitalist class. The Southern Rim's "cowboy" style is not new or unique, and not limited geographically; was the style of the Franklin National Bank so different when it tried to break into the inner circle of the New York banks?

THE MEANING of what Sale describes is that the capitalist class is being renovated, once again, by new blood and sources of money. One good paragraph at the end of the book reminds us that, in the past, earlier waves of capitalists rose, merged with older business strata, and learned to tame their rapaciousness in order to stabilize the system. Sale's book shows us that the sources of capitalist strength are still the same: control of food and energy, the manipulation of government, and technological innovation. Sale hopes that this renovated capitalist elite will mellow; yet, it is just as possible that it will not. The aggressiveness of the new southern wealth may reinforce the demands of older northern business groups trying to overcome the damage done to them by inflation and the underemployment of their capital. The taming of that renovated capitalist elite will depend on the growth of popular forces—unions, and truly democratic parties.

Sale has much of the story, but others will have to study the business class more systematically, make the geographical comparison more explicit, and bring the farmers and workers into the picture. One last question remains, which seems to have been in Sale's mind but was never made explicit in the book: is the growth of the Southern Rim a problem for the democratic forces in America? It strengthens capitalism. It withdraws resources that could be used to face such problems as the decay of industrial cities and makes it harder for us to get at those resources through the federal government. This growth makes matters much more difficult for us; but I feel that it is not a distinct policy issue. It would indeed be unfortunate if it were to become a policy issue, for this would allow the new "Rimian" elite to paint reform as opposed to the whole Southern Rim.

The issues posed by the Southern Rim are not regional but national. They are the result of unplanned growth: the control of defense and energy policy; the allocation of capital; the abandonment of social capital in built-up areas; suburban sprawl; the distribution of the fruits of growth. As a whole, the Southern Rim still lags in income and public services. It needs healthy growth. □

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Barbara Jacobson

Women's Studies

CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, by Eleanor Flexner. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap / Harvard University Press. 405 pp. $15.00. Revised Edition.

WHAT WOMEN WANT, by Dorothy Graham Yates. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 230 pp. $10.00.

These two books share the theme of the struggle for women's rights but little else. *Century of Struggle* (a minimally revised edition of the 1959 classic) surveys the first wave of the movement from 1820–1920; *What Women Want* emphasizes the second wave from 1959–73. There also are important differences in perspective. Yates focuses on movement ideologies, Flexner on events, people, and the way these coalesce into issues. Yates examines the ideas of declared feminists, Flexner the significant contributions of the declared and the undeclared. An interesting example of the latter is Flexner's treatment of the founding of the first black women's school in 1833 by Prudence Crandall in Canterbury, Connecticut. Yates studies feminist writings and features movement literati; Flexner follows the silent and the articulate, the literate and the illiterate. *What Women Want* is, in fact, a compact summary of what upper-middle-class white women in the movement who write about the movement want. *Century of Struggle*, by contrast, tells the story of the activities of upper-, middle-, and lower-class blacks, whites, affiliated, unaffiliated, men and women as they struggle for women's suffrage and the entrance of women into higher education and labor unions.

Yates's limited vision reflects, in part, the movement she wishes to analyze. However, this unfortunate lack of catholicity is also a consequence of her attempt to explain through categorizing, of the concomitant problem of converting cases that do not fit into deviant categories, and of some surprisingly naive comments such as "in the final analysis what is true is what we believe." She divides movement ideologies into three types, each differing in terms of focus and strategy for change: (1) the feminist perspective of women-equal-to-men (exemplified in the early years of the women's movement, e.g., Friedan, Bird, NOW, and *Cosmopolitan*); (2) the women's liberationist perspective of women-over-against-men (Millet, Mitchell, Firestone, and Atkinson); (3) the androgynous perspective of women-and-men-equal-each-other (Rossi, Heilbrun, Ozick, Greer, Janeway). The focus for change of the feminist perspective is "political," the strategy is pressure; the focus for change of the liberationist perspective is "social," the strategy is conflict; the focus for change of the androgynous perspective is "cultural," the strategy is conversion (by means of cooperation and rationality). Yates then considers each of these types as progressive stages "along life's way" as well as of the historical development of the movement—they characterize steps in the life of every feminist and three periods in the history of feminism. She argues that American society is now entering the last stage of androgyny in which significant social changes occur primarily through rationality and cooperation. As she phrases it. "...women and men can shift beliefs and behavior when they recognize injustice and intolerance. ..."

The framework is a naively optimistic unilinear theory of change, lacking even the sophistication of Rostow's three stages of economic growth. Nor does it go far enough toward the more difficult task of including and interpreting diversities within the women's movement. For example, Yates's categories take no notice of either racial or class differences. As a result, we can only assume she wishes to argue that, in this new phase of adrogyny, no serious conflicts of social privilege exist.

Fortunately, the book comes to more than its shortcomings. Yates collects a good bit of widely scattered information into a series of compact summaries. Moreover, she is careful with her sources and scholarly in her treatment of them.

Set beside almost any book other than Flexner's *What Women Want* would not look quite so pale. Yates offers a meat-axe approach to explanation; Flexner adroitly manipulates a scalpel. *Century of Struggle* survives both as first-rate historical research and inspirational primer. It more than deserves the accolades bestowed upon it over the years. The revisions here are, however, minimal—a brief preface, a new conclusion, and some few additions to the text. □

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- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. —THE EDITORS

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Heda Margolius Kovály

Voices from the Other Europe

THE GUINEA PIGS, by Ludvík Vaculík. Translated by Káca Polácková. 167 pp. $3.50.

LAUGHABLE LOVES, by Milan Kundera. Translated by Suzanne Rappaport. 242 pp. $3.50.

Both New York: Penguin Books (paperback), Writers from the Other Europe series, Philip Roth, editor.

Philip Roth is adding a new dimension to the American literary scene. He has launched his new series, Writers from the Other Europe, with two Czech works of fiction that have won international acclaim in English, German, and French translations but are virtually unknown in America. Not only there: the first volume of the series, Ludvík Vaculík's *The Guinea Pigs*, despite its author's great popularity, has never been published in his homeland.

Ludvík Vaculík is one of about a hundred blacklisted writers living in occupied Czechoslovakia. They are forbidden to publish, their books have been removed from the public libraries, and their names are never mentioned in literary textbooks or catalogs. Many work as night watchmen, garbage collectors, and in similar jobs. Still, they stubbornly refuse to heed the friendly encouragement by the Secret Police to leave the country or else write odes to those who set them free of the freedom to express their views. Last April, the Secret Police raided the homes of many writers and intellectuals and seized their notes and manuscripts—in the case of philosopher Karel Kosík, the sole copy of several hundred manuscript pages.

Despite this grim suppression, new works are being written—and read. In 1973, a group of authors decided to circulate their manuscripts among each other, their friends, and some blacklisted literary critics—thus lending out their manuscripts to interested persons at their own risk. In a short time this activity became thoroughly organized, and word from Prague has it that one such copy may reach as many as a hundred readers. Since the government controls all duplicating equipment, including mimeograph and copy machines, the only way of copying manuscripts is by typing, and so only a few copies can be made. The typescripts are bound between covers, sold to trustworthy readers—and everyone, even the author, has to pay for his copy.

This form of publication is called *Edice Petlice*—in English, The Lock and Key Editions might convey the meaning. Its "editors" refuse to call it *samizdat*. They are seeking to maintain a tenuous legality—insisting that these are not privately published [*sam-izdannye*] books but simply manuscripts circulating among friends. The manuscripts are carefully selected to avoid accusations of disseminating "subversive" ideas: they are literary rather than political works, not polemics against the regime. This, however, does not stop the police from seizing the manuscripts whenever they find them or from interrogating and harassing their owners. But there is no law forbidding an author from making a copy of his manuscript and giving it to a friend and, so far, there have been no arrests.

The present typed "catalog" of the Lock and Key Editions includes about 50 volumes of fiction, poetry, and historical, philosophical, and literary essays by 34 authors. And so, while the Prague bookstores display worthless political pamphlets and selected works of long dead and therefore harmless classic authors, contemporary Czech literature is surviving on typed, dog-eared pages, soiled by scores of nervously perspiring palms.

LUDVÍK VACULÍK'S NOVEL *The Guinea Pigs*—now the first book in Philip Roth's series—was also the first work circulated in Czechoslovakia's Lock and Key Editions. (Neal Ascherson has aptly called it "one of the major works of literature produced in postwar Eastern Europe.")

In the West, Vaculík is probably best known as the author of the *2,000 Word Manifesto* signed by the progressive intellectuals during the Czech Spring of 1968. His first literary success was the novel *The Axe*, published in 1966—an insightful, brilliant variation on a familiar theme of the late '60s in Czechoslovakia, the destruction of an ideal, the inevitable clash between integrity and corrupt political power.

Vaculík completed *The Guinea Pigs* in 1970, a dark time in Czechoslovakia when all ideals were dead and buried and the human condition was an ever deeper descent into degradation. The protagonist, a bank clerk, lives in a world whose familiar outlines dissolve around him. Sinister, inexplicable

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happenings threaten to undermine his own life and also the whole structure of the society. He drowns out his confusion and fears by his absorption in a new hobby—the guinea pigs he has brought home for his children. At night, when his wife and children are asleep, he plays with the guinea pigs—fascinated by these little animals who are even more helpless than he is himself—examines them, experiments with them, and eventually tortures them. In a moment of supreme anguish man and animals meet at the same level, and the animals emerge as more human than the man.

In order to endure his ultimate alienation, the protagonist switches his narrative from first to third person, to "detract the attention of the readers... from his deeds to his words." The shadow of the inexplicable, mysterious menace becomes so unbearable that the clerk, out of curiosity and "sheer helplessness," decides he must get to the bottom of the mysterious circumstances that surround him. But before he can get a glimpse of the truth, he meets his death—as senseless and perplexing as his life. The singular impact of this disturbing tale is enhanced by the narration's gentle, easy, and often cheerful tone; even the dreadful ending has an overtone of tired resignation.

Most readers find it impossible to read modern Czech fiction without thinking of Kafka. But it is not merely Kafka's influence that made the present Czech literature what it is. If there had been no Kafka, today's Czech writers surely would create his world out of their own everyday experiences. Both Kafka's and Vaculík's tortured visions indeed rise up from the battered flagstones of Prague.

LAUGHABLE LOVES, the second volume in Roth's Writers from the Other Europe series, is a collection of seven stories. Their author, Milan Kundera, another eminent Czech writer, is best known in the West for his two political novels, *The Joke* and *Life is Elsewhere*. *The Joke* tells the story of a young man who finds out the hard way that the Party will not condone even the most innocent joke—for the Party bureaucrats are devoid of humor. And it was perhaps this grim humorlessness that alienated them most from the Czech people. *The Joke* appeared in 1967, and the party readily confirmed the author's insight by submitting him to a treatment similar to that meted out to the novel's protagonist. Kundera's *Life is Elsewhere*—a novel about a poet who accepts the immorality of the Party as the supreme ethical imperative—won the Prix Medicis of 1973 for the best foreign novel published that year in France. The book has not been published in the author's homeland.

Kundera finds nothing mysterious in the workings of the obtuse and vicious machinery that destroys human potential and turns life into an absurd, cynical spectacle. He attacks them head-on, with scornful irony: when we laugh at a tragedy, it becomes a farce. Should you take a mad world seriously, you yourself would go mad.

In Kundera's *Laughable Loves* the political situation merely provides the backdrop for a series of erotic encounters—sometimes grotesque, sometimes nostalgic and tender. But all these people, playing ephemeral, laughable sexual games, try to find in each other the genuine feeling and the reality of a life that their alienated existence cannot provide.

In the first story, two lovers on a vacation trip decide to play "The Hitchhiking Game": they pretend they are strangers—just a driver who casually picks up a hitchhiking girl on the road. At the beginning of their trip they are a happy couple, only dimly aware of the insecurities and doubts inherent in their relationship. The game with its playful pretense of make-believe feelings creates a confusion of identities and a destructive eruption of emotions; when it is all over, the two lovers are left with nothing except disgust and a "sad emptiness."

This theme of substituting sham beliefs for truth and of illusion for reality runs through most of the stories. The protagonist of the last story, an atheist who is "almost certain that God does not exist," feigns religion only in order to seduce a pious girl. Yet he ends up spending his afternoons in a church, longing for God. For "God alone is relieved of the distracting obligation of *appearing* and can merely *be*."

THE NEXT two books in Philip Roth's series are the works of two Polish authors: the late Tadeusz Borowski's concentration camp stories, *This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen!* and Tadeusz Konwicki's novel, *A Dreambook of Our Time*. The editor of the Writers from the Other Europe series, Philip Roth, cannot be praised enough for his aim to "bring together outstanding and influential works of fiction by East European writers" and publish them in paperback, making them available to a wide range of readers.

For the American reader, all these books open up unexplored territory of strange lives and alien beings—among whom he may encounter the most mysterious of strangers—himself. □

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LETTERS

McGovern Vote

Editors:

In Mr. Connolly's review of Kevin Phillips's *Mediacracy* (Winter 1976), he lists the "areas of greatest McGovern strength" as "New England, the upper Midwest, and the Pacific Northwest." Perhaps this is merely an example of a reviewer conveying without comment the gist of the book being reviewed. But since Mr. Connolly calls Phillips "essentially right" in some of his analyses (though abhorrent in his values), I can't resist blowing the whistle on this important inaccuracy.

In 1972, George McGovern carried some of the major cities of the Pacific coast—north, central, and south. In the Pacific Northwest, Nixon carried Oregon with 55 percent of the vote, Washington with 60 percent, and Idaho with 71 percent. Of the 13 congressional Districts in these three states, McGovern carried only one—Oregon's Third (Portland), by a slim 52 percent.

In contrast, although Nixon carried California with 57 percent (three percentage points below his national average), McGovern carried eight Californian congressional districts—four in the north (Sacramento, San Francisco, Berkeley, and San Jose) and four in the south (all in Los Angeles).

DOUGLAS SCOTT
Riverside, Conn. □

What's Fact, What Gossip?

Editors:

In the Fall 1975 *Dissent* J.C. (I assume the initials stand for Joseph Clark) reviewed my book, *The Rise and Fall of American Communism*, under the title of "Fact and Gossip."

Early in the review, J.C. comments at length on the matter contained in the two *secret coded* documents that Earl Browder received by radio from the Comintern at the end of 1939. He describes the material in them as old hat, saying that everything in them had already been in print throughout the Communist world. Therefore, what's all the excitement about?

But what J.C. fails to mention is by far the most important sections of these documents—namely, the paragraphs that state very clearly that the war that began only three weeks before the messages were sent to Browder spelled the *end* of capitalism. Then followed specific instructions to the CPUSA on how to take advantage of this "predicted" event. My chapter, furthermore, describes in quotations how Browder translated these instructions for the faithful. And since none of this had previously appeared in any Communist document anywhere, J.C. had to be aware that this part of the documents was not old hat. Why did he omit it from his review?

The second half of J.C.'s review discusses only one part of my story of the Spanish Civil War. It is this that he terms "unsubstantiated gossip." In this section, I deliberately omitted mentioning names. However, not only had I read *The Story of an American Communist* by John Gates, a man I admire for what he did in 1957, but I also had two conversations with him, about two years apart, on the question of what happened to Dave Doran and Robert Merriman. In the earlier of the two conversations, his description of what happened to these two men differed considerably from the story as it appeared in his book. In the second conversation, Gates's description of the mysterious disappearance of Doran and Merriman was closer to what he wrote in his book but entirely different from what he had told me two years or so earlier. At about the same time, Earl Browder himself told me that while he was in Spain he was informed that both Doran and Merriman were executed without a trial by André Marty.

Then I met Major Milton Wolff and told him what Gates had described to me and what Browder had told me. To which Wolff replied that both Gates and Browder were full of baloney. He then described the incident in some detail. According to him, both Doran and Merriman were with him in a battle many miles south of Teruel. To escape annihilation by Franco's forces, Major Wolff's contingent fled into the forest behind them and the last he saw of Doran or Merriman was as they were fleeing through the woods. It must be clear that an analysis based on such statements by Browder, Wolff and even Gates can hardly be said to be based purely on gossip.

However, in the last few years, several books on the Spanish Civil War have appeared that added some new material though not specifically on the fate of the two men in question. I, therefore, decided to write my analysis of the fate of Doran and Merriman on reasoning and probability based in part on the new published material. Of course, J.C. and John Gates can honestly question my conclusions, but they can hardly say that they are based on gossip.

But more important, the reviewer chose to latch on to a small and minor section of a book that contains dozens of heretofore unpublished documents, letters, and interviews; sensational quotations from unpublished stenograms of nine different National Committee meetings; Eugene

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Varga's dispute with Stalin on the nature of capitalism; an original analysis of the Soviet-German Pact; and much more material of interest and importance to students of the subject.

If the purpose of a reviewer is to give the reader a reasonably accurate knowledge of the contents of a book, an honest balanced judgement of J.C.'s review of my book can hardly justify the title "Fact and Gossip."

PHILIP J. JAFFE
New York

JOSEPH CLARK *Replies:*

Jaffe's claim that only in the cables to Browder did Moscow reveal the fateful news that the war spelled the end of capitalism is fanciful. First, I didn't ignore that priceless suggestion from Moscow, but wrote in my review that the Moscow cable said: "anti-fascism was out, 'the overthrow of all imperialists' was in." Second, this ineffable command had already appeared in Communist publications all over the world by the time the cables arrived here.

As to the unsubstantiated gossip about the execution of Doran and Merriman, Jaffe gives us more gossip. Gates informed me, when I read Jaffe's letter to him, that he never told Jaffe, or anyone else, anything but the account that appears in his (Gates's) book about Doran and Merriman, and which I reported in my review. If Jaffe misquoted Gates to Wolff about the incident, and if Wolff replied "baloney," Gates informed me Wolff would be justified in calling Jaffe's gossip, baloney. □

Strip-Mining

Editors:

When President Ford vetoed the bill passed by Congress to control strip-mining of coal, and to require the companies that were strip-mining to put the land back into decent condition for agricultural or other uses, he argued that the bill would cost 36,000 jobs.

The argument was wrong. It costs substantially less to strip-mine coal than to bring it up from underground mines, so the companies engaged in strip-mining could well afford the cost of putting the land back into proper condition. In any case, any jobs that might be lost by men engaged in strip-mining would be gained by underground coal miners. There would also be a good many thousands of new jobs created by putting the land devastated by strip-mining back into proper condition. But President Ford evidently did not realize these very plain facts; unless he was deliberately trying to deceive, which does not seem very likely.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS
Riverside, Conn. □

Sectarian Scruples

Editors:

In John P. Diggins's unbiased and otherwise unexceptible "Buckley's Comrades," one must quibble with his use of the term "neoconservatives" to label the ex-Marxists who went over to the right before 1950. In contemporary usage, "neoconservative" labels those liberals who would not accept the "New Politics" shift during the mid-1960s; they are careful to keep their distance from the premature antiliberals of Buckley and company. On the right, as the left, sectarianism demands scrupulous care in nomenclature.

B. BRUCE-BRIGGS
Hudson Institute
Croton on Hudson □

On "Buckley's Comrades"

Editors:

Though John Diggins makes a number of valid points in his recent piece on the ideological odysseys of Max Eastman, James Burnham, *et al.* ("Buckley's Comrades: The Ex-Communist as Conservative," Fall 1975), his analysis as a whole is marred by several errors of fact and interpretation.

Most disturbing of all is Diggins's assertion that Will Herberg was a supporter of the McCarthy inquisition in the 1950s (pp. 374, 375). The charge is totally without foundation. Not only did Herberg not endorse or even tacitly condone the Senator's activities, he specifically condemned McCarthy and McCarthyism in the two articles he wrote on the subject: "Government by Rabble-Rousing," *New Leader*, January 18, 1954, pp. 13–16 & "McCarthy and Hitler: A Delusive Parallel," *New Republic*, August 23, 1954, pp. 13–15.

In Herberg's words, McCarthy was a "demagogue" and "rabble-rouser," "a crude and rather primitive plebeian" undermining the American constitutional system. As for the Senator's backers, such people were not real conservatives at all, Herberg felt, but rather "radicals...whose whole approach is subversive of...constitutional democracy." In their excitement, Herberg contended, the McCarthyite nationalists were "rapidly losing all sense of proportion and rendering themselves incapable of making the most elementary distinctions—such as the distinction between the Communist entrapper and the dupes he entraps, between the Communist and the ex-Communist, between conspiracy and heresy. "Indeed, in their fury, they were becoming "ever more crude and primitive, exhibiting modes of behavior that arouse very disturbing memories of the recent past."

Herberg, of course, did not offer a conventional left-wing critique of McCarthy. In decrying the Senator's activities, he pointed out that demagogic appeals through the

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mass media had actually originated with "the Great White Father" of American liberalism, Franklin D. Roosevelt—a statement that could hardly sit well with many progressives. Herberg, moreover, mocked the tendency of many anti-McCarthy spokesmen to defend automatically and without reflection anyone accused by the Senator. By insisting on the innocence of every victim, such "liberals," he believed, only made themselves look ridiculous when they found their faith misplaced. Herberg also criticized the hysteria with which many on the left reacted to McCarthy. McCarthy was not another Hitler, he argued, nor was McCarthyism an American version of fascism. Contrary to some excited statements, legal and constitutional procedures had not broken down in the United States. McCarthy was indeed an unpleasant individual, but he was scarcely in the mold of the totalitarian demagogue who operates, in Herberg's words, "with some idea or cause which he himself believes in yet perverts and exploits for his purposes." McCarthy, by contrast, operated with no positive idea, Herberg argued.

This, in a way, was a saving grace, according to Herberg, for the very hollowness of McCarthyism made it "in the long run far less dangerous than it would be were it genuinely an 'idea' movement."

These are not the views of a contributor to the *Nation* or *Dissent*, but I fail to see how they could be construed as those of a McCarthy sympathizer.

Herberg, of course, was a strong anti-Communist—and an anti-Communist in a way that many on the left would disapprove of. He emphasized the conspiratorial nature of Communism and felt that it posed an enormous threat to America and the West. More damaging to his reputation with the left, Herberg argued that all Communists should be banned from non-Communist educational institutions ("Freedom and Loyalty in Economic Life: Labor," *Christianity and Society*, Autumn 1952, p. 12), and that the U.S. government *did* need a comprehensive security system—though Herberg also felt that loyalty oaths were largely useless and any security program had to be "scrupulously non-partisan and free from the corruptions of political exploitation and rabble-rousing... if it is not to prove more destructive to ourselves than to the enemy..."("Loyalty and Security in Historical Perspective," *New Republic*, April 11, 1955, p. 22). Once again, such opinions, though condemned by most radicals, hardly make one a supporter of the McCarthy inquisition. Herberg's views on the Communist issue were really no different from those expressed by Sidney Hook (especially in *Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No*) or most of the moderate liberals who wrote for *Commentary* or the *New Leader*. If Will Herberg was a McCarthyite in Mr. Diggins's definition, then so too were Professor Hook and many others.

No one denies that there are striking parallels between Herberg's intellectual career and the odysseys of Max Eastman, James Burnham, and John Dos Passos. But just because Herberg was a radical in his younger days and is now associated with *National Review* does not mean that his journey to the right was identical to theirs. Eastman and his friends, after all, were all identified with the right by 1950; Herberg did not write for an explicitly conservative publication until 1959, and he did not become a regular contributor to *National Review* until the fall of 1961—long after the McCarthy furor had subsided.

With Herberg, in fact, the transition from Communism to conservatism was a long and drawn-out process lasting more than 20 years. Along with the other Lovestoneites, he repudiated Bolshevism in the late '30s; and in the early '40s rejected Marxism as well. Searching for a new "absolute," around which to center his life, Herberg then embraced Judaism, though still considering himself very much a man of the left and a democratic socialist. (Herberg's theologically grounded socialism, of course, was not to the taste of all radicals. Its religious basis probably offended most, and many would not have been too happy with its pessimistic and limitationist biases.) By the early '50s, Herberg had eased further to the right, to a position that could best be described as moderate or revisionist liberalism. It was as a moderate liberal that he wrote his articles on the McCarthy controversy. (In this period, of course, Herberg began to express a certain sympathy for the conservative position, but the conservatism he found congenial was the anti-McCarthy "new conservatism" of Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter, not the conservatism of Buckley and the *Freeman-National Review* crowd.) Only at the end of the decade and in the early '60s did Herberg formally identify himself with the right. Joining *National Review* as contributing editor in 1961, however, did not mean that he gave retroactive sanction to the magazine's earlier pro-McCarthy stance, nor did it mean that he necessarily agreed with some of the more belligerent right-wing views of the other editors. Unlike most of his colleagues, for example, he strongly supported the trade union movement and continued to hold Reinhold Niebuhr in high regard.

Mr. Diggins apparently had been so blinded by the similarities between Herberg's intellectual biography and those of Eastman *et al.*, that he has failed to make basic distinctions and to view events in proper historical sequence. If the only qualification for being a McCarthy supporter in Mr. Diggins's eyes is a commitment to radicalism before 1945 and a later affiliation with *National Review*, then such former leftists as Lewis Feuer, William Petersen, and Selden Rodman, all of whom began writing for *NR* in the 1970s, might as well be considered McCarthyite intellectuals too.

On another, though less vital, issue, Mr. Diggins is equally misleading. Discussing James Burnham's career, he argues that Burnham in *The Machiavellians* set out "to prove that democracy and freedom are 'myths'" (p. 372). I suggest that Mr. Diggins reread *The Machiavellians*, particularly pages 265 to 287, for he seems to have missed one of the main points of the book. As Burnham saw it, democracy defined in terms of majority rule or government by the people *was* a fraud, an impossibility, a myth; but democracy conceived as freedom or liberty ("a measure of security for the individual which protects him from the

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arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of personally held power") most definitely was not. Complete freedom, of course, did not exist in any society, but it made a profound difference whether one lived under a totalitarian dictatorship or in a country where most liberties were preserved. As Mr. Diggins might recall, the full title of Burnham's work is *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom*.

DOUGLAS WEBB
West Hill, Ontario/Canada

J. P. DIGGINS *Replies*:

Mr. Webb finds "most disturbing of all" my alleged assertion that Herberg supported the McCarthy "inquisition." In the *Dissent* article I suggested that Herberg, like many exradicals, found himself in the awkward position of supporting the "logic (or illogic)" of McCarthyism while disapproving of the Senator's "methods." The two Herberg articles that Webb cites, which are indeed sophisticated critiques of the demagogic component in McCarthyism, are fully discussed on pp. 282–84 of my book, *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History*. On the other hand, Herberg's flirtation with the McCarthyite logic of "either-or" emerges in his debates with Daniel Bell and Sidney Hook during an "Ethics of Controversy" discussion held at the Tamiment Library in 1952, the minutes of which I found in the files of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. See pp. 280–82 of my book.

Webb also feels I slighted Herberg's rich and varied ideological career. "With Herberg, in fact, the transition from Communism to conservatism was a long and drawn-out process which lasted more than twenty years." I could not agree more. In my book (p. 302) I wrote of Herberg: "His path to conservatism was a long and arduous ordeal, and if it has taken us some distance to trace his intellectual footsteps, it is because his path took so many interesting turns: personalism, humanism, pluralism, Judaism, neo-orthodoxy, existentialism, and, finally, historicism. Herberg had no easy time getting to the other side, and it is a measure of his intellectual honesty that once he got there he would still be discontented with 'what passes for conservatism in contemporary American politics.'"

Webb claims I am "equally misleading" on the subject of James Burnham. Again I think this is a matter of mistaking a compressed article for a complete statement. The points Webb raises are fully discussed in both my book (pp. 303–15, 411–22, 441–42) and in a forthcoming article, "Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War," to appear in the June issue of the *American Political Science Review*. □

Racism and the Arabs

We reprint a portion of an article that was written by Eldridge Cleaver from his prison cell in California and published in the Boston Herald-American. — Eds.

Two aspects of the recent U.N. resolution labeling Zionism as racist both shocked and surprised me. Shocked because, of all the people in the world, the Jews have not only suffered particularly from racist persecution, they have done more than any other people in history to expose and condemn racism. Generations of Jewish social scientists and scholars have labored long and hard in every field of knowledge, from anthropology to psychology, to lay bare and refute all claims of racial inferiority and superiority. To condemn the Jewish survival doctrine of Zionism as racism is a travesty upon the truth.

Second, I am surprised that the Arabs would choose to establish a precedent condemning racism because it can so easily and righteously be turned against them. Having lived intimately for several years among the Arabs, I know them to be among the most racist people on earth. No one knows this better than black Africans living along the edges of the Sahara.

Once while traveling through Bamoko, Mali, a cab driver flew into a rage when we asked him to take us to the Algerian embassy. When he learned that we actually lived in Algeria, he concluded that we were crazy.

"Man," he said irritatedly, "don't you know that the Arabs still have black slaves?"

He was right, although I didn't find out until later. Many Arab families, that can afford to, keep one or two black slaves to do their menial labor. Sometimes they own an entire family. I have seen such slaves with my own eyes. Once I pressed an Algerian official for an explanation of the status of these people, and he ended up describing a complicated form of indentured servitude. The conversation broke up when I told him that it was nothing but a hypocritical form of slavery.

I have the deepest sympathy for the Palestinian people in their search for justice, but I see no net gain for freedom and human dignity in the world if power blocs, because of their ability to underwrite sagging economics for a season, are able to ram through the U.N. resolutions repugnant to human reason and historical fact.

The combination of Communist dictatorships, theocratic Arab dictatorships, and economically dependent black African dictatorships are basically united in their opposition to the democratic forces inside their own borders. This gives them a lot in common and lots of room and motivation to wheel and deal among themselves. But it is not a combination deserving of respect by people from countries enjoying democratic liberties and traditions of freedom. It is a combination that must be struggled against.

Eldridge Cleaver □

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